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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation I criticize and reconfigure the ontological framework 
within which discussions of the organization, ontogeny, and evolution of 
organic form have often been conducted.  Explanations of organismal form 
are frequently given in terms of a force or essence that exists prior to the 
organism’s life in the world.  Traits of organisms are products of the 
selective environment and the unbroken linear inheritance of genetically 
coded developmental programs.  Homological traits share unbroken vertical 
inheritance from a single common ancestor.  Species are the product of 
exclusive gene flow between conspecifics and vertical genetic inheritance.  
And likewise, race is ascribed on the basis of pre-existing essential features.   
 In place of this underlying preformationism which locates the source 
of form either in the informational program of inherited genes or within a 
selecting environment, I suggest form is the product of an organism’s self-
construction using diverse resources.  This can be understood as a 
modification of Kant’s view of organisms as self-organizing, set out in his 
Critique of Judgment (1790).  Recast from this perspective the meaning and 
reference of “trait,” “homology,” “species,” and “race” change.   
 Firstly, a trait may be the product of the organism’s self-construction 
utilizing multiple ancestral resources.  Given this, homologous traits may 
correspond in some but not all of their features or may share some but not 
all of their ancestral sources.  Homology may be partial.  Species may 
acquire epigenetic, cellular, behavioural, and ecological resources both 
vertically and horizontally.  As such, they are best conceived of as recurrent 
successions of self-constructed and reconstructed life cycles of organisms 
sharing similar resources, a similar habitus, similar capacities for 
sustaining themselves, and repeated generative processes.  Lastly, race 
identity is not preformed but within the control of human organisms as 
agents who self-construct, interpret, and ascribe their own race identities 
utilizing diverse sets of dynamic relationships, lived experiences, and 
histories.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
There is no denying the impressive achievements of genetics, genomics, and 
evolutionary biology since the discovery of the structure of DNA and the 
insights revealed by the many genome sequencing projects.  Yet these 
achievements are often framed using the metaphors of development as the 
unfolding of a genetic program and of the environment as something that 
moulds organisms over time.  I criticize philosophical commitments that 
some work on biology imputes to these widely-used metaphors.  I do not 
criticize biological research, only the interpretation of the metaphors 
employed in describing that research.  I introduce a new philosophical 
perspective employing different metaphors that allows for a clearer 
understanding of biology.  In this introductory chapter I discuss the 
background against which the thesis is written.  
In section one I argue that describing an organism’s ontogeny using 
the metaphor of an unfolding program and describing evolution using the 
metaphor of the environment’s moulding organisms over generations 
involves a commitment to versions of preformationism.  In section two I 
introduce an organism-centred alternative.  In section three I summarize 
the chapters that follow. 
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1.1 TWO METAPHORS:  ONTOGENY AS UNFOLDING AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT AS MOULDING 
 
 Different species exhibit different forms and behaviours.  In the 
Origin of Species, Charles Darwin explains these differences as the 
outcomes of external factors in the environment which cause changes to the 
form of the organism over many generations which result in its being better 
fitted to its environment.  This explains variation between species in terms 
of their phylogenetic history; the form of different species is determined by 
their different selection histories.  According to Gregor Mendel, the 
variation between individual organisms within the same species is the 
result of internal factors which are passed from one generation to the next.  
This explains why organisms develop with the characteristics that they do.  
 One current presentation of evolutionary biology combines elements 
of these two accounts—Darwin’s theory of variation under natural selection 
and Mendel’s segregation of inherited factors—with population genetics.  
There are two different metaphors in play:  development as the unfolding of 
the form contained in the genes and the environment as shaping the form of 
organisms over time (Lewontin 2001: 59-60).  These metaphors pick out 
kinds of abstract processes; those of unfolding and shaping.          
 This combined perspective will be referred to as the neo-Darwinian 
approach.  It understands organismal evolution and development to be 
principally gene-driven.  For instance, Richard Dawkins (1989) takes genes 
to be both ontologically and explanatorily most important with respect to 
variation and evolutionary change.  On his view, genes are “selfish” in their 
pursuit to replicate themselves.  They are “immortal replicators” because 
they survive the demise of the individual organism, organisms are merely 
the transient vehicles the genes use for their own replication.  Genes are the 
source of the continuity of form across generations that we see in the 
biological world.   
 Another example of this view is that of Ernst Mayr.  Mayr (1982) uses 
the metaphor of a “genetic program” that controls the development and 
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organization of organisms:  “the activity of an orchestra … is just as much 
controlled by the score as the development of an organism is controlled by 
its genetic program” (Mayr 1968: 379).   
 This gene-centred perspective on organismal ontogeny is based on a 
dualism which separates the organizational form of the organism from the 
physical matter of the organism.  The metaphors of genetic program, genetic 
code, and blueprint used to describe explanations of form and development 
suggest that the form of organisms pre-exists within their genes.  Genes 
encode and transmit the phenotypic form of an organism from one 
generation to the next.  The genes inherited in each generation contain the 
information which organizes the matter of organisms.  The matter is passive 
and acted upon from within by the organizing force of the genes.  Encoded 
information about the organism’s form exists in its genes; it is the 
preformed form—the information in the genes which unfolds during the 
development of the organism.   
 Although present in the writings of René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, 
Karl Nägeli, and Wilhelm His (Fisher 2006: 103-123), this dualist 
perspective is particularly striking in August Weismann’s work (1885, 1893, 
cf. Moss 2003: Ch. 1).  Weismann distinguishes the organism’s form, which 
is contained in the chromosomes within the nuclei of the germ plasm, from 
the material constitution of its body, made up of the somatoplasm.  
According to Weismann, the germ plasm and somatoplasm belong to two 
“distinct spheres.”  The form of the organism is contained and transmitted 
only within the germ cells from one generation to the next:  “the essence of 
heredity is the transmission of a nuclear substance [contained in] the germ 
plasm” (Weismann 1885: 65).  This means that although somatic cells 
participate in the development of the organism, they are tied to the 
mortality of the organism.  Unlike the information contained in the germ 
cells which is inherited in each generation, characteristics which are 
acquired in the soma of the organism over its lifetime cannot be inherited 
(Weismann 1885).  Weismann’s dualist perspective holds that organismal 
form is conceived as both ontologically and ontogenetically prior to the 
biological matter of organisms.   
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 On this perspective, what makes an organism the kind of organism it 
is (e.g. what makes a fox a fox) is its form, not its matter.  To understand 
what makes a fox a fox means understanding the directive activities of its 
germ cells which are the source of its form.  In addition to seeming to 
provide an explanation of what makes a fox a fox, conceiving organisms in 
terms of a dualism of form and matter means that one can explain why 
organisms produce offspring which look and behave like their parents (e.g. 
why foxes produce foxes and not donkeys or butterflies).  Foxes inherit their 
form from the nuclear elements within the germ cells, which are passed on 
to them during reproduction from their parents, which in turn inherited 
their form in the same way from their parents.  
 This neo-Darwinian gene-centred view of the ontogeny of organisms 
trades heavily on such metaphors as information, code, and program.  We 
may ask what notion of information is being appealed to in these metaphors.  
It cannot be the notion found in Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory of 
communication.  Shannon (1948) went to great pains to expunge any 
semantic meaning from his theory.  Information was exclusively understood 
as, 
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a 
message selected at another point.  Frequently the messages have 
meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some 
system with certain physical or conceptual entities.  These 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the 
engineering problem.  The significant aspect is that the actual 
message is one selected from a set of possible messages (Shannon, 
as quoted in Kay 2000: 96).   
 
So, the notion of information appealed to must be a semantic one.  Genes are 
conceived of as transmitting information with semantic content.  
Information has semantic content insofar as it encodes a meaningful 
message (this view has been supported by Sterelny, Smith, and Dickinson 
1996, and criticized by Godfrey-Smith 2000, Moss 1992, 2003).   
 According to the gene-centred view of ontogeny, genes are not just 
parts of DNA molecules that play an important role in making proteins, 
they code for the traits of organisms and determine their development; they 
are therefore appropriately described as the text of the so-called book of life.    
 13
 Understanding genes as uniquely coding for traits involves taking 
genes to be the main source of information necessary for their development.  
However, it is not clear why it is only genes and not any other epigenetic or 
environmental factors which play a significant role in development.  There 
seems to be no metaphysical basis that may be used to justify the 
privileging of one type of cause as primary and another type of cause as 
background.  Whether one privileges genes over other factors is determined 
by one’s interest.  Instead, there is a “causal parity” among many different 
kinds of causes and influences (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 195).  That is, 
organismal development is the result of a number of causes which include 
but are not limited to genetic causes.  Different influences might include 
cellular, metabolic, climatic etc. influences and those that result from 
intraspecies (e.g. siblings, mates, parents) and interspecies (e.g. predators, 
prey, bacteria, viruses, endosymbionts) interactions. 
 The second metaphor is that of the environment as shaping the forms 
of organisms over genealogical history.  This metaphor is appealed to when 
describing selection and adaptation.  Adaptation is often understood in 
terms of the action of natural selection as moulding a species to fit 
particular conditions within an external environment.  The external factors 
which mould and adapt the organism’s form to the environment exist within 
the ecological niche prior to the organism’s occupation of it.  The metaphor 
of the environment moulding or shaping organisms relies on the pre-
existence of an ecological niche which shapes the organisms within it.  
According to Leigh Van Valen (1986), information is contained not just in 
the genes, but also in the environment.  Differences in “environmental 
variables produce different phenotypes (or none at all) just as do differences 
in DNA sequences.  Therefore information resides in the environment as 
well as in the genome” (Van Valen 1986: 67).  The information in the 
environment moulds organisms to fit the requirements of living within that 
niche; e.g. environmental information such as the presence of thalidomide, 
overpopulation, or the scarcity of nutritional sources moulds the organism 
by inhibiting growth, or increasing aggressive behaviours.  Constant 
changes in the environment mean that species are continuously adapting, 
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trying to keep up with these changes (Van Valen 1973).  The upshot of this 
view is that ecological niches are understood to be autonomous entities; able 
to be defined without any reference to the organisms which live within 
them.  This has lead to the use of such phrases as a “vacant niche” (for 
criticisms of this view see Griffiths and Gray 2001). 
 Both metaphors—ontogeny as an unfolding of an internal program 
and the external environment as something that moulds organisms over 
time—involve preformationist commitments.  The view that the genes 
contain information about the form of organisms prior to their development 
is conceptually analogous to the view that organismal form arises from the 
divine designing power of God, and the view that organismal form is 
contained in a pre-formed homunculus (Oyama 2000: 55-83).   
 Likewise, the metaphor of the environment as something that moulds 
organisms is also committed to preformationism.  The preformationism of 
the metaphor of development as unfolding consists in the prefiguring of 
organismal form within the genes.  In contrast, the preformationism of the 
metaphor of the environment moulding organisms consists in conceiving the 
environment as independently specifiable from the organism.  The 
information within environmental niches can be described without reference 
to organisms (Griffiths and Gray 2001).  This information determines the 
form of an organism prior to the mode of living or career of organisms within 
it.  In this sense, explanations of why organisms evolve as they do can be 
described using the metaphor of the environment’s selecting certain 
characteristics of organisms to fit within it. 
  One might think that what has been referred to as the interactionist 
consensus (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 99) or conventional interactionism 
(Oyama 2000: 2-6) can deal with these points.  Interactionism is the view 
that organismal development is the result of the interaction of both genetic 
and extragenetic factors.  It acknowledges the important role of both in 
development.  However, interactionism still maintains a dualism between 
genes and environment as two ontologically distinct causal factors.  This 
kind of interactionism remains wedded to the underlying preformationism 
of the two metaphors discussed previously.  It holds that genes and 
 15
environmental niches exist prior to their interaction with each other and 
can be described independently of one another.  This is because for genes to 
interact with the environment, they must not be a product of it but must 
exist prior to the organism’s life within it.  Only by conceiving of genes as 
isolatable units can they be understood as independent factors which 
interact with the external environment.   
 The view of the biological world already mentioned, in which these 
two metaphors are combined conceives of development as the unfolding of 
information contained in the genetic program and evolutionary change over 
time as a consequence of the environment shaping organisms (cf. Dawkins 
1989, 1996; Mayr 1982; Dennett 1995).  It is this combined perspective that 
I offer an alternative to.   
 This is not to deny that this perspective has facilitated a great deal of 
scientific discovery and progress within biology and has provided helpful 
heuristics for scientists’ empirical research (Maynard Smith 1999).  
However, philosophers of biology can ask whether the metaphors of 
development as the unfolding of information contained in the genes and the 
environment as shaping organisms over time are the appropriate ones to 
use in describing organismal development and evolution. 
 Challenging Mayr’s use of the genetic program Lenny Moss does just 
that arguing: 
the self-organizing and self-developing capacity of living things 
have been projected into an abstraction called the genetic 
program which, as an informational analogue of the preformed 
homunculus, is housed in the nuclear germ of every living cell 
(Moss 1992: 345).   
 
If the genetic program is understood in this way—as a metaphor or 
heuristic, then it cannot be something that empirical science can either 
ratify or deny.  It is, in Immanuel Kant’s terminology, a regulative principle, 
(Moss 1992: 347) and as such, must not be evaluated in terms of something 
which can be judged to be true on the basis of empirical evidence, but in 
term of whether or not it aids our reflective judgment about biological 
development. 
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 Rather than viewing organisms as outcomes of the separate causal 
forces of the internal unfolding genetic blueprint and the external factors 
present in a pre-existing environmental niche, we can instead view 
organisms as being both cause and effect of their own construction within 
their environments.  Organisms are responsive to both their internal and 
external environment.  This responsiveness runs in both directions.  
According to Mary Jane West-Eberhard (2003) this sensitivity, or what she 
calls “phenotypic plasticity,” means that organisms have certain capacities 
to interact and respond in certain ways to certain genes, cells, hormones, 
parasites, offspring, parents, and other organisms, etc.  The organism’s 
genes do not orchestrate organismal development.  Genes are constrained by 
the responsiveness of the organism to other genes or extragenetic factors.  
The effects of gene action depend not only on the specificity of the genes but 
on the plasticity (the organized flexibility) of the organisms’ phenotype.  
The impact of gene expression at every stage of the life cycle 
depends on the presence of a structure susceptible to change.  
There is no stage of development in any organism without an 
organized phenotype capable in specific circumstances of some 
specific, active response (West-Eberhard 2003: 94).   
 
It is this interactive responsiveness which is necessary for both the ontogeny 
and evolution of organisms.    
 
 
1.2 AN ORGANISM-CENTRED PERSPECTIVE  
 
 Some have suggested alternative ways to understand genes, 
organismal development, variable morphology, inheritance, and evolution 
which rely on different metaphors (cf. Griffiths and Gray 1994, 2001; Ingold 
2001, 2004; Lewontin 1983, 2001; Moss 2001, 2003; Oyama 1985, 2001; and 
Taylor 1995, 2001).  Richard Lewontin (1983) and Susan Oyama (1985) 
separately suggest that we conceive of development using the metaphor of 
organismal construction.  They argue that the development of organisms is 
not best described using metaphors which locate the important source of 
causal power within the genotype.  Metaphors of blueprints and codes lead 
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one to think that there is a concentrated source of causal power which forms 
passive organisms.  This view does not deny the important role of genes in 
development, but it does deny that genes are the source of an organism’s 
form which exists prior to its development.  Taking Lewontin and Oyama’s 
metaphor of organisms as constructing themselves as a starting point, Peter 
Taylor (1995, 2001) extends this metaphor to form his own conception of 
“heterogeneous construction.”  Something is constructed heterogeneously if 
it builds itself out of diverse resources and has multiple causes.   
 The metaphor of construction can be used to describe both the 
ontogeny and the evolution of organisms.  This leads to what I call an 
“organism-centred perspective.”  Viewing development and evolution from 
this perspective does not just highlight the diversity of resources utilized in 
the organism’s self-construction.  It also provides the means to explain how 
these resources come to be the distributed causes of the organism’s form and 
behaviour.  The causes of organismal form are those resources which are 
linked together in the ontogeny of the organism.   
   What does it mean to say that an organism’s ontogeny can be 
understood using the metaphor of construction?  An organism builds itself 
using a diversity of interacting resources.  These resources include but are 
not limited to the nuclear chromosomes, cytoplasmic structures and 
organelles within the cellular membrane, cell walls and membranes, 
mitochondrial DNA, organizing areas for basal bodies and microtubules, 
DNA methylation patterns, metabolic pathways (Jablonka and Lamb 1995), 
as well as ecological, behavioural, and cultural resources.  Genes are but one 
resource which the organism uses in its construction.  The importance of the 
genes as a resource comes not from the genes themselves but from their use 
by the organism’s cells which determine what parts of the DNA count as 
genes and how these are used; e.g. there are different ways the same DNA 
molecule can be used by a cell.  Genes do not direct the ontogeny of 
organisms by the unfolding of the information contained within them.  The 
causes of organismal form are not localized in a single source—they are 
distributed over many available resources which the organism uses in its 
construction.  There are “multiple points of intervention or engagement that 
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could modify the course of development … [C]ausality and agency are 
distributed, not localized [to one cause or one resource]” (Taylor 2001: 316).   
 An organism is the product of multiple intersecting causes and 
interlinking resources which are cumulative over the organism’s lifetime.  
Organismal ontogeny is the constant process of construction and 
reconstruction.  Ontogeny as described with this metaphor means that 
organisms are continually building upon what is already constructed by 
many interlinked and intersecting processes:  “construction is polyvalent, 
things involved in one construction process are implicated in many others” 
(Taylor 1995: 307).  The development of organisms is thus a set of various 
historical contingencies where each stage depends on the causal pathways, 
processes, and resources that were utilized by the organism in a previous 
stage.   
 An analogy to the making of a suit may help.  Consider the crafting of 
a bespoke suit in a tailor’s workshop.  In the making of the suit, the 
materials for its construction, e.g. the textiles, cutting and sewing 
equipment, tape measure, and buttons are all available.  But their presence 
in the workshop does not constitute a completed suit, nor does it include all 
relevant factors which the tailor uses in making the suit.  For instance, the 
suit’s construction is constrained by the size of the client and his or her 
measurements, which styles are popular considering what time of year or 
what is in vogue at the moment, and the career of the client.  Its 
construction also depends on how material is cut, whether it is a summer or 
winter weight suit, the pattern of cloth, which part of the suit is sewn first, 
second, third, how the inside hems and tapes are stitched and whether there 
are cuffs.  Even once finished, the suit may be altered given the increasing 
girth of the client, his or her transfer to a country with different customs or 
climate, accidental damage, or the change in fashion over time.   
 The interlinking processes that lead to the construction of the suit 
from diverse resources are analogous to an organism’s own construction 
with two important exceptions.  There is no superintending master or 
mistress overseeing the construction of the organism and there are no easily 
determined boundaries where resources are located as there is with the 
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tailor’s workshop.  The resources available to the organism for its 
construction include genes, cells, intercellular pathways, gut bacteria, trees, 
shrubs, grasses, and other organisms.   
Organismal construction, like the construction of a suit, also depends 
on a contingent sequence of events, within a particular context.  How the 
organism constructs certain aspects of its ecological context affect other 
aspects of both the organism’s own construction and may contribute to the 
construction of its offspring.  An organism may change part of its 
environment; e.g. it may build nests or galls.  Many female insects help 
construct the environment of their offspring by choosing to lay her eggs on a 
particular plant which provides the habitat and nutritional source for her 
larvae.  Not only does her choice of oviposition help make the environment 
of her growing larvae, it also affects the form of the plant which is the site of 
her egg-laying (West-Eberhard 2003: 109).  For example, this is evident in 
the presence of galls on trees which develop as a result of the female or 
larvae of certain flies and wasps.  Although the insect’s oviposition is 
required for the development of a gall, some trees (e.g. oaks) are more 
susceptible to galls than others (e.g. maples or larches).  Insects do not 
construct these galls on their own.  The development of galls is contingent 
on whether a plant has a particular susceptibility to galling from certain 
insects:  “specific properties of the plant genome or environment must play a 
role too … not all [plants] are hospitable or responsive to galling insects” 
(West-Eberhard 2003: 109).  Construction of organisms and their 
environments is heterogeneously caused by many interconnected causal 
resources supplied by factors in the environment, relationships between 
parents and offspring and other species.  
 The construction of the organism, like the suit, continues even after it 
appears to be finished.  Organisms may continue to construct themselves 
and their environments over their lifetime.  They may do this by altering 
their outer appearance by dramatically changing the colour of their skin 
(chameleons) or the seasonal moulting of the fur of some arctic animals 
(arctic hares) as a means of camouflage, by migrating to another location 
(Canadian geese or flamingos), by hibernating underground (desert toads) or 
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in caves (black bears), or by altering their environment by building webs 
(spiders), dens (foxes), nests (wasps, robins), warrens (rabbits), or dams 
(beavers).  The analogy of the self-constructing organism to the tailor’s 
construction of a suit has some obvious limitations which make it, like most 
analogies, incomplete.  Although the analogy serves to highlight some 
aspects of the external construction of organisms and their niches, it 
probably fails to illuminate the nature of their internal construction and 
maintenance (e.g. the organism’s utilization of different homeostatic 
mechanisms, the organization of its molecular, metabolic, and cellular 
activities).  
  Use of the metaphor of construction is not limited to describing the 
ontogeny of organisms.  It can also be used in describing the evolution of 
organisms, variation over time and the striking suitability of organisms 
within their ecological niches.  Rather than describing the variation among 
organismal phenotypes and fit to their ecological niches as due to their 
being shaped by certain factors within the environment or selected by the 
environment, the metaphor of construction provides a new way to 
understand the evolution of organisms and their ecological niches.  It 
provides a way to understand these factors as resources which organisms 
utilize over generations.  In this way, environments do not shape or choose 
the traits of organisms, they are used by organisms in constructing 
themselves and their niches.  The causal importance of these environmental 
factors as resources comes not from the environment but from the 
organisms’ use of them:  “organisms do not adapt to their environments; 
they construct them out of the bits and pieces of the external world” 
(Lewontin 2001: 64).  Organisms actively construct their own niches 
through their interactions with both the animate and inanimate components 
of their environment and their responses to different situations.  They may 
change what is included in their ecological niche depending on what is 
available to them and what is needed.  For instance, a rattlesnake may use 
tortoise burrows as a refuge during brush fires.  Unable to dig burrows 
itself, the rattlesnake utilizes the burrows dug by the tortoise which has 
claws which allow it to dig burrows wide enough for its own protection but 
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which are also used by rattlesnakes and other animals as a refuge.  In this 
way, the tortoise’s burrows become appropriated as part of the snake’s 
ecological niche which it uses for its survival.  Organisms organize and link 
various interdependent causal resources for their own construction and the 
construction of their niche.   
 As the above example of the rattlesnake illustrates, some of the 
resources an organism inherits are not transmitted to it from its parents.  
What an organism inherits is also not limited to nucleic acids transmitted 
from one generation to the next.  Both genetic as well as extragenetic 
resources are inherited and contribute to the organism’s mode of life.  The 
inherited resources which are transmitted include genes, cellular 
interactions within their embryological environment, disease resistance 
gained from mother’s milk, intestinal endosymbionts obtained by 
coprophagy (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 195), features of their ecological 
environment (e.g. grasses, seeds, sand, bushes), the knowledge of which type 
of food is most nourishing, the system of warrens or burrows built by either 
previous generations of its own kind or by other kinds of organisms within 
its niche, and the transmission of behavioural patterns (e.g. hunting 
practices, nest building, migratory destinations).  
 The organism-centred view is an historical-ecological perspective; it 
takes ecological dynamics to underlie biological ontogeny and evolution.  
This perspective is historical because it explains current states of affairs in 
terms of a combination of organisms’ past use of contingent resources.  It is 
ecological because “all organisms live in an ecological context … 
[P]hilosophy of biology depends on some conceptualization of ecology” 
(Taylor and Haila 2001: 521).   
 Instead of locating the causal source of form internally, within the 
genes, or externally, within the selective power of the environment, the 
organism-centred perspective rejects the view common to both:  that there is 
one localized cause of organismal organization—genes in development and 
the environment in evolution.  The organism-centred perspective fleshes out 
the metaphysical consequences of taking Taylor, Oyama and Lewontin’s 
metaphor of construction seriously.   
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 There is no one privileged source which is the primary cause of an 
organism’s development.  When we say, for example, that the nest-building 
behaviour of birds is either the result of primarily genetic or environmental 
causes, we do not speak meaningfully about the causes of this behaviour.  
Rather, nest-building behaviour arises from causes distributed among 
various resources which may include genetic, environmental, acquired 
through learning or copying from observing the nest building of other 
members of its species.  Nest-building may also be “responsible for 
modifying some of the sources of natural [construction] in the environments 
that subsequently feed back to [them]” (Laland, Odling-Smee, and Feldman 
2001: 122).  The phenotype of nest-building is not simply the result of the 
one-way process of environment’s shaping phenotypes of organisms but 
rather is the result of reciprocal feedback from populations of organisms to 
their environment and back.   
 Referring to this perspective as organism-centred does not mean that 
the organism is the source of all causes of its development and form, but 
that the organism is the vantage point from which to understand and 
describe evolution, phylogeny, and ontogeny.  What it intends to pick out is 
the ontological centrality of organisms.  Organisms are ontologically central 
because it is in their use of the resources available to them that organisms 
determine what are and what are not causes of their development and 
evolution.  Organisms, rather than anything else, organize the use of the 
various resources available to them for their own development and 
evolution.   
 Before summarizing the chapters that follow, I locate the organism-
centred view with respect to developmental systems theory (DST).  DST 
does not pick out one theory but refers to a collection of theories that share 
some central commitment (see papers in Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001).  
The most widely held commitments are to the dissolution of dualist thinking 
in developmental biology (e.g. Griffiths and Gray 2001: 195, Ingold 2001: 
255-61) and to a strong antipreformationism which takes organismal form 
not to be contained in the information found within the genes (e.g. Oyama 
2000: 28-35, Moss 2003).  We can distinguish between two aspects of DST.  
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DST refers at once to both:  on the one hand the scientific theory about 
biological systems which suggests a new mode of empirical research, new 
heuristics that aid in forming testable hypotheses; and on the other a 
“philosophy of nature” that provides a new perspective, metaphors, and 
categories of thought applied to our existing empirical knowledge (Godfrey-
Smith 2001: 283-84).  Philosophy of nature in this sense, “comes after 
empirical science and tries to redescribe structures in the world that have 
already been described by the sciences” (Godfrey-Smith 2001: 284).  
Although “philosophers are at liberty to make novel empirical suggestions” 
“a good philosophy of nature makes no empirical claims that are 
inconsistent with those made in the relevant sciences” (Godfrey-Smith 2001: 
284).  It is the general philosophical perspective of DST that I espouse in 
this thesis.  Thus, the organism-centred view is a version of the 
philosophical project of DST, a philosophy of nature in the sense that Peter 
Godfrey-Smith articulates.  This approach aims to dissolve the boundaries 
between genes and environment, nature and nurture, and biology and 
culture.  It offers an alternative way of thinking about organismal 
organization, inheritance and development which does not depend on 
privileging one type of cause over another or conceiving of them as separate 
causes. 
 
 
1.3 CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
1.3.1 CHAPTER TWO:  KANTIAN ORIGINS OF THE ORGANISM-CENTRED 
VIEW 
  
 The organism-centred view is not unique in taking the organism to be 
both cause and effect of its self-organization.  The notion that the causes of 
organismal form and organismal development are circular rather than 
linear not only pre-dates Lewontin, Oyama and Taylor, it also predates 
Darwin.  It is prefigured in the Critique of Judgement (1790) in which 
Immanuel Kant argues that organisms are mutually interdependent means 
and ends of their own self-organization.   
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 In Chapter Two I discuss some of the views on biological organization 
that Kant puts forward in the Critique of Judgement.  Some of these are 
motivated by his more general metaphysical framework; however, they can 
be accepted even if we do not share his specific motivation.  Neither do we 
need to adopt Kant’s notions of biological organization wholesale.  Pre-
dating Darwin, some of them are limited in their applicability to a 
Darwinian view of evolution and so must be revised.  However, careful 
consideration of the Kantian notions of purposiveness and common 
generative capacity provides a philosophical basis for the notion of 
distributed causality that underlies Taylor’s view of organisms as 
constructed from heterogeneous resources.   
 Kant’s view of the self-organization of organisms has two central 
components:  1) purposiveness and 3) common generative capacity.  
Biological entities, in contrast to inorganic entities, have what he calls an 
internal purposiveness (zweckmässige).  This internal purposiveness is the 
organism’s directedness towards a telos.  Kant believes that we understand 
organisms as simultaneously both means and ends of their own self-
organization because we compare them to ourselves.  We understand 
ourselves as self-directed subjects, so, by analogy we understand organisms 
as self-organizing ends in themselves.  Purposiveness constitutes a 
teleological understanding of organisms in terms of their ends.   Kant 
believed that we need to use teleology as a regulative idea to understand 
biological organization:  “we use this term only to designate a kind of 
causality of nature by analogy with [our own self-directedness]” (Kant 1790: 
Ak. 384).  Teleology and mechanism are heuristics we use to study the 
biological organization (cf. Lenoir 1982).  According to Kant, we can never 
know the intrinsic purpose of nature.  “When we study nature in terms of its 
mechanism [or purposiveness], we keep to what we can observe or 
experiment on in such a way that we could produce it as nature does, at 
least in terms of similar laws; for we have complete insight only into what 
we can ourselves make and accomplish according to concepts” (Kant 1790:  
Ak. 384).     
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 The second component of organismic self-organization is common 
generative capacity.  For Kant, organisms can be grouped together in terms 
of their common generative capacity or original stock of Keime (germs) and 
Anlagen (dispositions or capacities).  All variations and modifications which 
are made to an individual and its descendants are contained in its original 
generative capacity.  In this sense, organisms cannot possess novel 
characteristics.  Kant rejects the view that the traits of organisms vary as a 
result of the selective pressure of the environment.  He holds that the 
variation in an organism’s traits is present in the original generic potential.  
This notion does not imply a preformationism of an unfolding homunculus 
which specifies the definitive set of an organism’s traits.  A shared 
generative capacity consists of a generic set of resources available to the 
organism.   
 Karl Ernst von Baer built on and extended Kant’s teleomechanist 
framework (cf. Lenoir 1982).  For von Baer, what the organism will 
ultimately become determines how it behaves and reacts over its life cycle.  
He argued that biological wholes are better understood in terms of their 
goals rather than ends.  From insight drawn from his work on embryology, 
von Baer understood biological wholes as becoming over time and 
developing towards a goal.  Against Kant, he argued that ends do not exist 
in themselves in the biological world.  They exist only as the interactive 
developmental processes of organisms towards goals.  This resulted in von 
Baer altering Kant’s conception of causation from ends (Zweck) and means 
(mittel) to goals (Ziele) and means (mittel).  Taking this revised account of 
Kant’s view means that we can conceive the purposiveness of organisms in 
terms of real phenomena of nature rather than simply heuristically.   
 I discuss how this revised Kantian approach can be interpreted as a 
distant ancestor of the organism-centred views of Oyama (2000), Taylor 
(2001), and Moss (2006).  I conclude by articulating the main claims of my 
own organism-centred view in light of these. 
In the remaining chapters I discuss how this organism-centred view 
provides a new approach to understanding the evolution and development of 
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organisms; specifically the origin of analogous and homologous traits, and a 
reconceptualization of the categories of species and race.    
 
1.3.2 CHAPTER THREE:  EXTENDING THE MEANING AND REFERENCE 
OF THE CONCEPTS OF “TRAIT” AND “HOMOLOGY” 
 
 There are longstanding debates within comparative and evolutionary 
biology about the meaning of the concept of homology.  Homology is defined 
as similarity that is due to common descent from a shared ancestor.  For 
example, although human forelimbs and cetacean flippers have different 
functions and appear to be very different, they are considered to be 
homologues because they share a common mammalian ancestor.  It is not 
this definition which is the subject of these debates but the meaning of the 
concept of homology, the criteria used for identifying instances of homology, 
and how homology is to be distinguished from analogy (c.f. Owen 1843, 
Boyden 1943, de Beer 1971, Fitch 1970, papers in Hall 1994, Jardine 1967, 
Patterson 1982, 1987, Roth 1984, 1988, Reidl 1978, Van Valen 1982, 
Wagner 1989, 2007).  Much of these debates seems to centre on whether the 
common descent from a shared ancestor is broken or unbroken.  Broken 
ancestry refers to the absence of the similarity in some generations, e.g. 
recurrent traits (West-Eberhard 2003: Ch. 19) or latent phenotypes (de Beer 
1971, Roth 1984).  Unbroken ancestry requires the similarity to appear in 
every generation (Hennig 1966, Patterson 1982, 1987).  But recent 
discussions have highlighted the fact that the traits which are compared as 
homologous are rarely exactly the same trait from one generation to the 
next.  For instance, the same traits in different organisms may share 
similar cellular or developmental processes but utilize different genes.  
Many traits which are not considered to be completely homologous may in 
fact be the result of different recombined elements which have been 
inherited from more than one ancestral trait (Minelli 2003, West-Eberhard 
2003).  This has led to the controversial suggestion that if we want our 
conception of homology to reflect this mixed ancestry, it should be extended 
to include partial, combinatorial and mixed homologies (Sattler 1986, 
Minelli 2003, and West-Eberhard 2003 respectively).  In this chapter I argue 
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that once we recognize that traits are constructed from multiple resources, 
we will welcome these extensions to our conception of homology.  
 Homology may be contrasted with analogy.  Analogy is typically 
defined as similarity which is due not to shared ancestry but rather to the 
result of processes such as convergent evolution; e.g. bat wings and bird 
wings have the same function and appear similar but are considered to be 
analogues because the wings of birds and wings of bats evolved 
independently—the former from reptilian ancestry, the latter from 
mammalian ancestry.  A human’s arm is homologous with a whale’s flipper 
because these two organisms share a common ancestor from which both 
have inherited the same forelimb structure.  What Richard Owen (1843: 
374-79) calls “the same organ” was later described by Darwin (1859: 435-38) 
as the sameness of structure due to descent from an equivalent structure in 
the common ancestor.  But what does saying that a human arm and a 
whale’s flipper are the same structure, or have remained relatively 
continuous (with obvious modifications in each organism), mean?  It means 
that whales and humans have inherited from a common ancestor an 
arrangement of bones in their respective forelimbs that are isomorphic to 
one another.  The positions of the human’s phalanges, metacarpals, radius, 
ulna, and humerus are isomorphic to the positions of the same bones in the 
whale’s flipper.  This is not the case with respect to the wings of bats and 
the wings of birds:  the bat’s wing consists of thinly stretched skin between 
its digits (metacarpals and phalanges) whereas the bird’s wing is made up of 
hollow bones (humerus, ulna and radius) and primary and secondary flight 
feathers.  That is, the bat is kept aloft by the collapsible umbrella-effect of 
the thin skin stretched between its fingers, while the bird’s flight is 
facilitated by its light bones and the air resistance of its feathers (Owen 
1849: 7-8). 
 Using the metaphor of the selecting and moulding environment, 
convergence is described as the cause of the analogous wing structures of 
birds and bats.  These wings represent similar solutions to the problem of 
flight posed by the pre-existing aerial environment.  The environment 
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moulds organismal traits and causes the striking similarities between bat 
wings and bird wings. 
 According to the organism-centred view, birds and bats construct 
themselves in ways which allows them to traverse their environment by 
producing wing structures which provide wind resistance and facilitate 
propulsion through air, enabling them to glide and fly.  The wings are 
analogous because both bats and birds are subject to the same constraints, 
namely gravity, atmospheric pressure, and wind resistance.  This means 
that if their bodies are a certain weight and size, they must construct wings 
having a certain length and breadth if they are to be aerodynamic.  The 
wings of birds and bats are similar, not because they have both been 
moulded by similar pre-existing niches but because both have similar 
resources and are subject to the same physical constraints in their self-
construction.  This provides an alternative to the metaphor of the moulding 
environment which takes the causal source of wing development to come 
from the pre-existing environmental niche of both birds and bats which 
selects and shapes the morphology of wings to fit the environment.  The 
organism-centred view takes there to be multiple sources of wing 
development which include the physical constraints of flying, the difference 
in air pressure of high flying birds and cave dwelling bats among the 
resources which are used in both birds’ and bats’ wing development.  The 
birds’ and bats’ environmental niches do not pre-exist them.  The organism 
co-constructs itself and its niche over many generations. 
 It may seem fanciful to say that organisms construct themselves and 
their environments over evolutionary time.  But this impression arises from 
a misinterpretation of the metaphor of trait construction as conceiving of 
traits as being built de novo within a limitless space of possibilities.  This is 
not what trait construction implies.  Bats cannot build gossamer propellers 
or brocade zeppelins attached to their feet to carry themselves through the 
air.  Trait construction occurs within a confined possibility space, partially 
restricted by the physical laws of nature such as gravity, the available 
resources in the environment, nutrition, limitations of bone mass, tissue 
thickness, and organism’s genetic and extragenetic resources.   
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 Homologues and analogues are traditionally believed to arise from 
two completely separate and non-interacting processes:  shared ancestry 
and convergent evolution respectively (c.f. Hennig 1966, Patterson 1982, 
1987, papers in Hall 1994).  Homologues are important in determining how 
closely two individuals are related because homologous traits are 
understood to be conserved from one generation to the next.  Two 
individuals that possess homologous traits share a common ancestor from 
which each has inherited this trait via an unbroken (or “linear”) route from 
the ancestral generation.  This is obviously an oversimplified account of the 
conservation of homologues as it is strictly incorrect to say that the same 
trait is conserved and passed down from one generation to the next.  
Organisms are constructed in each generation—so what is retained or 
conserved has been the subject of much debate within the study of homology 
and philosophy of biology (Hall 1994, Griffiths 2007, Love 2007).  While 
some believe that the conservation of homologues depends on the organism’s 
genetic inheritance (Hillis 1994), others believe it depends on the organism’s 
structural morphology (Owen 1849, Remane 1952), while some believe it 
depends on the developmental processes and mechanisms (Gilbert and 
Bolker 2001).   
 Instead of assuming the continuity of structures from one generation 
to the next, the organism-centred view takes the generationally repeated 
structure of homologues as explicable in terms of what Taylor calls the 
“contingent outcomes of intersecting processes” (Taylor 2001: 313).  
Applying this notion of construction to the discussion of homology and 
analogy allows us to highlight the contingent processes which lead to the 
construction of homologous traits.  The continuity or conservation of 
organisms’ homologous traits over a series of ancestors and descendants can 
be explained as the result of these organisms’ use of similar genetic, 
behavioural, and environmental resources in its construction.  
Understanding traits as constructed from various resources offers a new 
way of interpreting the increasing evidence that there may be diverse routes 
leading to the same traits.  Specifically, an organism-centred view further 
illuminates what West-Eberhard (2003: 358-74) identifies as “recurrent 
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traits.”  She shows that the route from ancestor trait to descendant trait can 
be broken (e.g. traits can be absent in one generation but recur in another) 
and need not be continuous, as traditionally assumed.  This view also 
accommodates Alessandro Minelli’s (2003: 59) conception of the different 
“temporal mosaics” which include both homologous and analogous 
components.     
 The organism-centred view of traits as heterogeneously constructed 
also provides an alternative to the standard either/or thinking within 
comparative biology—that similar traits are either completely homologous 
or are not homologous at all (but may be analogous).  If an organism’s traits 
are self-constructed from multiple interacting resources under similar 
constraints, the sharp distinction between homologous and non-homologous 
traits may not be possible.  In Chapter Three I consider recent suggestions 
to extend the concepts of homology to include homologies of process as well 
as complete, partial, and combinatorial homologies and analogies.  For 
instance, if a trait is the result of a combination of different structures and 
processes, it may not be best described as completely homologous or 
completely analogous to another trait in another organism which is 
generated by a similar process but which possesses a different structure.  
Conceiving of these two organismal traits as partially homologous and 
partial analogous is a better description of their nature.   
In contrast to the standard either/or thinking about homology, I 
argue that what have been traditionally thought to be independently 
evolved structures (analogues) may actually be the result of a combination 
of various ancestral traits synthesized together to form an amalgam trait in 
the descendant.  This constructed amalgam trait is the partial descendant of 
a number of different ancestral traits.  For example, both humans and 
octopi have camera eyes.  Their eyes possess certain striking similarities of 
general structure and function.  The camera eyes of octopi and humans both 
have lenses and retinae with photoreceptors.  However, the photoreceptors 
of humans face the back of the eye, while those of octopi face the front 
(Nilsson and Pelger 1994: 56).  Some of the ontogenetic origins of octopi and 
human eyes also differ.  Whereas octopus photoreceptor cells differentiate 
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from the epidermis, those of humans differentiate from the nervous system 
(Land and Fernald 1992).  Because of these and other differences, octopi and 
human eyes are widely believed to have evolved independently rather than 
being inherited from a common ancestor (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005).  
They are thought to be analogues not homologues.   
An organism-centred view helps us make better sense of the 
similarities in structure and developmental resources found in both 
organisms.  Conceiving of octopi and human eyes as analogues and not 
homologues offers a limited description of these similarities.  There is much 
evidence suggesting the homology of the structural organization of visual 
systems in octopi and humans (Land and Fernald 1992).  Vision in humans 
and octopi is the result of light on organs which are photosensitive.  The 
retinae of both organisms use rhodopsin for photoreception.  Rhodopsin is a 
type of opsin.  Over 1000 different opsin proteins have been found in 
different animals (Terakita 2005: 213).  What is striking is that in each and 
every animal, the opsin is connected to the same 11-cis-retinal chromophore 
(Terakita 2005: 213).  The 1000+ opsins are grouped into five types or 
families; all of which are thought to share a distant common ancestor 
possessing multiple opsin types (Menon, et. al. 2001).  Apart from the deep 
homology of the opsins across a wide range of organisms, similarities in the 
neurological structure of the visual system of octopi and humans have also 
been found.  Exposure to light produces a chemical change in both octopus 
and human retinae.  This change produces voltages that are transmitted to 
the brain through a network of neurological events (Dawson 2006: 66).  In 
addition to the structural similarities in the visual systems of octopi and 
humans, eye development in both (as well as a range of other organisms 
including fruit flies) is initiated by the Pax-6 gene (Quiring et al. 1994).   
These findings reveal that distinguishing the eyes of octopi and 
humans as either homologous or analogous means ignoring certain aspects 
of their development or structure.  The organism-centred view conceives 
octopi and humans as utilizing the same resources in the construction of 
eyes in different arrangements.  Their eyes can be understood as 
homologous because the resources used in their construction are present in 
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all bilateral organisms, all of which share a common ancestor.  Put another 
way, they share a common generative capacity—a stock of Keime and 
Anlagen.  Although octopi and human eyes initially appear to be analogous, 
it is perhaps more accurate to understand them as partially homologous due 
to their use of similar tissues, genes, cells, proteins and organization of their 
visual systems, and partially analogous due to the different ontogenetic 
pathways which lead to the construction of similar outcomes.   
  This is admittedly highly controversial and may sound Lamarckian to 
some.  However, neo-Darwinists of many stripes avoid the accusation of 
being Lamarkian by maintaining a distinction between inherited traits and 
acquired traits which is not ontologically justified.  The idea that some 
organismal traits are inherited from common ancestors (through 
transmitted genetic information) while others are the result of 
environmental pressure relies on a dualist assumption that there are two 
independently specifiable sources of form, criticized above.  Considered from 
an organism-centred perspective, most identifications of homologous and 
analogous traits are more likely to be partial (Sattler 1994) or combinatorial 
(Minelli 1996, 2003) rather than completely homologous or completely 
analogous.  Traits are instead constructed from multiple resources, some 
homologous, some analogous, some neither. 
  
 
1.3.3 CHAPTER FOUR:  REINCORPORATING ONTOGENY BACK INTO A 
CONCEPTION OF SPECIES 
 
 Species have been conceived of in a number of different ways and 
there continues to be much debate concerning their nature (cf. the papers in 
Ereshefsky 1992; Claridge, Dawah and Wilson 1997; and Wilson 1999).  
Although frequently criticized, Mayr’s biological species concept (BSC) 
remains the one to which other conceptions are compared.  Mayr defines 
species as groups of interbreeding or potentially interbreeding organisms 
that share a gene pool.  Species are populations of organisms that are 
genetically and reproductively isolated from members of other populations.  
According to the BSC, species are sharply separated from one another.  
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They are “protected gene pools” (Mayr 1992: 24).  The environment provides 
the usual conditions that facilitate the exclusive interbreeding among 
individuals that share the same gene pool.  Species separateness is ensured 
by “isolating mechanisms” which “protect [the species] from harmful gene 
flow from other gene pools” (Mayr 1992: 17).  He cites hybridization and 
horizontal gene transfer as examples of the kind of harmful gene flow which 
breaches species boundaries and threatens species separateness.  Mayr 
argues that “species have reality and an internal genetic cohesion owing to 
the … evolved genetic program that is shared by all members of the species” 
(Mayr 1992: 17).  The central criterion for species membership is genetic.  A 
“species is a genetic unit consisting of a large intercommunicating gene 
pool” (Mayr 1992: 17).    
 In Chapter Four, I contrast the gene-centred BSC with a new 
ecological perspective on species that combines consideration of an 
historical-ecological view of species found in the early writings of Georges-
Louis Leclerc, the Comte de Buffon (1744-1749) with the notion of 
heterogeneous construction from Taylor (2001).  Buffon claims that a species 
is the succession of individual organisms each of which constructs itself 
within its life cycle according to a particular form of life.  Individual life 
cycles of organisms are materially connected with each other by a series of 
repeatedly generated developmental processes.  This meant that a species is 
the physical and temporal series of individual organisms which shares a 
capacity for sustaining themselves in a particular way within their 
environmental context (Buffon 1749).  He argues that species are not 
defined in terms of shared morphology but on the basis of their way of life.  
Buffon is one of the earliest thinkers to emphasize the role of behaviour, 
climate, environment, and nutrition in determining species habitat.  He 
believes that to understand a species, one must consider the morphology, 
internal activities (e.g. digestion), external activities (e.g. locomotion), and 
the mode of living (habitus) of the members (organisms) of the species 
within their environment.    
 The organism-centred view of species combines Buffon’s historical-
ecological view of species with Taylor’s metaphor of the heterogeneous 
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construction of organisms.  On this view we can reconceive species as the 
recurrent succession of self-constructed and reconstructed organismal life 
cycles embedded in particular ecological contexts.  Species are collections of 
organisms that use the same resources in the same way in their 
development.  I do not discuss whether on this view species are 
epiphenomenal or not.   
 This organism-centred approach is historical insofar as it takes 
species to be understood as a recurrent succession of organisms; it is 
constructive insofar as it denies that the environmental niche and the form 
of species is preformed but is instead the outcome of ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic processes of organisms in the world.  A phenotypic trait of 
species A may cause changes to its environment.  These changes may 
provide resources that are used in the natural construction of subsequent 
generations of species A.  These changes may then affect the phenotypes 
and genotypes of organisms within species A.  For instance, a phenotypic 
trait of beavers is that they build dams.  Dams change the beavers’ 
environment by changing the depth and course of the river in which it is 
built.  The dam may cause the water to pool into a small pond.  This 
provides a new resource that the beavers which built the dam, as well as 
other organisms (e.g. plants, birds, fish, newts), may use in the construction 
of their environment.  The dam and the pond may be inherited by later 
generations of beavers thus affecting the resources available to them, as 
well as other organisms, for the construction of themselves and their niche.   
 This historical-ecological perspective holds that a species is not best 
understood using Mayr’s notion of species as a protected gene pool 
maintained by a stable environment.  Instead, a species is ecologically 
embedded within a dynamic environment.  A species is ecologically 
embedded insofar as its situation within the environment is the result of 
interconnected relationships, e.g. relationships of inheritance, interactions 
with conspecifics, learned behaviours, and relationships with other 
resources within its ecological niche such as prey and predators, trees, lakes 
and rocks.  According to Taylor, the ecological structure (of species) has a 
history. 
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To say that the ecological structure has a history … [is to say 
that] it changes in structure and is subject to contingent, spatially 
located events, while at the same time the structure constrains 
and facilitates the living activity that constitute and ecological 
phenomenon in its particular place (Taylor and Haila 2001: 526).  
  
A species is the constructive outcome of a contingent historical sequence of 
past resources and relationships.  
 Rather than being understood primarily as groups of interbreeding 
organisms that share a gene pool, this alternative perspective allows us to 
understand species as sequences of dynamic ecologically embedded 
populations that share similar resources in constructing and reconstructing 
themselves generation after generation.  On this view, the shared gene pool 
is one of many resources the species uses in its contingent historical 
construction and reconstruction over each generation.  
 Some members of some species may hybridize or horizontally transfer 
genes across species boundaries.  They may utilize the genes acquired from 
the gene pools of other species.  Although not widespread, there is much 
evidence within zoology, botany and microbiology of regular hybridization 
and non-vertical gene transfer between organisms of different species, for 
example ducks (Mallet 2005), flowering plants, and grasses (Stace 1975).  
Rather than viewing hybridization, as the BSC does (Mayr 1992), as a 
detrimental breach of species boundaries threatening species separateness, 
the organism-centred view describes hybridization as providing another 
resource that may be used by a species’ members in their self-construction.  
If we use the metaphor of heterogeneous construction to reinterpret the 
conception of species, we can conceive of the permeability of species 
boundaries as allowing organisms access to a wider pool of genetic 
resources.  For instance, hybridization has allowed members of one South 
American species of butterflies (Heliconius cydno) to mimic the phenotypes 
of the members of two different species (Heliconius sapho and Heliconius 
eleuchia).  This means that it allows H. cydno butterflies to avoid being 
eaten by birds that have developed an aversion to eating the foul-tasting H. 
sapho and H. eleuchia   (Mallet 2005, 2007).  The colour pattern of these 
butterflies is the result of a number of resources including the behaviour of 
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predators, the rate of development of the structure of scales on their wings, 
the expression of pigment, and their genes (Janssen, et. al. 2001: 415).  
 According to the organism-centred view of species, the co-construction 
of a species’ members and their environment is the result of the interplay of 
a wide variety of resources.  These resources may take many forms, for 
example the genetic inheritance from the offspring’s parents, horizontally 
transferred islands of pathogenicity between different species of bacteria, a 
female insect’s choice of oviposition for the environment of her developing 
larvae, disease resistance of the mother that is supplied in her milk passed 
on to her own (or another’s) infant, the acquisition of symbionts and 
intestinal bacteria after the infant’s birth from its parents’ regurgitant or 
faecal matter, the ecological inheritance of burrows, nests or treeless 
moorland constructed by previous generations, or the transfer of 
behavioural patterns within a community (e.g. nut burying and retrieval in 
squirrels, foraging behaviour in finches, the waggledance of honey bees).  
The members of one species may also utilize resources from different 
species.  For example, the tadpoles of spadefoot toads (Scaphiopus 
multiplicatus) begin life as omnivores, but when they ingest the thyroid 
hormone of their main food source, various species of algae and pond 
detritus (containing bits of shellfish), they develop a more carnivorous 
morphology.  The thyroid hormone affects the prey as well as the predator.  
S. multiplicatus has evolved in such a way that the ingestion of this 
hormone contributes to the development of a carnivorous morphology 
allowing it to feed on small animals such as shrimp (West-Eberhard 2003: 
111).  
 The members of a species are the organisms which share similar 
resources, a similar habitus, a similar capacity for sustaining themselves 
and a repeated generative process.  Whereas the BSC assumes that the 
members of a species form a cohesive unit because they share a gene pool, 
the organism-centred view redescribes species as a contingent succession of 
individual organisms each of which reconstructs itself within its life cycle.   
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1.3.4 CHAPTER FIVE:  RE-CONSTRUCTING RACIAL IDENTITY  
 
 Taking the organism-centred view and its dissolution of the 
dichotomous thinking which separates form from matter, biology from 
culture, and nature from nurture has significant implications not only for 
the so-called biological concepts of homology, analogy, and species, but also 
for those which have been separately partitioned as the so-called social 
scientific concepts.  In Chapter Five, I consider what effect this view has on 
the various conceptions of race.  Historically, “race” has been used to group 
people on the basis of many different kinds of criteria, e.g. their morphology, 
religion, cultural heritage, geographical origin, language, and more recently, 
genes.   
 To avoid the racist thinking based on the preponderance of theories 
available at the time, which held cultural differences to be the result of pre-
determined factors in one’s biology, Franz Boas (1940: 65) explicitly 
separated conceptions of race into the “biological” and the “cultural.”  
Conceptions of race have been traditionally grouped into two different 
categories depending on whether they employ criteria from the putatively 
natural sciences (e.g. morphological, genetic, biomedical) or the putatively 
social sciences (e.g. cultural, behavioural, familial).  The dichotomy of the 
natural scientific-centred race conceptions and the social scientific-centred 
race conceptions often results in one set of criteria being privileged over the 
other.  Within different conceptions of race there have also been suggestions 
that there is interaction between what is considered natural and what is 
considered social.  An interactionist conception of race holds that humans 
possess characteristics of two distinct kinds—cultural and biological—that 
interact with one another.  So the cause of racial features of human 
populations is understood in terms of percentages, e.g. racial characteristic 
X is 30% biologically and 70% sociologically caused.  This means that 30% of 
the differences within members of a population are due to biological effects 
and 70% due to sociological effects.  These are two different causes of the 
variation within populations—not within individual organisms.  The 
interactionists using this kind of statistical distinction maintain the 
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ontological distinction between environmental and biological causes as 
separate and independent sources of racial differences. 
 Boas separated the biological from the cultural in order to avoid the 
racist conclusions of his contemporaries who purported to show that racial 
differences are correlated with biological differences (e.g. differences in 
intelligence or athletic ability).  Such worries still arise from publications 
such as The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).  However, as Tim 
Ingold (2001: 260) argues, what is incorrect about making such conclusions 
is not that race or culture may have a biological basis.  Biological factors 
such as nutrition, mode of living, environmental distresses caused by aridly 
or frigidly inhospitable climates, the isolation from other people in rural 
communities, or the following of a vegetarian diet on the basis of one’s 
religion are widely considered legitimate contributing causes of cultural 
differences.  What must be avoided is the racist implication that arises from 
the attribution of “cultural characteristics to the influence of genetic 
inheritance” (IUAES 1996: 19-20, as cited by Ingold 2001: 259).  What is 
incorrect is not the use of biological factors to understand cultural 
differences per se, but rather conceiving of those biological factors as 
genetically inherited.  The problem with thinking that cultural 
characteristics are genetically inherited lies in conceiving of one’s genetic 
inheritance as causally most important and cultural characteristics as being 
simply the result of the unfolding preformed program contained in a 
person’s genes.  This is not to say that people do not inherit genes from their 
parents; obviously they do.  But genes do not contain a pre-existing program 
which specifies the racial form of humans.  Rather, they are stretches of 
DNA that are resources used by the organism within its ecologically 
embedded developmental process of construction.   
 According to the organism-centred perspective, the form a human 
being takes is dependent not on the preformed code contained in her genes 
but rather on her own self-organized development.  The organism-centred 
view conceives of the biological as including a whole range of factors, 
including nutrition, behaviour, mode of living, and ecology rather than just 
genetic factors.  This perspective takes inspiration from Ingold’s (2001, 
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2004) conception of humans as “organism-persons” making themselves 
within their world.  Humans are not organisms plus culture or organisms 
plus social interactions or organisms plus language ability—humans are 
organisms without remainder.   
Considering human organisms from this point of view means that our 
putative cultural, biological, and behavioural aspects are all aspects of our 
being organism-persons.  Humans, like other organisms, are understood in 
terms of their mode of living or habitus.  A human-organism’s habitus 
within a particular ecology includes various aspects of how she lives, e.g. her 
racial and gender identity, language, religious and political beliefs, practices 
and rituals which affect methods of slaughtering or cooking animals, 
farming, land ownership, lending schemes, marital customs, familial 
groupings, etc.  The conception of an organism-centred human habitus, or 
one’s situatedness within the world, is not one which has been clearly 
articulated in the West.  But the concept of tahna, as it is used in southern 
Thailand, comes close.  Tahna refers to “the functional cultural capital of 
each person and expands in a close-knit way into community culture, 
varying with the forces of nature and of power base in a correlation of 
circumstance, place, and time” (Pongpaiboon 2004: 10).  In this chapter, I 
use Ingold’s conception of humans as organism-persons to defend an 
alternative conception of race which does not separate the natural and social 
aspects of humans.  This view combines Ingold’s conception of organismal 
personhood with Taylor’s conception of heterogeneous construction.   
 The organism-centred view is an alternative to a preformationist 
perspective of race which sees characteristics and behaviours as the 
unfolding of pre-existing information contained in the genes passed down 
from one generation to the next.  Within discussions concerning the concept 
of race, this preformationist view takes the form of the widely held Western 
conception of race as determined by one’s parents.  That is, we “assign 
people to races in a way that is governed by the rule:  if your parents are of 
the same race, you’re of the same race as your parents” (Appiah 2006: 364).  
But this is an incomplete notion of race.  There is much that is not included 
if one restricts one’s criteria of racial membership or identity exclusively to 
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ancestral relationships.  These do not provide us with any information about 
familial relationships apart from reproductive ones.  For instance, they do 
not tell us whether parents live in close proximity to offspring, live halfway 
across the world from one or more of their offspring, whether parents and 
offspring live in families with steps, adoptive children, unrelated friends or 
partners of one or both parents, or have even met one another.  Using 
ancestral relatedness as the crucial criterion of racial membership or 
identity between the race of the parent and offspring is thought to pick out a 
direct route of inheritance and therefore of morphological and cultural 
characteristics.  This relies on a preformationist conception of race as 
contained within one’s genes and transmitted from parent to offspring.  
Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) highlights how this conception is based on a 
view of race that is “essentialized” or determined.  This view takes the fact 
that children inherit their genes from their parents as evidence that racial 
identities are passed on within this genetic inheritance.  Relying on purely 
genealogical or genetic criteria for race membership and identity 
unjustifiably privileges ancestral relationships over all other kinds of 
relationships.  Fixing one’s racial identity in one’s genealogy relies on 
viewing ones’ genealogy as the preformed source of ones’ racial 
characteristics that exists prior to one’s life.  This is a preformationist 
conception of race that explains racial continuity between generations as 
ensured by the identity of genes in parents and offspring.   
 The organism-centred view offers an alternative to this 
preformationist notion of race.  According to this alternative, our identity is 
not pre-determined by our genes or morphology, and does not pre-exist in 
the environment—it does not exist prior to our life in the world.  We are 
embedded within the world that we construct ourselves and in the histories 
we share.  This view brings together the heterogeneity of self-construction 
from Taylor with a sociohistorical conception of race from W. E. B. Du Bois 
(1897).  This results in understanding racial identity as a process of 
development within a web of relationships with other human organisms 
who share a common history and similar problems, as well as different 
genetic and extragenetic resources that may include but are not restricted to 
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one’s parents, culture, religion, language, or way of living within a 
particular ecology.   
Racial identity, like the other concepts discussed, is the outcome of 
heterogeneous self-construction.  Unlike the other concepts, this 
construction centres on the self-interpretation of human organisms 
themselves.  A human organism self-reflectively constructs her racial 
identity utilizing and interpreting the different resources available to her, 
including her genetic, developmental, familial, cultural, geographical, 
community, and political resources (amongst others).  This means she is 
responsible for both the organization of resources in constructing or 
reconstructing her identity and also for choosing and interpreting what 
contributes to her identity.  This does not mean that race is an inevitable 
source of identity.  An individual may choose not to identify herself with any 
racial group.  However, if a person does, she uses various resources which 
may include her morphological features, familial relationships, and 
community relationships to form her identity.  She may choose to straighten 
or plait her hair, participate in community groups, listen to a particular 
form of music, speak the language of her parents or adopt the vernacular of 
her peers.  She may have her mother’s hair, but this does not mean that she 
necessarily identifies herself in the same way her mother does when it 
comes to her racial identity.  Information about a person’s race does not pre-
exist within her genetic information inherited from her parents.  It is not 
pre-determined by her genes; neither does it pre-exist in her morphological 
traits—it is self-made.  A person may have some of the same morphological 
traits as her parents but this does not necessarily mean that she has the 
same racial identity as they or her siblings have.  This is because the 
physical similarity or identity of a person’s morphological traits or genes to 
those of her parents is not equivalent to her personal racial identity. 
Not only does an organism-centred view explain the similarity 
between parents and offspring in terms of their contingent use of similar 
resources, e.g. similar genes, similar traits, similar development, and 
similar relationships with other people or organizations used to construct 
their own racial identities in similar ecological contexts, it also provides a 
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way to understand multiraciality.  Instead of relying on conceptions of race 
that demarcate race in terms of “pure lines,” this view conceives race 
without assuming identity is homogeneously experienced.  In focusing on 
the individual as the centre of his or her own racial self-ascription, it easily 
accommodates such identities as discussed by Linda Alcoff’s (1995) in 
“Mestizo Identity.” 
         What is considered a significant identifier of one’s race is what is 
thought by a particular person or group at a particular time to be indicative 
of race.  The attempt to fix a definitive set of either natural scientific or 
social scientific criteria for race fails to recognize both the self-interpretation 
involved in the construction and reconstruction of racial identity and the 
changeability of racial identity over time.  Racial identity is not static.  Its 
construction is a continuous process that does not stop.  Self-identification 
and recognition of a person’s race may change depending on where one lives, 
e.g. which country one lives in or visits, the local beliefs and activities of 
people within local and surrounding communities, and histories.  Racial 
identity is a continual construction built on what and who came before.  A 
person’s identity undergoes continual construction over her lifetime and 
depends on the changing resources and relationships which contribute to 
her self-identification.   
 The arguments within each of these chapters share the common 
philosophical perspective of the organism-centred view set out in Chapter 
Two.  However, they may each be taken as stand alone arguments that do 
not depend on accepting the arguments set forth in the others.  This over-
arching perspective provides a philosophical alternative to those based on 
metaphors of ontogeny as the unfolding of information contained in the 
genes and evolution as the environment’s moulding of organisms.  However, 
it is possible to use different perspectives to understand different aspects of 
the natural world.  One may choose to accept some but not all of my 
reformulations of the concepts of homology and analogy, species, and race.  
One might continue to use perspectives employing these preformationist 
metaphors for some while make use of the organism-centred perspective for 
others. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Kantian Origins of the Organism-centred view  
 
 
2.1 ORGANISM AND ORGANIZATION   
Our understanding of what constitutes an organism has been intimately 
tied with our understanding of organization from its initial dubbing by the 
plant morphologist, Nehemiah Grew:  
Wherefore, the Organism of a Body, although it hath nothing to 
do, in the production of Life:  Yet is necessary, that every Body 
should have its Organism, agreeable to the Species of Life, … 
wherewith it is endowed.  So as hereby to be fitted to receive from, 
and transfer unto Life, all manner of proper Motions and 
Impressions (Grew 1701, as quoted in Cheung 2006: 324).1  
 
The capitalized “Organism” refers to the natural disposition of a body to 
become organized.  One recognizes his conception of organism as following 
an Aristotelian understanding of the organization of organic living beings as 
                                                     
1  There are earlier uses of “organism” (the Latin “organismus” and “organismos”) 
in the second and fourth centuries, but these are not of interest for the purposes of 
this chapter as they do not refer to organic beings but instead to “playing an 
instrument” or “disharmonic” or “polyphonic voices” (Cheung 2006: 331-32).   
According to his comprehensive archival studies which include a series of letters 
between Lady Masham and Leibniz (1703-1716), Cheung uncovers the first 
instance of the uncapitalized “organism” clearly referring to an organic being.  In 
this correspondence, Leibniz uses the French, “organisme” interchangeably with 
“organisation,” and the Latin “organismus” to identify an organized animal body.  
Interestingly, although Lady Masham wrote in English, she used a capitalized 
version of the French “Organisme” in her letters to Leibniz.  This was three years 
after Grew’s initial dubbing of the capitalized “Organism” (Cheung 2006: 323-326).   
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the result of simultaneously formal and final causes.  It is obvious that this 
particular conception of organism is antiquated when compared with ours 
today, however there is something in it that we retain—the notion that 
organization is ineliminable to our understanding of organisms. 
 The notion that organisms are organized beings is surely 
unproblematic.  But, how do organisms become organized and what (or 
where) is the source of their organization are questions which are part of a 
long history of debates.   
 How organisms become organized during their development from 
zygote through their life cycle and how this form appears to be maintained 
from one generation to the next have been variously understood as either 
due to a gradual process over time of being formed by the action of a 
concentrated causal source of internal or external agency or the result of a 
preformed form which unfolds.  Causal sources of the organization of 
organisms have been located in an internal form contained within an 
informational program within the genes, located outside the organism in the 
consciousness of an external designer, or in the selective forces of an 
environmental niche that carefully moulds the organism to fit it.  More 
recently, a consensus has been reached that concludes it is both the 
information contained in the genes and the selective power of the 
environment which interact with each other to impart organizational form 
to the organism.  These interactionists claim  
the DNA and proteins carry instructions or a program, for the 
development of the organism; that natural selection of organisms 
alters the information in the genome; and … genomic information 
is ‘meaningful’ in that it generates an organism able to survive in 
the environment in which selection has acted (Maynard Smith 
2000: 190).   
 
 In this chapter, I outline an ontological alternative to conceiving of 
the ontogeny of an organism to the adult form as acted upon from within it 
by the directing causal forces of the genetic program and from without by 
the selective power of the environment.  In a nutshell, the view I defend 
conceives the organism not as the passive object of these internal and 
external causal forces, but as an environmentally situated self-organizing 
nexus of heterogeneous reciprocal causes.  To clearly illuminate what this 
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means requires me to reveal the philosophical lay of the land traversed to 
arrive at this view.  I do not have space for a complete exploration of the 
history of thinking about biological organization, so I will provide only a 
whistle-stop tour of the highlights.   
 In the first third of the chapter, I explore Kant’s view that the self-
organization of organisms can be understood as a response to the debates 
between the opposing views of epigenetics and preformationism.  This 
response relies heavily on Buffon’s contribution to seeing organisms as 
organizing themselves throughout their lives through the joint action of 
their organic molecules and the internal shaping of its moule intérieur.  In 
this respect, Kant’s third critique, the Critique of Judgement (1790) is seen 
as picking up in some way where Buffon left off.  It is here that he develops 
a novel view which incorporates aspects of both epigenetics and 
preformationism to form a teleological approach to biological organization.  
The generically preformed part Kant calls the “Keime,” (germs); the more 
epigenetic, “Anlagen” (dispositions and proclivities).  The second third of my 
discussion centres on what Kant calls his “regulative principles,” their use 
in understanding organisms as self-directing natural purposes, and various 
criticisms and amendments to these provided by those studying physiology, 
comparative morphology, embryology, and cytology.  The empirical studies 
greatly modified the Kantian idea of organisms as reciprocally causing their 
own organization.  In the final third of the chapter, I move to discuss how 
this Kantian approach can be interpreted as a distant ancestor of the 
organism-centred views of Oyama (2000), Taylor (2001) and Moss (2006).  I 
conclude by articulating the main claims of my own version of a neo-Kantian 
organism-centred view. 
 
 
2.1.1 GRADUALLY ACQUIRED FORM 
 
It has long been observed that different kinds of organisms have 
different forms and behaviours, and the forms and behaviours of parents are 
the same as those of their offspring.  Foxes produce foxes and oak trees 
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produce oak trees.  These observations have led to what I call the “folk 
theorem” of the generation of organic beings:  like produces like.  But what 
gives us this impression that like produces like?  Sustained interest in this 
question is still palpable today from biomedical testing that attempts to 
explain how parents “pass on” certain favourable or unfavourable genes or 
phenotypes to their offspring, to what are the essential phenotypes (or 
genotypes) of members within a particular group, e.g. the Iroquois tribe2.  
Today, this impression of like producing like still seems to demand 
explanation.  How like produces like and, more particularly what (and 
where) the causal sources of this continuity of form are, are problems which 
affect the present day accounts (e.g. Mayr’s, Maynard-Smith’s, Dawkins’ 
and Dennett’s) as much as they did the ancients’. 
How like produce like finds perhaps its earliest analysis in Aristotle’s 
On the Generation of Animals.  Providing an answer to this question 
involves revealing the source of organic form and more specifically, the 
development of biological organization.  In his discussion of the generation 
and composition of organic beings, Aristotle begins with the observation, 
“All which are produced by union of animals of the same kind generate also 
after their kind, … if like, then their parents ought to have come into being 
in the same way” (Aristotle 2007: Book 1: 1).  In this passage, it is clearly an 
explanation of this observation that like tends to produce like which 
Aristotle pursues.  On the Generation of Animals is a delightfully 
entertaining record of his detailed observations and speculations on the 
copulatory and reproductive activities of different animals.  His discussion 
of like producing like is focused in discussions of fertilization and early 
development of the sanguinea or “blooded animals.”   
Based on these observations, Aristotle conceived of the organization 
of the embryo as gradually being formed over time through the cooperative 
activities of the formal, material, efficient, and final causes.  He attributed 
the four causes to different bodily parts and fluids on the basis of their 
morphological differences and their contributions to reproduction.  For 
instance, he describes the generation of offspring to be the shaping of the 
                                                     
2 I discuss issues surrounding race and ethnicity in Chapter Five. 
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female’s catamenia (menstrual blood) by the male semen.  The offspring is 
“concocted” or divided into parts (Aristotle 2007: Book 1: 19) by the action of 
the semen on the catamenia.  The catamenia provides the material cause, 
whereas the semen provides the formal and efficient causes.  Aristotle 
likens the activity of the semen to the action of rennet on milk in the process 
of making cheese.  As the rennet causes the milk to coagulate, it splits into 
various parts (the curds and the whey).  In like fashion the semen works on 
the catamenia forming it into the parts of the animal (Aristotle 2007: Book 
1: 20).   
Similarly, the generation of an offspring from its parents is not 
initially completely formed but becomes formed.  The form of organic beings 
is not present in either the catamenia or the semen.  The form of a living 
being is, therefore, not preformed but generated gradually over time.  It is 
the result of the activities of the four causes over time.  The material, 
formal, and efficient causes are present in the union of the semen and 
catamenia where they constitute the potential that, when combined, provide 
the organic impetus or life motion needed for the generation of the offspring 
(Aristotle 2007: Book 1: 20). 
Only after their coming together, can the male semen provide the 
movement necessary to form the unformed matter provided by the female’s 
catamenia and providing the push forward to start the momentum needed 
for the continued growth of the organism.  The formal cause gradually 
develops in the organization of the organism over time through the activity 
of the efficient, material, and the final causes which directs its development 
to the fulfilment of it.  Like the other three causes, the final cause does not 
arise from outside the organism, but is present within the union of the 
catamenia and semen (Aristotle 2007: Book 1).  The final cause directs 
development through the formal and functional requirements of organisms 
according to this teleological potential.  It is that for the sake of which all 
the parts (organs, tissues, limbs) are produced. 
In this sense the final cause is both the future end state the animal 
will attain as well as the present determiner of its organization dictating the 
order in which its parts are formed in its ontogeny.  As Moss emphasizes, it 
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is the “fusion of formal and final cause within nature … that shapes and 
animates materiality from within.  Form and finality are inextricably linked 
in the living organism, and immanent in nature” (Moss 2008).  As a result, 
an organism’s organization, growth, nourishment, and its mode of living in 
the world all make sense only when they are understood as activities which 
are both shaped by and directed to its final cause. 
  
 
2.1.2 SOURCES OF FORM  
 
 Aristotle’s characterization of organisms as gradually acquiring their 
form through the activity of their four causes remained the accepted view 
until the mid-16th century (Pinto-Correia 1997).  However, in the latter part 
of the 16th and into the 17th century, an alternative to this Aristotelian view 
arose.  This view held that organismal form was neither gradually acquired 
nor inextricably linked with formal and final causes within the organism 
itself, but was preformed outside of the organism prior to its ontogeny.  
According to this preformationism, the source of generation and growth is 
due to the unfolding of a form which is already present prior to the 
organism’s organizational development.  Instead of relying on the 
simultaneity of the formal and final causes as the source of form over the 
organism’s lifetime, preformationists separated the formal from the final 
causes of organismal organization in an attempt to locate the source of form 
from without rather than within the organism itself.3  Debates were heated 
between those who retained the Aristotelian view that organic matter began 
unformed and gradually acquired its form over time and those who thought 
that organisms were already formed—their form already existing prior to 
their life in the world.    
 The most famous of these preformationist views maintained that the 
source of all succeeding generations of new life is contained within the 
                                                     
3 Moss (personal communication) suggests that much if not most of philosophy of 
biology after Aristotle can be understood in terms of later theorists either 
separating formal cause from final cause or attempting to bring them back 
together.    
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nesting of smaller and smaller organisms (in humans these are called 
“homunculi”).  This was popularly conceived of as a set of Russian 
matryoshka dolls, each of which contains a smaller and smaller figure of the 
same kind within itself.  Whereas some preformationists believed that the 
female ovum was the location of the encased homunculi (ovists), others 
believed it was the sperm (vermists).  For preformationists of both kinds, 
reproduction did not entail the generation of new life forms.  It was 
equivalent to opening up one doll to reveal a smaller doll inside.  Strictly 
speaking, offspring were not generated by the union of their parents’ ovum 
and sperm (in the case of sexually reproducing organisms).  All organisms 
were created at the same time—all humans were contained in Eve’s ova or 
Adam’s sperm (depending on whether one was an ovist or vermist), and each 
animal from the first of its kind in the Garden of Eden (cf. Pinto-Correia 
1997).  For preformationists, the final cause was located outside of 
organisms, conceived of as the intentions of the supernatural designer, God.  
Although preformationism seemed to be the theory du jour of the 17th 
century, alternatives began to arise.  One alternative that remained close to 
an Aristotelian view was the epigenetic view of William Harvey (1651).  In 
his Observations on Animal Generation (1651) Harvey retains an 
Aristotelian notion of organic organization as unformed matter which 
gradually becomes organized over time.  He understood this gradual 
formation to be the result of the action of a teleological force.  This force was 
the directive activity of something similar to an Aristotelian final cause (cf. 
Grene and Depew 2004: 96, Moss 2006).  In contrast to Harvey’s epigenesis, 
the epigenesis of Descartes relied on mechanical principles rather than 
either a teleological force or a vital force.4, 5  Like Harvey, Descartes also 
drew on Aristotle’s explanations of reproduction in the sanguinea in On the 
                                                     
4 In addition to his notion of teleological force, Harvey also used mechanical 
descriptions of organic functions such as his description of the heart beating in 
terms of the shooting of a gun.  His appeal to machines was used to illuminate the 
internal purposes of organisms.  He did not suggest that the heart’s beating 
followed the rules of mechanics (Harvey 1847: 31-32).  
5 The notion of a vital force (life force) was employed by some epigeneticists as a 
unique force organisms possess by virtue of being alive.  Harvey’s teleological force 
was, and continues to be frequently and inaccurately misconstrued as requiring a 
commitment to a vital force.  Vinci and Robert (in preparation) make this point.   
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Generation of Animals.  But whereas Harvey retained the notion of formal 
and final cause, Descartes discarded these, only retaining the notion of 
material and efficient cause.  Using these, Descartes understood the gradual 
generation of organisms to be due to a linear series of mechanical 
movements of matter, one following the next.  
To understand these movements mechanically meant to understand 
them as one would the events necessary to explain the action of playing 
middle C on a standard 88 key piano, i.e. if you depress the white key just to 
the left of the two black keys roughly in the middle of a recently tuned 
piano, this causes the hammer over the metal string beneath it to strike the 
string producing the sound of the note middle C.  Descartes believed that 
organisms are machines which God constructs; however, because we cannot 
know what His plan is, all we can know is how they operate.  For him, both 
physics and biology were given in terms of a unified theory of mechanics.   
Because all movements (inorganic and organic) are explainable in 
terms of the motion of matter, the laws of mechanics were enough to explain 
the organization of organic as well as inorganic matter (cf. Gunderson 1964).     
For Descartes, human bodies, like all other animal bodies, are 
machines.  However, humans have minds, unlike animals.  But because 
minds are not material, they are not explainable in mechanical terms.  
Unlike Aristotle’s conception of the four causes as conjoined in the activities 
and development of organismal organization, Descartes’ distinction between 
the material causes of the body and the non-material causes of the mind 
meant that mind and matter occupy ontologically distinct spheres.  Humans 
are distinct from other animals in that they are the only minded animal.  
Whereas humans are machines plus mindedness, all other animals are 
merely mechanical automata (cf. Gunderson 1964).  All change in 
organisms, including their growth and generation, is explicable in terms of 
the movement and change of position of matter articulated in the universals 
laws of mechanics.  Descartes mechanical view meant all we can know is the 
local causes of motion (for Aristotle, the material and efficient causes) not 
universal causes (final or formal causes).    
Although most theories of generation after Harvey and Descartes 
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were mechanistic they remained preformationist rather than epigenetic.  In 
opposition to the growing popularity of the mechanist-preformationism 
position, Buffon (and others, such as Maupertuis) began to formulate 
mechanist-epigenetic theories (cf. Pinto-Correia 1997).  In 1749, Buffon 
modified and extended Descartes’ mechanistic epigenetic view; he suggested 
that organic matter was made up of unorganized organic molecules.  These 
organic molecules were organized by a kind of mechanical force, similar to 
the way crystals are formed.  Buffon observed that crystals grow according 
to certain fractal patterns depending on their mineral composition.  For 
instance, salt crystals are found in cubes and these cubes are composed of 
smaller cubes (Buffon 1749: 240).  He believed that just as crystals were 
constrained in the way they form themselves, so too is the growth and 
generation of organic molecules which compose organisms constrained by 
the type of organism they generate (Buffon 1749: 243).  For both salt and 
animals, like begets like.  His mechanist epigenesis view held that 
organisms generated a succession of individuals themselves—reproduction 
was not merely the unfolding of the preformed homunculus.  While Buffon 
denied that the cause of generation exists completely outside the organism, 
even arguing that the environment contributes to the gradual ontogeny of 
an organism’s organizational form, his notion of an “internal mould” 
functions in a similar way to Aristotle’s formal/final causes: 
there exists in nature a general prototype in each species upon 
which all individuals are molded.  The individuals, however, are 
altered or improved, depending on the circumstances in the 
process of realization.  Relative to certain characteristics, then, 
there is an irregular appearance in the succession of individuals, 
yet at the same time, there is a striking constancy in the species 
considered as a whole.  The first animal, the first horse for 
example, was the exterior model and the internal mold [moule 
intérieur] from which all past, present, and future horses have 
been formed. But this model, of which we know only copies, could 
alter or improve itself in imparting its form or in multiplying. The 
original imprint subsists in its entirety in each individual; and 
although there have existed millions of these, not one of them is 
exactly like another, nor consequently, like the model of which it 
bears the imprint (Buffon 1749: 352). 
 
In the above passage, Buffon focuses his attention on both the form of 
organisms as well as their functioning and maintenance in accordance with 
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a particular mode of living.  In this way, his view can be seen to 
approximate Aristotle’s interest in unifying formal and final cause within 
the organism’s own being rather than locating either externally.  His 
conception of an internal mould (moule intérieur) also retains some 
elements of preformationism in claiming that it both gives shape to organic 
bodies and is present in all other organic bodies of its type.  In like fashion, 
each individual organism belonging to the same species shares an internal 
mould.   
 
 
2.2 PREREQUISITES FOR KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF THE 
WORLD 
 
 Kant claims in his “Transcendental Analytic,” that all experience and 
knowledge is ordered by a priori principles of pure reason.  These are 
concepts that organize and shape our experience of the natural world and 
provide the systematic structure necessary for scientific reasoning.  He 
refers to the central a priori ideas as the “regulative principles of reason.”  
These include the thinking subject, God, and mechanism (Kant 1781/1787: 
A334/B391, A646/B674 and McFarland 1970: 26-30).  Kant does not aim to 
argue for the concrete reality of these ideas.  Instead, it is their analogical 
use that is important.  Their ability to enable us to understand what we do 
not know by comparison with what we do know.  Each of the regulative 
principles is an “analogon,” an ideal by which we can order our experiences 
of the world.  
If … we assume such ideal beings, we do not really extend our 
knowledge beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend 
only a regulative principle.  For to allow that we posit a thing, a 
something, a real being, corresponding to the idea, is not to say 
that we profess to extend our knowledge of things by means of 
transcendental concepts.  For this being is posited only in the idea 
and not in itself; and therefore only as expressing the systematic 
unity which is to serve as a rule for the empirical employment of 
reason.  It decides nothing in regard to the ground of this unity 
(Kant 1781/1787: A674/B702).   
 
These analoga can be defined simply as ideals whose prime role is to 
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facilitate reasoning by comparison (Kant 1781/1787: A631-A668, B659-
B696).  When we think about some entity or process, we do not know its real 
nature.  What we can know, through our regulative ideas, is its relationship 
to other entities and processes within our experience.  These regulative 
ideas unify our phenomenal experiences.  
 As to the first of the regulative ideas, Kant believed that our 
understanding of organisms as directing and organizing their own form is 
arrived at by reflecting on ourselves as thinking subjects who direct our 
actions as means to achieve certain desired ends.  This reflection is possible 
only when we conceive of ourselves as thinking subjects which allows us to 
understand the activities and functions of organisms in comparing them to 
our own subjective agency.  The second regulative idea, God, conceived of as 
the author of life, provides us with the notion of teleological force and 
furnishes us with a number of teleological why-questions (McFarland 1970: 
25-36).  According to Kant, these teleological questions would not be 
imaginable to us without the notion of God.  Lastly, we utilize the regulative 
idea of mechanism whenever we explain things as mechanical by comparing 
our experience of objects in the world to a machine (e.g. how the parts fit 
together into wholes, how some causes regularly produce certain effects).  
For example, we understand the architecture of an oyster as a bivalve—two 
shells hinged together that open and shut, when we compare its composition 
to a simple machine.   
 These three regulative principles are transcendental ideas of reason 
which we use to order our experience and make empirical knowledge 
possible.  They furnish an empirically justified and unified science by 
providing heuristics which enable us to formulate laws and generalizations 
which frame our observations.  Without the regulative principle of the 
thinking subject we cannot understand the activities and organization of 
organic matter.  Without the regulative principle of mechanism, there is no 
possibility of gaining empirical knowledge of the world through the 
Newtonian laws of mechanical interactions.   
 Each of these regulative principles of reason provides us with a way 
to formally order our phenomenal appearances.  And only by organizing our 
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ephemeral phenomenal experiences can we have empirical knowledge of the 
world.   
 
 
2.2.1 ORGANISMS AS SELF-DIRECTING NATURAL PURPOSES 
 
 Whereas in the First Critique Kant outlines the prerequisites for all 
empirical knowledge and the regulative ideas of reason, in the Third 
Critique he pays particular attention to our knowledge of organic matter.  In 
the Third Critique, the Critique of Judgement (1790), he conceives of an 
organism as a self-organizing, self-directed and reciprocally caused natural 
purpose which shares a common generative capacity with other organisms 
of its kind.  To unpack this statement of Kant’s view requires an explication 
of its main components:  purposiveness, reciprocal causality, and common 
generative capacity.  I begin with purposiveness.  
 According to Kant, our understanding of organisms is inextricably 
linked to our understanding of them as internally directed means (mittel) 
and ends (Zweck) of themselves.  This view of organisms relies on the 
regulative principle of the thinking subject as an analogon for the 
directedness of the organism.  Biological entities have a different causality 
to that of rocks and other inorganic substances, what Kant called an 
“internal purposiveness” (zweckmässige).  This internal purposiveness is the 
organism’s directedness towards a telos, or final cause.  In the section of the 
Third Critique entitled “Critique of Teleological Judgement” Kant considers 
the question, what is the “character peculiar to things considered as natural 
purposes” (Kant 1790: Ak. 370-76).  He concludes, that if there are any 
natural purposes then organisms are. 
Therefore in order for us to judge a body as a being, in itself and 
in its inner possibility, a natural purpose, what is needed is that 
all its parts, through their own causality, produce one another as 
regards both their form and combination, and that in this way 
they produce a whole whose concept … could, conversely, be the 
cause of this body according to a principle so that the connection 
of efficient causes could at the same time be judged to be a 
causation through final causes … Only if a [body] meets [these] 
conditions, and only because of this, will it be both an organized 
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and a self-organizing being, which therefore can be called a 
natural purpose  (Kant 1790: Ak. 373-4).   
 
 Kant explains the self-organization of organismal growth by referring 
to his observations of organisms with birth defects and teratologies:  “if 
birth defects occur, or deformities come about during growth, certain parts 
… form in an entirely new way, so as to preserve [erhalten] what is there, 
and so produce an anomalous creature” (Kant 1790: Ak. 372).  Kant 
understood the ontogeny of the form of these teratological organisms as 
attempting to conform to a particular end state (Zweck) through whatever 
means possible.   
 Kant was aware of the criticisms concerning the use of teleological 
explanations and their associations with natural theology and vitalism.  To 
avoid the assumption that teleology must be connected with a 
transcendental plan or vital force, Kant restricts his notion of teleology as a 
study of ends, or (something akin to Aristotelian) final causes to screen off 
strong preformationism.  His teleological view takes the determination of 
biological organisms to come from the organism itself over time rather than 
originating either externally from a master designer outside of it or 
internally from some preformed plan. 
 
2.2.2 ORGANISMS AS RECIPROCALLY CAUSE AND EFFECT OF THEIR 
OWN SELF-ORGANIZATION 
 
 To say an organism is a natural purpose means that its causes and 
effects only make sense in light of its final products.  We understand these 
as causes and effects only when we consider them as fitting into a unified 
plan of directed actions towards a final end (Zweck) or final cause.  In 
organic beings cause and effect are mutually interdependent.  The definition 
of “organized beings, is:  An organized product of nature is one in which 
everything is a purpose and reciprocally also a means” (Kant 1790: Ak. 376)  
Organisms are organized in such a way that each of its component parts is 
ordered in relation to the others as simultaneously means and ends:  “each 
part exists only as a result of all the rest, so we also think of each part as 
existing for the sake of the others and of the whole” (Kant 1790: Ak. 374).  
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As such, the causal connections in biology occur in reciprocal series rather 
than in the linear series as they are usually thought to occur in inorganic 
matter.  Growth over time is understood as causally synergistic.  But what 
does Kant mean when he says that organisms are reciprocally self-forming, 
and how are the causes of organic being different from those of inorganic 
entities?   
 Understood in terms of a purely mechanistic view of the world, causes 
are understood always to precede their effects.  These effects may in turn be 
causes of later effects if and only if each cause is necessarily temporally 
prior to its subsequent effect.  Machines possess what Kant refers to as a 
“motive force.”  Kant argues that unlike machines and other inorganic 
matter which can be sufficiently understood in terms of linear causes, 
organic entities cannot be understood solely in terms of a mechanical (or 
efficient) causality as a linear series of causes followed by their effects.  This 
is because organic beings possess both a motive force as well as a self-
formative force.   
Now it is entirely possible that some parts in (say) an animal body 
(such as skin, bone, or hair) could be grasped as accumulations 
governed by merely mechanical laws.  Still the cause that 
procures the appropriate matter, that modifies and forms it in 
that way, and that deposits it in the pertinent locations must 
always be judged teleologically.  Hence everything in such a body 
must be regarded as organized; and everything, in a certain 
relation to the thing itself, is also an organ in turn (Kant 1790: 
Ak. 257).   
 
 Inorganic and organic entities have different causal forces.  A 
machine only has a motive force.  Machines can neither propagate 
themselves nor compensate for missing parts.  They cannot repair damaged 
parts.  This is because the cause that produces a machine and its form does 
not exist within the nature of the machine itself.  Machines gain their form 
and motive force from external sources while organisms have within 
themselves an internal formative force (as well as a motive force).  An 
organism’s formative force “imparts to the kinds of matter that lack it 
(thereby organizing them).  This force is therefore a formative force that 
propagates itself—a force that a mere ability [of one thing] to move 
[another] (i.e. mechanism) cannot explain.” (Kant 1790: Ak. 374).  The 
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organism’s teleological force means that it can propagate itself, heal 
damaged limbs or organs, and compensate for missing parts.   This self-
forming teleological force or capacity of biological entities cannot be 
explained using the standard mechanical understanding of linear causality 
which sees cause and effect as unidirectional.  To do so amounts to a 
category mistake.  Trying to explain biological organization in terms of 
linear causality misidentifies the direction of causality as linear when it is 
reciprocal.  Whole organisms, unlike whole machines, are not 
understandable in terms of their parts and processes, without remainder.  
The purely mechanical view is inadequate because of the underlying 
assumption that both organic as well as inorganic wholes can be completely 
understood in terms of their material decomposition.  But as Kant argues, 
nothing like a Newtonian view could be possible for living things.  There 
cannot be a complete physical reduction for living things:  “it is absurd for 
humans even to attempt, or to hope that perhaps some day another Newton 
might arise who would explain to us, in terms of natural laws unordered by 
any intention, how even a mere blade of grass is produces” (Kant 1790: Ak. 
400).  Because living things do not have the same ontological kinds of causes 
that non-living things have, we cannot fully understand the biological world 
purely by understanding it mechanically in terms of its material parts.   
  The circular causality of organisms that allowed effects to precede 
causes troubled Kant as it appeared to contravene the Humean principle of 
mechanical linear causation:  the view that causes always precede their 
effects (and a view Kant himself endorses in the First Critique).  Whereas 
the causality of inorganic entities is understood completely in mechanical 
terms as causes preceding their effects, in organic entities causality involves 
both final causes which direct the organization of organisms ultimately 
towards end states as well as mechanical causes of their proximate 
activities.  An organism’s teleological force (a final cause) is both the end the 
organism strives for and the means by which it is directed to that end.  As 
natural purposes, organisms are reciprocally effect and cause of their own 
self-organization (Kant 1790: Ak. 374).   
 This problem seemed to Kant a contradiction between two principles 
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each of which seems necessary and reasonable.  Kant sought to resolve this 
antimony.  He explained that the appearance of a contradiction between our 
notion of linear and reciprocal causation is only that—an appearance.  When 
we use the regulative notion of the thinking subject as an analogon, we 
interpret the actions of organisms as being purposefully directed towards 
achieving a certain end.  But, because our principles of reasoning are (only) 
regulative:  
the concept of a thing as in itself a natural purpose is not a 
constitutive concept either of understanding or of reason.  But … 
it is a regulative concept for reflective judgment, allowing us to 
use a remote analogy with our own causality in terms of purposes 
generally, to guide our investigation of organic objects and to 
mediate regarding their supreme basis—a meditation not for the 
sake of gaining knowledge either of nature or of that original 
basis of nature, but rather for the sake of [assisting] that same 
practical power in us [viz., our reason] by analogy with which we 
were considering the cause of the purposiveness in organized 
objects (Kant 1790: Ak. 376).  
 
A concept is constitutive if it applies to an actual (what Kant calls 
“noumenal”) relationship in the world—one of quantity rather than of a 
phenomenal quality.  The knowledge we gain of the relationships that we 
compare using a regulative idea guides us in understanding our own 
phenomenal perceptions of the world.  They are reflective insofar as they 
occur in our judging our phenomenal perceptions rather than constitutive of 
the actual (noumenal) world (Kant 1781/1787: A249-A250, B305-307).  
Therefore, we err in our use and consideration of these principles when we 
treat them as able to provide us objective principles about the noumenal 
world.  If we regard these regulative principles as constitutive principles 
antimonies arise.  
 Kant explains that we are able to dissolve any seeming contradiction 
by showing that our understanding of organisms as self-directed towards 
their own organization are regulative ideas which give us understanding of 
organic being by allowing us to reflect in a certain way on our phenomenal 
experiences of the world.  We make a mistake when we believe that our 
regulative principles of reason relate directly to the actual (noumenal) 
objects in the world and give us knowledge which is not mediated by our 
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phenomenal experiences.6  Kant cautions against this mistake.  
Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the 
understanding; and it is only through the understanding that it 
has its own (specific) empirical employment.  It does not, 
therefore, create concepts  (of objects) but only orders them, and 
gives them that unity which they can have only if they be 
employed in their widest possible application (Kant 1781/1787: 
A643/B671).  
 
These regulative “principles of pure reason can never be constitutive in 
respect of empirical concepts; for since no schema of sensibility 
corresponding to them can ever be given, they can never have an object in 
concreto” (Kant 1781/1787: A664/B692).  As regulative ideas, they do not 
provide concrete explanations for the biological organization we perceive.  
This means that although we grasp organisms as purposeful, we can only 
explain their activities with mechanical laws of science.  Whether Kant 
manages to do this, or whether amendments to his teleological and 
mechanistic perspective of the organism are needed, will be discussed below.  
  Kant solves this problem within a transcendental idealist 
framework.  Whether we need to commit ourselves to this position in order 
to resolve this antimony of reciprocal and linear causation will be discussed 
later in more detail.  Within the section “From the Kantian ‘Zweck’ to the 
von Baerian ‘Ziele’,” I consider the metaphysically simpler account of the 
relationship between the regulative principles and reality itself offered in 
my von Baerian revision to the Kantian view. 
  
 
2.2.3 COMMON GENERATIVE CAPACITY 
 
 Kant refers to the continuity of form that we observe as like 
producing like in organisms of the same species or race over generations as 
“systematic unity” (Kant 1790).  This systematic unity is the basic principle 
upon which natural science and classification is based.  In his essay, “Of the 
different human races” (1777), Kant explains how organisms can be grouped 
                                                     
6 Kant states this by saying that our regulative principles are present to our 
reflective, not to our determinate judgement (Kant 1790: Ak. 386-400). 
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together into classes (e.g. races or species) in terms of what he calls their 
“common generative capacity” (Kant 1777, 1790).  An organism’s particular 
bodily form develops according to the generative capacity which is common 
to all of its particular kind.  An organism in one generation of a species 
shares the same generative capacity to organisms in the previous generation 
of the same species.  Kant argues that the continuity of form within 
individuals from one generation to the next is due to their sharing the same 
stock of germs (Keime) and the same capacities and natural dispositions 
(Anlagen) that together cooperate in the development of organs, limbs, and 
tissues within a particular set of ecological conditions.   
The causes lying in the nature of an organic body (plant or 
animal) that account for a specific development are called seeds 
(Keime) when this development concerns a particular part of the 
pant or animal.  When, however, such development only concerns 
the size or the relationship of the parts to one another, I call them 
natural predispositions (Anlagen).  For example, in birds of the 
same species which can nevertheless live in different climates, 
there are seeds (Keime) for the development of a new layer of 
feathers.  These feathers appear when such birds live in cold 
climates, but they are held back when they live in temperate 
climates (Kant 1777: 13). 
 
 This notion of a common generative capacity forms the basis of Kant’s 
generic preformationism.  This is the view that all groups of organisms 
originate from a single ancestral stock of Keime and Anlagen.  Generic 
preformationism holds that there is a flexibility of form—the actualization 
of a capacity for variation already immanent within each biological 
individual.  Unlike the strong preformationists, Kant believed that the 
Anlagen guide and limit the Keime.  Keime and Anlagen can be understood 
to constrain rather than determine an organism’s form of life.  Rather than 
existing preformed within the organism or its ancestors, Anlagen can be 
understood to have a fertile adaptability or “Tauglichkeit.”  Although Kant 
does not endorse the strong preformationist views of encasement, he does 
think that this potentiality of flexible development must be already present 
in the Keime and Anlagen shared by a species.  
Neither chance nor general mechanistic laws could produce such 
matches [of morphology with environment].  For this reason, we 
must view this sort of chance development as preformed. … [A]ny 
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possible change with the potential for replicating itself must 
instead have already been present in the reproductive power so 
that chance development appropriate to the circumstances might 
take place according to a previously determined plan … or 
purposive cause (Kant 1777: 14).   
 
 The development of an organism’s bodily form from embryo to adult is 
the result of a generic set of germs and dispositions that are constant over 
generations.  Rather than relying on a vital or Newtonian force as a source 
of biological organization, Kant relies on the purposiveness of the 
dispositions acting on the germs and organizing them gradually in ontogeny.  
An organism’s teleological force (final cause) exists immanent in the fertile 
adaptive potential of the dispositions and germs. The particular notion of a 
teleological force which directs organic development of form from embryo to 
adult Kant adopts from Blumenbach’s idea of a formative force 
(Bildingstreib).  It is important to note that Kant’s notion of Tauglichkeit is 
quite dissimilar to the modern notion of adaptation in a very important 
sense.  Kant dismisses outright the idea that races or species can acquire 
organic modification through their interaction with different environmental 
conditions—what we conceive of as evolutionary adaptation.  For Kant, the 
flexible capacity of classes is the stock of Keime and Anlagen which directs 
its purposive organization.  All changes and modification which are made to 
that individual and all its descendants must be within the original stock of 
Keime and Anlagen.  Within the Keime and Anlagen is contained the 
developmental capacity for all changes in structure or function.  Although 
Kant speaks of flexible capabilities, he believes that new species do not come 
from others.  He did not accept that one species could transform into 
another.  In this way, Tauglichkeit can perhaps be best understood as a 
fertile flexibility of form as it referred to the capability of organisms in 
different ecological situations to develop differently—depending on what 
other resources are available (e.g. the ability to grow a new layer of 
feathers).    
 What makes Kant’s approach so different from the current view of 
evolution by natural selection is that on Kant’s view, individuals cannot 
possess novel characteristics and there are no such things as random 
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mutations.  Individuals cannot possess novelties because mutation or 
developmental perturbations cannot cause novelty.  Nothing can be novel 
because the capacity for all variation and change which exists is already 
present in the original stock of Keime and Anlagen.  All developmental 
differences among individuals within a species are present in the original 
stock.  The original stock of Keime and Anlagen contains a wide 
developmental possibility space such that some organisms may develop 
certain morphological forms whereas others develop different ones.  The 
other morphological forms which do not develop are still there in the 
possibility space of the Keime and Anlagen.  For instance, the above 
mentioned ability for some birds of the same kind to develop an extra layer 
of feathers if they live in a cold climate exists as a potential but latent 
ability in birds living in temperate climates.  The same stock of Keime and 
Anlagen could be differently instantiated in individuals within the same 
species given a wide range of environmental conditions.  Although Keime 
are responsible for the different characteristics of different individuals 
within a species, they are only activated when there are external 
environmental forces which cause their development and their development 
is determined by the Anlagen.  Morphological and behavioural variations 
among organisms allow them to “live in every climate and endure each and 
every condition of the land … these seeds and predispositions appear to be 
inborn and made for these conditions through the on-going process of 
reproduction” (Kant 1777: 14).  The flexible capacities of the species were 
what organized the organism’s organs and structures purposively so that it 
was fit for a specific environment.  Organisms which shared flexibility of 
capacities were related as members of the same species because they shared 
a similar generic form of biological organization.  Kant’s generic 
preformationism rejects the view that organisms acquire their ability to 
change to fit itself to its specific environment.  Generic preformationism 
allows change but holds that the ability of the animal to change depending 
on its environment resources is immanent within the organism’s purposive 
organization.  Therefore, Kant does not believe that chance plays a part in 
the development of organic organization.  He claims that development of 
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animals that seem to be perfectly fitted to the environments in which they 
are found can be explained in terms of their common generative capacity.  
The apparent fit of organism to environment is explicable on Kant’s view by 
reference to the organism’s generically preformed set of Keime and Anlagen 
which self-directs the development of the organisms’ morphological 
architecture, rather than its form being imposed from outside by the 
environment.  
 
 
2.3 CONCEPTS OF BODILY ORGANIZATION: KANT’S SCHEMA, CUVIER’S 
EMBRANCHEMENTS, AND VON BAER’S TYPES 
 
 Offspring are like their parents because they share the same 
generative capacities.  Kant understands the organization of these 
generative capacities in terms of a “common schema.”   
So many genera of animals share a certain common schema on 
which not only their bone structure but also the arrangement of 
their other parts seems to be based; the basic outline is admirably 
simple but yet was able to produce this great diversity of species, 
by shortening some parts and lengthening others, by the 
involution of some and the evolution of others.  Despite all the 
variety among these forms, they seem to have been produced 
according to a common archetype, and this analogy among them 
reinforces our suspicion that they are actually akin, produced by a 
common original mother.  For the different animal genera 
approach one another gradually: from the genus where the 
principle of purposes seems to be borne out most, namely, man, all 
the way to the polyp, and from it even to mosses and lichens (Kant 
1790: Ak. 419).   
 
 This common schema provides us with the means to understand why 
like produces like.  Like produces like because they have a common original 
type or schema.  However, it is not just the relationship between parent and 
offspring which is understood by reference to a common schema.  Organisms 
of the same race, species or genus all share a common schema.  Kant’s 
innovative notion of an original common type identified both the continuity 
of form over generations and the basis for biological classification.  This 
notion began to influence the biological practice of his contemporaries. 
 Kant’s common schema might be thought of as the necessary tinder to 
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the sparks of the series of debates between the idealist Naturphilosoph 
Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and the material morphologist, Georges 
Cuvier that ignited a revolution in comparative morphology and 
classificatory thinking.  In these heated debates (1830-1840) Geoffroy and 
Cuvier each proposed what they believed to be the source of organic form, its 
organization in biological beings, and the continuity of form over 
generations.   
 Geoffroy believed that there was one universal or “unified body plan” 
which all animals have in common (Russell 1916: Ch. 5).  The organization 
of animal form was the expression of one generalized, abstract, universal 
type.  Similarity between the same parts in different animals was possible 
through what he called the “principe des connexions” (Geoffroy 1796, 1818).  
According to this principle, one could locate the same limb in two different 
animals in terms of their identical position within a universal body plan.  
Any differences in these parts were understood to be due to modifications of 
the universal body plan.   
 Whereas Geoffroy relied on a universal body plan to explain our 
perception of like producing like and the continuity of form in different 
animals, Cuvier believed form could only be understood in terms of the 
organism’s conditions of existence.  From his embryological observations 
Cuvier concluded that instead of Geoffroy’s one universal body plan, there 
were actually four fundamental arrangements of bodily organization or 
“embranchments” (Cuvier 1817, cf. Russell 1916).  One of these four body 
plans is embodied in every organic being.  His embranchments were the four 
ways parts (limbs, organs, tissues) of organic beings were found together in 
animals.  Rather than Geoffroy’s emphasis on the structure and topology of 
organic architecture to explain animal form, Cuvier believed that an 
organism’s ontogeny constituted a coordinated set of actions towards an end 
state.  For instance, an animal’s embranchment was correlated with its 
conditions for existence—the conditions required for the organism’s 
functioning (e.g. its respiratory organs, forelimbs and the texture of its 
epidermal layer) within a particular environment (e.g. aquatic, aerial, or 
desert).  Cuvier emphasized the central organizing power of these conditions 
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of existence.  In constituting 
a principle peculiar to natural history, … the conditions of 
existence, [are] commonly styled final causes.  As nothing can 
exist without the reunion of these conditions which render its 
existence possible, the component parts of each being must be so 
arranged as to render possible the whole being, not only with 
regard to itself but to its surrounding relations (Cuvier 1817, as 
quoted in Lenoir 1982: 62). 
 
 Although obviously distinct, I think that Cuvier’s notion of 
embranchments can be gainfully understood as supporting both the Kantian 
understanding of organisms’ continuity of form over generations as being 
the result of teleological causes in a common schema as well as his forebear 
in Buffon’s view that the cause of organismal form was attributable to a 
deep architecture of the organisms’ interior mould.  Cuvier’s approach to 
organisms as functional wholes fits with Kant’s whole-organism perspective.  
In both, organisms were understood to be the result of internally directed 
teleological self-organization. 
 Von Baer’s extensive embryological work integrated both the Kantian 
organism-centred view and Cuvier’s four basic embranchments into his own 
comparative embryological work (cf. Lenoir 1982: Ch. 2 and 3).  Although he 
followed Cuvier’s approach to organisms as functional wholes in order to 
understand the positions of their limbs, organs, and tissues, von Baer’s 
particular interest was in securing an empirical basis for his theory of 
organismal organization.  Von Baer uncovered the origin of certain 
morphological similarities by comparing the embryological stages of a 
variety of different organisms, including the chick embryo.  These 
embryological investigations provided him with the resources to explain the 
ontogeny of organisms in terms of their flexible development within a 
particular body plan.  He observes of the chick embryos: 
the younger the embryos are that we compare the more variation 
we find in the structure of essential characters which later affect 
the whole manner of life of the organism … [I]t is difficult to grasp 
how all these variations can lead to the same result and how, 
alongside of complete, well-formed chickens, there are not 
numerous cripples [teratologies] … so it must be concluded that 
the differences somehow cancel each other out and that every 
variation, as far as it is possible, is conducted back to the norm 
(von Baer 1828: 147 as quoted in Lenoir 1982: 85). 
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   Von Baer’s innovation was in deducing that the cause of the chicks’ 
similar arrangements of organs and tissues within different organisms at 
the same level of embryological development were due to their similar 
patterns of development.  The reason why the chicks maintained their 
particular body plan despite numerous variations was due to the plasticity 
of their developmental pathways and processes which reliably “conducted” 
them to their goal of attaining a particular bodily arrangement (the chicken 
body plan).  Instead of following Cuvier’s usage in calling the organism’s 
body plan an embranchment, von Baer used two terms that picked out the 
different aspects of the body plan:  “type” and “schema.”  Von Baer used 
“type” to refer to the organism’s body plan, and “schema” to refer to the 
becoming of the organism in its growth within that plan.  Von Baer 
explains: 
In reality, instead of ‘type’ and ‘schema’ I might have used a 
common term expressing both.  I have only kept them separate in 
order to make it obvious that every organic form as regards its 
type, becomes by the mode of its formation that which it 
eventually is.  The schema of development is nothing but the 
becoming type, and the type is the result of the scheme of 
formation.  For that reason the type can only be wholly 
understood by learning the mode of development (von Baer 1828, 
as quoted in Lenoir 1982: 86).  
 
The type is a relational concept which holds between the different positions 
of the organs, membranes, and systems within the embryo.  In an 
organism’s becoming, it forms relations between the different organs, 
tissues, and limbs of the embryo and regulates the order and direction of 
various events in the organism’s embryogenesis, (e.g. the organism’s 
polarity, that is, which side of the developing zygote becomes ventral and 
which becomes dorsal).   
 Von Baer uses type and schema to reveal the formative force driving 
the organism’s development over time to achieve its bodily organization.  
Von Baer’s understanding of the concepts type and schema follows Kant’s 
own notion that the development of an organism’s form is both driven by 
and ultimately attains the form of the common generative schema of its 
kind.  But von Baer adds that organisms sharing the same schema also 
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share a similar ontogenesis.  Their ontogeny may not be exactly similar but 
they may have patterns of development or organ systems (e.g. the same 
respiratory system, for example one with lungs or gills) which are common 
to them.  He emphasizes the importance of embryological investigations as 
the source of our knowledge of organic form.  It was only through the careful 
attention to the study of embryological development that von Baer was able 
to understand the interactions which occur between organ systems and their 
mutual ontogenesis within the organism, as a whole, as well as its unified 
directedness.   
  
 
2.3.1 FROM THE KANTIAN “ZWECK” TO THE VON BAERIAN “ZIELE” 
 
 Von Baer embraces Kant’s teleological view of organisms as natural 
purposes and marries it with his own embryological observations.  He 
follows Kant in thinking that it is what the organism will ultimately become 
which directs the order of activities and the development of its form 
throughout its ontogenesis.  He agrees that it is the purposiveness 
(zweckmässige) of organic wholes that directs their ontogenesis and not 
simply the gradual accumulation of new parts.  Although von Baer followed 
the spirit of Kant’s teleo-ontological approach to organisms as self-directing 
their own organization, he revises it in light of embryological research.  This 
more empirical understanding of organisms leads him to challenge some of 
Kant’s views.  In particular, whereas Kant viewed the self-directedness or 
purposiveness of organisms heuristically, von Baer conceived these qualities 
as realistically constitutive of life.   
 Von Baer was particularly concerned with Kant’s notion that organic 
causes were circular rather than linear and how organic matter was 
directed towards its purposive finality.  Von Baer thought biological wholes 
did not have ends (Zweck), as Kant thought, but rather biological wholes 
had goals (Ziele).  
Nearly a century ago Kant taught that in an organism all the 
parts must be viewed as both ends and means [Zweck und mittel] 
at the same time.  We would rather say:  goals and means [Ziele 
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und mittel].  Now it is announced loudly and confidently:  Ends do 
not exist in nature, there are in it only necessities; and it is not 
even recognized that precisely these necessities are the means for 
reaching certain goals.  Becoming [ein Werden] without a goal is 
simply unintelligible (von Baer 1865: 231, as quoted in Lenoir 
1982: 271). 
 
This is perhaps von Baer’s most significant amendment to Kant’s 
teleological understanding of biological self-organization.  He changes 
Kant’s ends and means (Zweck und mittel) to goals and means (Ziele und 
mittel).  Von Baer believed that biological wholes were better understood in 
terms of their goals rather than ends because he viewed biological wholes 
(from his embryological work) as developing or becoming over time towards 
a goal.  He argued that ends do not exist in themselves in the biological 
world; but developmental processes towards goals did exist.  In addition, 
Zweck implied a kind of intentional act of the biological whole to which it is 
applied.  Von Baer considered it to be imbued with a kind of vital agency 
which he wanted to extinguish in the strong teleological approach to 
organisms.  Ziele, on the other hand, does not carry this implication.  Ziele is 
a pre-conditioned result which arises or develops in much the same way as 
the zygote develops into the embryo and then into a foetus, juvenile, and 
adult.  It is a necessary consequent of the integrated processes of 
developmental mechanisms, pathways, and networks within the organism 
as a whole throughout its lifetime.  In making the change from Zweck to 
Ziele, von Baer sought to extract the last bit of vitalist-style talk from the 
original Kantian approach.   
 Why is this shift from Zweck to Ziele important for the organism-
centred view?  For von Baer, this shift was important because he believed 
that Zweck imported too much intentional agency into his teleological view 
of organisms.  However, I think there is more to this than just a shift from 
ends to goals.  This is a shift in the use of Kant’s regulatory ideas through 
which he believed we were able to understand biological phenomena.  We 
can understand this if we go back and consider once again the regulative 
principles of reason, the analoga of the thinking subject, God, and 
mechanism.  Whereas Kant helped himself to the analogon of the thinking 
subject when trying to understand organisms in terms of their ends and 
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means, von Baer seems to have made use of both the thinking subject as 
well as the analogon of mechanism.  This amalgamated use of the thinking 
subject plus mechanism provides an innovative way of conceiving of the 
organization of organisms while eschewing the intentional agency reflected 
in the exclusive use of the thinking subject as analogon for organic being 
and God as the analogon of the teleological force.   
 Von Baer’s swap of Zweck for Ziele can be understood as an attempt 
to avoid the seemingly ineluctable tendency of conceiving of organisms with 
the analogon of thinking subject as having the same intentional agency as 
human subjects that Kant’s original approach perhaps invites.  Von Baer’s 
use of Ziele can be construed, not as the final intended end of a thinking 
subject, but purely as an immanent goal—or the endeavour of a 
teleomechanically construed organized being.  What von Baer seems to have 
brought to the conceptual table is that we not only can use the Kantian 
regulatory ideas individually but also in combination.  Connecting two 
regulative ideas together seems to be more profitable than to simply use one 
of the three at a time.  In effectively combining the regulative ideas of the 
thinking subject and mechanism to explain the organized being of 
organisms, von Baer harnesses more explanatory value from this combined 
approach than the original Kantian view of organized being understood in 
terms of the thinking subject.  Von Baer’s adoption of Ziele over Kant’s 
Zweck extends our conception of organisms as internally directed by 
emphasizing the goal-directed becoming of organic beings manifest in their 
biological “type” and “schema.”   
 Taking this revised account of Kant’s view means that we conceive 
the purposiveness of organisms in terms of real phenomena of nature rather 
than simply heuristically.  I build on this understanding over the remaining 
sections of this chapter and rely on it for the remainder of this thesis.  This 
still leaves me with an obligation to resolve Kant’s antinomy of reciprocal 
and linear causation spelled out in section 2.2.2 “Organisms as reciprocally 
cause and effect of their own self-organization,” something I return to later.  
My discussion of reciprocal causation will take the form of a reconfiguration 
of the meaning of organic cause in each chapter of this thesis.  The meaning 
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of reciprocal causation will become clearer when seen in use within 
biological examples and within the context of an applied organism-centred 
perspective. 
 
 
2.3.2 FURTHER EXTENDING THE NEO-KANTIAN VIEW:  
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EMBRYOLOGISTS AND CYTOLOGISTS 
 
 Before moving on to extend the Kantian view, we might do well to 
quickly take stock.  Kant’s original conception of organisms took the 
potential form of an organism as immanent in its Keime and Anlagen.  The 
development of an organism’s form was understood in terms of the 
interactive activities of the Keime and Anlagen towards an end state 
(according to von Baer, goal).  The Keime and Anlagen were conceived of as 
ontologically interdependent aspects of an organismal whole.  Kant did not 
specify what the material substrates of the Keime and Anlagen were and 
whether they were localized in some specific entity or whether they 
pervaded the organism as a whole.   
 Those working within the conceptual framework Kant laid out were 
keen to uncover the material nature of the Keime and Anlagen.  According 
to von Baer, to reveal the material nature of the Keime and Anlagen 
required investigation of the ontogeny of organic organization.  To this end, 
his studies on embryology, discovery of mammalian ova, and his theory that 
there were different germ layers during development brought new insight 
into the possible locations and sources of the material structure and 
potentiality of the hitherto only theoretical notions of Keime and Anlagen 
(Lenoir 1982: 89).  It was through his study of the mammalian ovum and the 
germ layers in particular which lead him to conclude that the potentialities 
(the Keime and Anlagen) for the existence of the whole organism were 
located within the centre of the ovum.  The ovum itself was the centre of 
formative activity from which all growth originated.  
 Von Baer sought to explain the activity of the formative force 
throughout the becoming of an organism to its final goal state.  To this end, 
he was particularly interesting in what occurred in organisms when their 
 71
ontogeny went awry.  The unusual ontogenesis of teratological animals 
enabled him to contemplate how the purposive agency of the whole 
organism attempts to construct itself in accordance with its type as best it 
could despite hinderances.  His investigations of teratologies, like his 
observations of the variation in the chicks, provided a new avenue by which 
he could explain organismal form—this time in terms of the malformed.   
 The study of teratologies was not new; both Kant and Blumenbach 
also observed them and speculated on the curious forms they developed.  
Kant took the malformations of these creatures to be the result of the 
interplay between the Keime, Anlagen, factors in the embryo’s intrauterine 
environment (including chemical, disease, and hormonal perturbations), and 
the developmental activities of the organism towards its goal state.  During 
the organism’s early development all of these may become resources or 
obstacles which contribute to its embryogenesis.  These factors can be 
variously interpreted as preventing or facilitating the differentiation of the 
organism’s cells, the growth of its tissues, the positioning of its limbs and 
head, and the temporal ordering of the growth of these features throughout 
its ontogeny.  The extent of the perturbations and anomalies within the 
individual may be buffered by the organism’s own ability to redirect 
developmental pathways to accommodate these deviations.  There may be 
malformations, omissions or duplications, environmental influences or 
missed embryological stages, and some version of an organism can still be 
produced.  What von Baer observed in teratological animals was that they 
appeared to utilize other developmental avenues, resulting in 
morphological, topological, or other developmental aberrations.  
 Von Baer believed that teratologies showed that although an 
organism’s ontogeny was dependent on formal preconditions of existence 
and the specific organization of its type and schema, its developmental 
patterns and pathways, which it arranged in its purposive activity to attain 
this final type, varied greatly (Lenoir 1982: 120).  Individuals affected by 
deviations in some of the biological resources necessary for the generation of 
a fully functioning individual according to its final type may still strive to 
develop as best they can whilst negotiating the deviations and anomalies 
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which impede the usual patterns of its development towards its final type.  
As an illustration of this, consider the congenital craniofacial defects that 
affect some Burmese kittens (Noden 1986, Sturgess et al. 1997).  Taking von 
Baer’s perspective, we can understand the facial defects in the development 
of the kitten’s skull as a working out of a new developmental avenue within 
the kitten’s body plan in its attempt to create a viable well-formed kitten as 
best it can.  If there is some lack, or often among this kind of teratology, an 
addition or impediment to its development, the developing kitten works 
with the resources available to it.  The different structuring of the cranial 
bones, ocular structures, and palate mean that the musculature and tissues 
of the developing cat must fit in a coordinated attempt towards its goal 
state—a cat body plan that facilitates a well-formed, functional cat able to 
eat, breathe, purr, and meow, etc.  This teratological development points to 
a more plastic notion of developmental patterns in all organisms.  A 
teratological animal, such as the one just discussed, makes use of a space of 
ontogenetic flexibility trying to achieve certain goals, ultimately that of 
attaining a species-specific body plan.  As such, the organism’s self-
directedness is attributable to the coordinated activities of its interrelated 
parts striving towards this goal as a functional whole.   
 Although the founders of cell theory, Matthias Schleiden (1838) and 
Theodor Schwann (1839), largely agreed with von Baer’s framework, they 
rejected his reliance on what they took to be vitalist-sounding formative 
activities at the centre of the ovum.  Unlike von Baer, Schwann did not 
think that there were formative activities or concentrated agency within the 
centre of the ovum.   He thought that there was no localization of this force.  
Schwann reconceived von Baer’s formative force7 in terms of what he calls 
an “idea.”  To avoid appeal to teleological forces or an ontological 
commitment to organic wholes, he provided a more mechanical account of 
biological organization:  
the science of biology consisted solely in the study of order and 
arrangement of materials in an organic setting acting according to 
normal physical laws.  In this view, life is not something resulting 
from order and arrangement; nor is it different from order and 
                                                     
7 Von Baer and Kant both adopted their own notions of formative force or activity 
from Blumenbach’s own “Bildungstrieb.”  
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arrangement.  Life consists in the order and arrangement of 
particles of matter tout court  (Schwann 1839, as cited in Lenoir 
1982: 126, italicization his own).   
 
Schwann rejected the need to refer to emergent, and what he thought to be 
occult and vitalist, forces to explain our empirical observations of the 
natural world.  Instead, he saw order and form as constitutive of biology and 
explainable in terms of standard laws.  In contrast to von Baer’s belief that 
an organism’s type and schema exist only in it as a developing functional 
whole, Schwann argued that the organizing principles of the organism were 
present in all its parts (cells, tissues).   
 Although departing from von Baer’s conception of the organism as a 
functional whole, Schwann’s understanding of the organizing principles as 
distributed potentia throughout the organism remains consistent with 
Kant’s own conception of the common generative stock of Keime and 
Anlagen.  But instead of an organism-centred perspective, Schwann’s 
perspective takes the cell, not the organism, to be the centre of 
organizational force:  
Since all cells grow according to the same laws, the cause of 
development cannot in one case lie in the individual cell and in 
another be based in the organism as a whole.  Furthermore, since 
certain individual cells, namely the fertilized egg, which also 
follow the general pattern of growth of all cells, can develop 
completely independently, we must assign an independent life to 
the cells (Schwann 1839 as quoted in Lenoir 1982: 129-30).  
 
In addition to von Baer and Schwann, many other 19th century natural 
philosophers have contributed to and revised the original Kantian approach 
(cf. Lenoir 1982).  This was not a static view.  The study of comparative 
anatomy and developmental processes, especially within embryology, 
focusing on cellular differentiation, and cytology, reformed it.   
 
 
 
2.4 GENE-CENTRED APPROACHES   
 
 In the foregoing, I have outlined a Kantian understanding of the self-
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directed development of organismal form and highlighted some 
amendments.  These have all contributed to what can be thought of as a 
unified neo-Kantian view of organisms which takes the organism to be 
ontologically central to our understanding of their self-directing, self-
organizing form over time.  In order to justify the choice of an organism-
centred view of organismal ontogeny over any other view, it will be 
necessary to articulate the genesis and uptake of some of the alternatives.  
The next few sections highlight the basic gene-centred approach and its 
underlying dualism which serves to validate the notion that genes are either 
the sole cause or the most important cause of an organism’s form and 
organization.  
 Although earlier work utilized microscopic observations, these were 
in some sense limited.  In the 18th century, microscopes were still plagued 
with spherical aberrations and distortions of colour which compromised 
some observational data.  However, in the early part of the 19th century 
dramatic improvements to the design of the microscope meant that there 
was a reduction in these spherical aberrations and colour distortions when 
looking through at high settings (cf. Schickore 2003).  These innovations are 
what provided the reliable evidence needed for Meyen (1830), Brown (1831), 
Schleiden (1838), and Schwann (1839) to propose their cell theories.  In 
particular, it was necessary for Schleiden’s thesis that all plant tissues are 
built out of cells and Brown’s discovery of the cell nucleus (cf. Wolpert 1995: 
229). 
 These discoveries occurred just before the re-discovery of Mendel’s8 
work on pea plants which focused on theoretically characterizing the source 
of continuity of form across members of the same species and from one 
generation to the next in terms of inherited “factors.”  He distinguished 
between the factors that were inherited and responsible for the organism’s 
morphology and the morphological traits themselves.9  By the 1940s 
embryology was effectively sidelined by the newer science of genetics which 
                                                     
8 Mendel’s studies on pea plants were rediscovered in 1900. 
9 The distinction between the inherited factors and the morphological traits was 
formally made by Wilhelm Johannsen in 1909 when he distinguished the genotype 
from the phenotype.  Johannsen himself was an anti-preformationist (cf. Moss 
2007).   
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took genes rather than organisms as providing the causal source of 
organismal form (cf. Sapp 1987).  Scientists utilizing microscopic data began 
to study the activities of cells and their nuclei in an effort to try to find 
where these factors were located and whether they had a physical vehicle or 
substratum which facilitated their dissemination from parent to offspring.  
Among these early cytologists was August Weismann.  Weismann had 
originally espoused a version of epigenesis but later became convinced that 
the source of continuous form over generations was contained preformed in 
the germ plasm located in the nuclei (Weismann 1893).  Weismann believed 
that Mendel’s studies (1856-1865) on the variation and inheritance of pea 
plants and the variation between individual organisms within the same 
species were evidence in support of his own preformationism (Maienschein 
1986: 75).   
 Weismann sought to find a material substrate for Mendel’s factors.  
From his own research and study of cell biology and genetics, he found that 
organisms began as single cells with nuclei.  He argued that the germ plasm 
is the material substrate which is continuous from one generation to the 
next:  “the essence of heredity is in the transmission of a nuclear substance 
in germ plasm” (Weismann 1885: 65).  The essence of organismal form was 
contained in the germ plasm within the nuclei and was the source of all 
directive activities out of which the organism is built.   
 Echoing the Mendelian distinction between inherited factors and the 
morphological traits of the organism, Weismann understood the passive 
somatoplasm of the material body as shaped by the active germ plasm.  
Keen to distance himself from his Lamarckian successors, who thought that 
external influences affected both the soma and the germ plasm and that 
both of these were heritable, he argued that external influences only affect 
the somatoplasm, not the germ plasm.  Only the germ plasm was heritable.  
Underlying this distinction between the germ and the soma was a dualist 
metaphysics of organic organization and causality.  His metaphysics of 
organic organization held that germ and soma were spatially distinct or 
“sequestered” from one another.  They interacted, but in the way marbles 
interact with a glass vase that contains them.  The germ in this sense was 
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contained in the body (either in the body of the cell or of the whole 
organism).  The body was the passive vessel that weakly interacted with but 
also protected the germ cells from insult by the environment external to the 
skin of the organism (or extra-nuclear contents of the cell):  “For the germ-
cells are contained in the organism, and the external influences which affect 
them [the germ-cells] are intimately connected with the state of the 
organism in which they are safely contained” (Weismann 1891, as cited in 
Winther 2001: 525). 
 The separation of the germ from the somatoplasm underlies a dualist 
metaphysics of organic causation which takes the germ and the soma to 
occupy two distinct ontological spheres.  This distinction between the 
passive soma and the active germ leads to Weismann’s reliance on the germ 
plasm as the primary causal force of organismal development.  This view of 
causality as concentrated in one localized source was neither Aristotelian 
nor Kantian.  It disposed of three of Aristotle’s four causes (i.e. the material, 
efficient, and final causes) and centres the causal organizing force (formal 
cause) firmly within the germ plasm, giving no substantive role to 
capacities, dispositions or common schemas.  His dualism was nothing if not 
decisive.  Weismann (1893) defined the somatoplasm as everything that was 
external to the germ plasm—this included the cytoplasm, organelles, 
membrane, and the whole of the organism as an extra-nuclear environment 
(Winther 2001: 519-520).  There was the germ plasm and there was 
everything else.  Nothing outside the germ plasm caused cells to 
differentiate.  This was entirely determined from inside the cell nucleus.  
Once one identified the germ plasm, one had a complete answer to the 
question how like produces like.      
 Interestingly, this was not always the case.  Rasmus Winther reveals 
that in Weismann’s earlier work (1881) he held a view which did not split 
the organism into two distinct parts. Weismann still believed that there was 
an external environment, but this was external to the whole organism.  He 
defined the organism as internal to the external environment (Winther 
2001: 520 ft. 7).  But by 1893, he restricts what is internal to the germ 
plasm.  The germ plasm was the sole source of organizational form and 
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variation.  And it alone was ultimately responsible for determining the fate 
of cells: 
a certain cell in a subsequent embryonic stage does not give rise to 
a nerve, and muscle, or an epithelial cell because it happens to be 
so situated as to be influenced by certain other cells in one way or 
another, but because it contains special determinants for nerve, 
muscle, or epitheliael cells [in its germ plasm] (Weismann 1893: 
134).   
 
The resultant phenotypes of the cells were not based on self determination 
of the cells, cells were merely the passive bodies acted upon by the germ 
plasm.  It was this perspective that lead to what is often termed 
Weismannianism.  This perspective extended the strongest claims of 
Weismann (from 1893 onwards).  It took the dualism of germ and 
somatoplasm to be evidence that any external influences that affected the 
somatoplasm were, by definition, non-heritable, as it was forever separated 
from the germ plasm, which was the sole material of heredity.  This sleight 
of hand only succeeds in justifying Weismann’s distinction between the 
soma and germ by assuming it first, a vicious circularity for which 
Weismann should not be held culpable (Winther 2001).  
 
 
2.4.1 THE INTERACTIONIST CONSENSUS AND ITS CRITICS 
 
 Although the spirit of Weismannian dualism may infuse the modern 
gene-centred perspectives, it seems unlikely that any of its advocates would 
support a purely preformationist or purely epigenetic view of organismal 
form (as characterized in the beginning historical sections of this chapter).  
However, this is not the case.  It appears the specters of preformationism 
and epigenetics seem to haunt not only Kant, but many others who try to set 
up their view somewhere in the space between these two opposing 
perspectives.  This bothersome duo has troubled even one of the founders of 
Modern Synthesis.  Perhaps in an attempt to exorcize them once and for all, 
Ernst Mayr (1997) proposed that by combining parts of preformationism 
and epigenetics a more complete understanding of the organization of 
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organisms can be attained.  He wagers modern genetics itself does just that.  
By offering a view that combines the best parts of both epigenesis and 
preformationism, it relies on DNA as the preformed causal source of 
information which unrolls over the gradual epigenetic development of the 
organism.  Mayr claims that the idea of a genetic program which directs the 
organism’s organization and development relies on the belief that genes 
rather than anything else are the sources of causal agency (Mayr 1968: 379).  
Modern genetics provides this union, as it  
distinguished between a genotype (the genetic constitution of an 
individual) and a phenotype (the totality of the observable 
characteristics of an individual) and showed that during 
development the genotype, by containing the genes for becoming a 
chick, could control the production of a chick phenotype.  By thus 
providing the information for development, the genotype is the 
preformed element.  But by directing the epigenetic development 
of the seemingly formless mass of the egg, it also played the role 
of the vis essentialis of the epigenesis …. Molecular biology 
removed the last unknown by showing that the genetic DNA 
program of the zygote was this vis essentialis.  The introduction of 
the genetic program terminated the old controversy.  The answer 
was thus, in a way, a synthesis of epigenesis and preformation.  
The process of development, the unfolding phenotype, is 
epigenetic.  However, development is also preformationist because 
the zygote contains an inherited genetic program that largely 
determines the phenotype (Mayr 1997: 157-8).   
 
This view is, as Mayr freely admits, preformationist in its thinking 
that an organism’s form is specified in advance of its ontogeny—arguably, 
before it is even alive.  It is specified as soon as a zygote is formed.  The 
ontogenetic process of the organism’s becoming formed throughout its 
lifetime is for Mayr, as it was for Weismann, irrelevant to understanding 
the cause of its form.  The environment in which the organism develops 
within its lifetime is taken to be easily screened-off as non-heritable and not 
evolutionarily significant (it affects the somatic cells and not the causally 
salient germ cells responsible for the organism’s form). 
 Although not without criticism, a version of Mayr’s genes-plus-
environment view, or as it is more commonly known, the interactionist 
consensus, is widely held (for criticisms cf. Lehrman 1953, Oyama 2000, 
Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, Lewontin 2001, and Moss 2001).  In response to 
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the question how like produces like, an interactionist answers that it is not 
just genes but the interaction between genes and the environment which 
causes like to produce like.  Opponents of this consensus argue that the 
ontogeny of an organism is not the result of interactions between the 
environment and the genes when these are conceived of as standing in two 
ontologically separate Weismannian spheres.  Instead, it results from (the 
arguably embedded) relationships between the environment and the 
organism (Lehrman 1953: 345).  The main criticism of the interactionist 
view that proponents of the developmental systems perspective have offered 
is that the dichotomy between the genes and the environment (as including 
everything but genes) is a false one (Griffiths and Gray 1994).  
Interactionism is therefore dead in the water as it relies on this distinction 
between the environment and the genes as two isolated entities which can 
then interact with each other.  Extending the point originally made by 
Daniel Lehrman, the interactions or relationships do not exist between an 
isolated environment and isolated genes—or indeed, an isolated organism—
but between the organism within its environment (Griffiths and Gray 1994). 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2 OVEREMPHASIZING THE ACTIVE SUBJECT 
 
In addition to the above, there are other philosophical problems which 
affect both the interactionist perspective as well as the Kantian perspective.  
These can be revealed by looking at the perspective from which both are 
based.  Interactionists believe that an organism’s form is the result of the 
interaction between the informational program contained in the genes 
inherited from its parents and the information within the organism’s 
environmental niche.  The genetic program actively directs and organizes 
the unfolding of the organism’s form throughout its ontogeny.  The 
preformed program directs the form and organization of the organismal 
body through a set of instructions which regulate, trigger, and interact with 
 80
the information contained in the environment (Mayr 1997).  The form of an 
organism is acted on from within by this directed unfolding of the preformed 
program and from without by the selective moulding of the environment.  
For interactionists, the transgenerational unity we observe as like 
producing like is the result of the same informational program which is 
passed from parent to offspring in the genes.  
Interactionism draws on an implicit acceptance of the Weismannian 
dualism as it holds there to be two separate parts of the organism:  the 
active subject which directs the ontogeny of organismal form (the genes), 
and the passive object of that direct action, (the body).  Although not 
Weismannian, our Kantian approach to organismal self-organization is also 
committed to a distinction between an active subject and a passive object.  
We understand the organism as self-directing its own organizational form 
because we compare it to the analogon of the thinking subject.  This way of 
thinking about the world puts emphasis on organisms as active subjects 
based on how we conceive ourselves as agents.  We interpret our own 
activities as being caused by reasons to act.  Oyama suggests that this 
amounts to understanding our own mental processes “by placing another 
‘we’ inside us, the mentalistic ghost in the machine” Oyama 2000: 88, after 
Ryle 1949).  
An illustration may help to explain what she means by this inner 
“ghost.”  Yesterday, I ran down to the end of the road because I wanted to 
buy a pint of milk for my morning porridge; I thought to myself, the 
milkman still hasn’t arrived and I know the corner shop is open early.  
These reasons were the cause of my running to the end of the road.  
However, it would be a mistake to think that there is an inner me inside my 
head directing my actions.   
 This subjective perspective leads interactionists to posit an internal 
master controller (genes or genome) as the causal agent that directs the 
activities and ontogeny of the organism and an external agent directing the 
organism’s ontogeny externally (the environment or natural selection) as a 
natural stand in for the supernatural agency of God.  In both cases, an agent 
of causal power is posited to direct the ontogeny of organismal form.  This is 
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facilitated either by “virtue of the meaning of in-formation as ‘shaping’ and 
‘animating,’ … [it] promised to supply just the cognitive and causal 
functions needed to make a heap of chemicals into a being” or by the 
moulding of the selecting environment (Oyama 1985: 12).  If we are 
interactionists, what we are doing when we think that the genetic program 
directs and orchestrates the ontogeny of the organismal form is we consider 
the genes to be an inner subjective agency located inside the nucleus 
(Oyama 2000: 87).   
 For interactionists as well as for Kantians, our experiences of the 
world are predominantly influenced by thinking of ourselves as subjects to 
the objects with which we interact.  We understand the causes of our own 
actions and we cite the reasons which lead us to act, e.g. like my episode of 
running to get the milk.  Our knowledge of the world is, inescapably, as 
agents.  For Kant, this is a prerequisite for understanding the world.  We 
understand organisms as purposive, by using our regulative principle of 
reason, the thinking subject.  Our mindedness (conceived of as an invisible 
internal subject), the external source of subjective superpower (conceived of 
as the omnipotent power of a supreme being), and the contents of the world 
that are not us (objects, e.g. other people, animals and trees) are all 
projections of our own subjectivity—either outwardly or inwardly construed 
to understand ourselves and the contents of the world.  In what strikes me 
as a particularly Kantian tone, Oyama argues that when we seek to 
understand the world, we do so by using ourselves as a template—we 
conceive of our actions to be the result of a super-subjective inner-me 
directing my actions.  How I arrange the contents of the world, my 
understanding of continuity, causation, and order is, therefore, premised on 
my own experience as an active subject.  
 Oyama objects to the kind of dualist perspective perpetuated in the 
gene-centred and interactionist views, which separate subject and object, 
form and matter.  She argues that “this separation of form from matter 
underlies and unites all versions of the nature-nurture antithesis that have 
so persistently informed our philosophical and scientific approaches to the 
phenomena of life” (Oyama, 2000: 1).  What I have called the Weismannian 
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dualist perspective conceives of mind and body, form and matter, and 
nature and nurture as antithetical pairs.   
 Although she does not state her view as such, Oyama seems to both 
adopt and reject two of Kant’s regulative principles:  the thinking subject 
and God.  Used as a regulative principle, the thinking subject appears to be 
what Oyama refers to as our “mindedness,” “the ghost,” or the “invisible 
internal subject.”  In what could be taken as a challenge to both the 
interactionist’s dualist perspective as well as the Kantian’s, she argues that 
this way of thinking “both exaggerates our role as detached subjects and 
denies our object-like [role]” (Oyama 1985: 76).  This causes more than a 
little trouble for a Kantian.  If our subjective perspective overstates our role 
as subjects and understates our objectivity, this distortion affects all 
understanding that is acquired using the thinking subject as a regulative 
principle of reason.  But what can we do about it?  If this regulative 
principle is based on reflecting on ourselves as thinking subjects, how can 
we get away from this arguably entrenched perspective of ourselves as 
embodied mindedness?  And if the way we perceive the world is inherently 
as subjects, what does this mean for our knowledge of what we think are 
real objects and order in the world?  In particular, how can we justify the 
veridicality of our knowledge of the world when our perceptions of the world 
are from an inherently subjective perspective?   
 If as Kant argues, our understanding and scientific knowledge of the 
world is only possible through our regulative ideas (of the thinking subject, 
God and mechanism), then how can we both screen off our experience of the 
world as thinking subjects and still use the analogon of the thinking subject 
to order our experience of it as well?  In the last remaining sections I 
introduce some ways of dealing with this problem and suggest that one 
alternative is that we reconceptualize the regulative principle of the 
thinking subject. 
 
 
2.5 TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF CAUSATION:  THE ORGANISM 
AS A NEXUS OF CAUSES 
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Just before this revision to the neo-Kantian perspective can be laid 
out, there is some unfinished business to attend to.  In what has come 
before, the problem of the ontogeny of individual organismal form has 
frequently been expressed alongside the unity of form from one generation 
to the next, as like produces like.  This is not the result of an unintended 
conflation of ontogeny with phylogeny.  It is true that the ontogeny of form 
in individual organisms and the phylogenetic unity of form over generations 
are traditionally understood using two different conceptual frameworks.  
The former understood in terms of the internal instruction of the genetic 
program and the latter in terms of the external moulding of the 
environment which selects over generations of organisms.  Following 
Oyama, I argue that this distinction is artificial and does not represent any 
real causal separation that enables us to isolate the causes of ontogeny from 
the causes of phylogeny: 
Development has conventionally been explained by internalist 
[genetic] models and evolution by externalist [selectionist] ones.  
But developmental constancy is no less a product of (systemic) 
interaction than is variation.  In like manner, lability … [or] 
variability is not less (interactively) systemic than is constancy 
(Oyama 2001: 188-9). 
 
Oyama denies that the dualism of internal and external causes, the 
division between ontogenetic and phylogenetic causes which they underlie, 
and the dichotomy of environment and genetic causes on which 
interactionism is based, exists.   
Taking Oyama’s anti-dualism to its extreme, I claim that what 
interactionists endeavour to pick out with their talk of the dual causes of 
genes and environment is not ontologically divisible.  These causes do not 
exist independently of one another, but only count as causes within the 
whole functional-developmental perdurance of an organism.  In the foreword 
to the 2000 edition of the Ontogeny of Information, Lewontin emphasizes 
the potency and centrality of this anti-dualism in Oyama’s perspective: 
Without organisms there may be a physical world, but there are 
no environments.  In like manor, no organisms exist in the 
abstract without environment … organisms are the nexus of 
external circumstances and DNA molecules that make these 
physical circumstances into causes of development in the first 
 84
place.  They become causes only at their nexus, and they cannot 
exist as causes except in their simultaneous action (Oyama 2000: 
xiv).  
 
 To this end, Taylor (2001) takes up the baton from Oyama, insisting 
that we cease assuming that the causes of transgenerational continuity and 
ontogenetic unity can be parcelled out neatly into two separate ontological 
boxes.  He suggests that instead of setting up dichotomous pairs of causes, 
we would do better to “consider, instead, what would follow if those [causes] 
were to be explained as contingent outcomes of ‘intersecting processes’” 
(Taylor 2001: 313).   
Taylor echoes Oyama’s criticism of the distinction between subjects 
and objects and the overemphasis on the active subject.  He suggests that 
understanding the world or the organism in terms of the active subject 
trades on the assumption that there is one “concentrated” source of causal 
agency—located in our genes.  But concentrating causal agency in one 
source does not sufficiently represent the nature of causation.  Taylor sets 
out his heterogeneous view of the self-construction of organisms, arguing 
that there are: 
many heterogeneous components linked together which implies 
that the outcome has multiple contributing causes and thus there 
are multiple points of intervention or engagement that could 
modify the course of development.  In short, causality and agency 
are distributed, not localized.  Moreover, construction is a process 
… components are linked over time (Taylor 2001: 316).   
 
This view substitutes single “concentrated” causes of organismal 
organization in preference for causes that are “distributed” over space and 
time.  What does it mean to say that an organism constructs itself from 
heterogeneous causes; and that these causes are distributed?  It means that 
the organism uses different components—genes, proteins, cytoplasmic 
structures and organelles, metabolic pathways, sources of food 
(photosynthesis, nutrient cycle, particular kinds of vegetation), learned 
behaviours, other species, such as predators, prey, branches, leaves, lakes, 
mountains—as causal resources in building itself over its lifetime.  Its self-
construction consists in linking certain components of its neurological, 
cellular (or ecological) development to other components in space and time 
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throughout its ontogeny.  Components by themselves do not constitute the 
causes of an organism’s ontogeny; it is only their linkage over time and 
space which makes them the causes of its ontogeny (Taylor 2001: 316).  This 
series of linkage events and processes is not specified in advance of the 
organism’s ontogeny, but is a result of it.  These contingent outcomes of 
developmental processes have a history.  They have an ontogeny that is 
dependent on what has come before.  This view ties back into Oyama’s; she 
states that these linked events are “identified by reference to the organism 
and may emerge only through its activity … they exist neither in the head 
nor in the surroundings.  They are constructed during an interactional 
history” (Oyama 2001: 189).  Organisms construct their form over time 
depending on responses in earlier stages of their ontogeny.  These responses 
and their effects on the organismal form then affect later stages of the 
organism’s ontogeny.  Which resources are used as causes and how they are 
used are determined through the ontogenetic activities of the organism.  
  Whereas Kant maintained that organisms are means and end, cause 
and effect, the subjective agents directing their own existence, Taylor and 
Oyama seem to hold a modified Kantian view in taking organisms to be both 
the necessary subjects that construct themselves throughout their ontogeny 
as well as the responsive objects of this constructive process.  The 
construction of an organism’s form is therefore not concentrated just within 
the organism’s Keime and Anlagen, but is both temporally and spatially 
distributed among the contingent resources available and dependent upon 
how these resources were linked in past stages of its ontogeny or in the 
lifetimes of its parents or littermates.   
 
 
2.5.1 THE ENVIRONMENTAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF ORGANISMS 
 
 This chapter has followed two questions which have occupied 
thinking on biological organization:  how do organisms acquire the form and 
organization they do, and how do parents produce offspring like themselves.  
However, criticizing various solutions to these questions, tracing Kant’s own 
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solution, and evaluating later neo-Kantian perspectives are not the ultimate 
aim of this chapter.  These have been necessary to uncover the conceptual 
ground (regulative ideas, underlying assumptions about preformed and 
informed form, and the many dualisms (of subject/object, passive/active, 
genes/environment, internal/external) on which understanding of the causes 
of biological organization have been based.  Now that this conceptual ground 
is exposed, I wish to till and turn it over before planting the initial seeds of 
my own solution.  The philosophical writings of Ingold (2002, 2004), Moss 
(2001, 2006, 2008), and Wheeler (2005) have enabled the cultivation of my 
revised organism-centred perspective.   
My perspective reconstructs the Kantian view of organisms as self-
directed and self-organizing in terms of their “situatedness” within their 
environments.  To say an organism is situated means that its self-
organization, ontogeny, and all its activities according to its mode of life are 
dynamically embedded within its environment.  In this sense it is an 
artefact of the language that organism and environment are two separate 
terms.  To grammatically identify this embeddedness it is perhaps better—if 
linguistically unlovely to talk of the organism-environment.   
Talk of situatedness or embeddedness intentionally blurs the 
distinction between subject and object, mind and body.  The nature of all 
organisms’ self-organization is in their “com[ing] into being with their 
particular forms and capacities and in which, through their environmentally 
situated activities, they condition the development of other organisms … to 
which they relate” (Ingold 2004: 218).  An organism’s becoming formed is 
not due (as Mayr 1997 argues) to the unfolding of genetic program as its vis 
essentialis.  Instead, it is due to the organism’s way of living in the world, or 
to follow the trend for Latinate terminology, its modus vivendi (Ingold 
2002). 
 As both Moss and Ingold independently suggest, the difficulties in 
articulating some of the concepts and kinds of things in the biological world 
as well as accurately accounting for the directionality of cause and effect 
discussed do not appear to be a problem specifically plaguing biology or even 
philosophy of biology.  These difficulties seem to be symptomatic of what I 
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interpret to be an ontological error of judgement—that is, we have for too 
long mistakenly thought our perception of objects in the world correspond to 
our concepts of it, without asking why it appears to us this way.  Although 
these transcendental questions of ontology often are considered in 
philosophy of mind or philosophy of language and form the bread and butter 
of traditional metaphysics, philosophy of biology seems to have been 
immune (or perhaps simply quarantined) from such ontological queries.10  
 
 
2.5.2 A REVISED ORGANISM-CENTRED VIEW 
 
 For most of this chapter I have endeavoured to show what is 
biologically beneficial and valuable in the Kantian view drawing attention 
to how later perspectives drew inspiration from ideas outlined in the 
Critique of Judgment and “Of the different human races.”  However, a 
strictly Kantian approach fails to be a sufficient conceptual aid in 
facilitating our understanding of organismal ontogeny and providing the 
heuristics necessary for reflecting on many of the scientific discoveries of the 
21st century.   
The question now to be answered is how can we best understand 
organisms as simultaneously means and ends, subject and object of their 
own organic activities and capacities?  Is it, as von Baer suggests, through 
their goal-directed behaviour as organic wholes?  If the purposiveness of 
organic wholes is manifest in the mutual interdependence of their parts, 
then thinking about organisms as purposes means thinking of them in 
terms of their Aristotelian final, formal, material, and efficient causes.  Is 
this, as Kant argued, only possible by using the three regulative principles 
of the thinking subject, mechanism, and God (as teleological force)?  Can we 
think about the nature of the structure and function of the parts of 
organisms to each other and to other organisms without relying on the 
regulative idea of the thinking subject?  
                                                     
10 I think this is a fair criticism of much of the Anglo-American discipline of 
philosophy of biology, however, it is not true of how it is treated elsewhere (cf. 
Gertrudis Van de Vijver et al. 2005). 
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To order and understand our phenomenal experiences of the world it 
would appear that we need some kind of regulative principles (metaphors or 
heuristics).  However, to avoid misrepresentations and unjustified 
assumptions to creep into the fabric of our scientific theories, we must be 
vigilant in our choice of regulative principles.  
I argue that Kant’s three regulative principles of reason are not 
enough to structure our phenomenal experience of the world.  In assessing 
and extending Kant’s view, I suggest that in addition to the regulative ideas 
he proposes (thinking subject, teleological cause, mechanism) a further 
regulative idea is required to enable our understanding of organisms as 
ecologically situated and heterogeneously self-constructing themselves from 
distributed causes.  Natural (heterogeneous) construction is a metaphor we 
can use to understand the organismal self-organization and as such can 
serve as an additional regulative principle.  Its use as metaphor (or 
analogon) to structure our phenomenal experience of organismal ontogeny 
and phylogeny is epistemologically equivalent to the other regulative ideas 
of reason.  It is a (normative) ideal which we use to order our phenomenal 
experience of organisms.   
Like the other Kantian regulative ideas, it is prerequisite for our 
ontological and ontogenetic understanding of organismal organization.  
Adding natural construction as a fourth regulative idea of reason not only 
means that we have a further analogon by which to understand organic 
organization, it also means that we increase our metaphysics of causes.  
Specifically we add to our linear and reciprocal causality a dynamic, 
heterogeneous causation of multiply intersecting causes.  As a regulative 
idea it adds to our biological ontology by enabling us to conceive of causality 
not just as reciprocal (as Kant did) but as arising from heterogeneous 
sources which are organized as causes by the organism itself.  Whereas von 
Baer interprets the agency of an organism’s development as its striving 
towards a particular final goal state, using heterogeneous construction we 
can understand that each causal step and each causal link in the journey to 
that goal state is determined and orchestrated by the organism.  This 
means, as philosophers of biology, we can reconceive what counts as causes 
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of the construction of organism-environmental complexes by identifying the 
contingent linkages this complex makes over space and time among a wide 
range of resources (including genes, cells, tissues, behaviours, trees, rocks, 
nests).  
For Kant, the organism was defined in terms of as a closed set of 
interconnecting relationships which did not make use of external resources 
outside its skin.  My own organism-centred perspective can be understood as 
opening up the organism.  Instead of only allowing the internal stock of 
Keime and Anlagen to be the resources available to the organism in its 
ontogeny, I add to these the so-called external resources in the environment 
which the organism may also avail itself of during the course of its 
ontogeny.   
With the addition of the new regulative principle of natural 
construction, my organism-centred perspective forms a real alternative to 
the current trend for conceiving the causes of organismal organization and 
phylogenetic continuity in terms of concentrated sources of organizing 
power.  It provides a philosophical perspective which says that the causes 
are distributed among a number of diverse sources and organized as causes 
by the organisms themselves instead of as concentrated within the genes, 
genomes, or environments.  Utilizing this additional regulative idea of 
reason enables us to reconceive a number of biological kinds and 
phenomena.  For instance, instead of understanding variation as random 
mutation, by using the regulative idea of self-construction, we can 
understand variation as part of the adaptive resources the organism uses in 
directing its own organization—the organism may either buffer the random 
mutation or amplify it to serve its needs.   
 Our revision of a Kantian organism-centred perspective is not yet 
complete.  Following the criticisms of Oyama and Taylor, we need to ask 
whether or not we can retain Kant’s notion of organisms as purposive, self-
organized beings without falling afoul of the troubles of overstating their 
subjective nature and understating their situatedness within their 
environment and interactivity with their heterogeneous resources?  We 
must outlaw any regulative principles which rely on concentrated sources of 
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cause (either in the genes or in the environment) that set up a dualism 
between that which is active and that which is passive.  If we are to retain 
the thinking subject as a regulative principle, we need to begin by first 
reconceiving ourselves as embedded in our environment as situated-
thinking-subjects.  Our situatedness must then be retained in our use of the 
situated-thinking-subject as a regulative principle of reason.  When used as 
an analogon to understand all organisms (including ourselves), we come to 
know them through our regulative idea as situated within an environment.  
This move brings our situatedness in the world to the fore.  By doing so, we 
become aware of our own embeddedness within our environment allowing 
us to order and understand our phenomenal experiences of the world as 
reflecting this fact.   
 Having articulated the understanding and misunderstanding of the 
causes of organismal organization and the continuity of form for the bulk of 
this chapter, it is perhaps appropriate to explain the role of the second half 
of the hyphenated perspective I call the organism-centred view.  My use of 
the word “centred” in this perspective is not what it might initially appear.  
It is not intended to indicate that it is the organism rather than the gene or 
the environment that has causal primacy.  On the contrary, “centred” plays 
an ontological role.  An organism-centred perspective is one which takes 
what I have articulated to be the situatedness of the organism-environment 
seriously.  An organism is, in a very real sense of the word, a centre of 
dynamic, situated activity, or as Lewontin states, the “nexus” of causes.  It 
is important to note that the situatedness of organism-environments is a 
situatedness in both time and space.11   
 Over the next two chapters I cash out how this organism-centred view 
works in reconceptualizing our perspectives of the biological concepts of 
traits, homology, and species.  In Chapter Five I discuss how this 
perspective might illuminate some of the debates surrounding the 
controversial concept of race.  Chapter Three, which focuses on homology 
and traits, centres on an updated version of Kant’s idea of a common 
generative capacity—in particular, the conservation of a common body plan 
                                                     
11 This might seem obvious on reflection, as the organism’s ontogeny occurs over its 
lifetime, but sometimes the obvious needs stating to be brought to our attention. 
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and the capacity for a wide range of phenotypic and developmental 
possibilities.  Whereas Kant understood this range of possibilities to lie in 
the original stock of Keime and Anlagen, I show that these can be 
interpreted in terms of a developmental space of possibilities or in West-
Eberhard apt phrase, the organism’s “phenotypic repertoire” (West-
Eberhard 2003: 146).  In the following chapters I discuss the implications of 
the mosaicism of evolution, developmental recombination, the mixed 
ancestry of complex traits, and the abundance of intraspecific 
polymorphisms and polyphenisms for our understanding of homology, 
species, and race.  Discussions in each chapter will centre on the 
purposiveness of flexibly responsive ontogenesis and the self-constructive 
activities of organisms using diverse resources.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Extending the meaning and reference of the concepts 
“Trait” and “Homology”  
 
 
From early antiquity, it was observed that different animals share striking 
similarities among some of their traits.  Whilst some were thought to be 
accidental similarities, others were believed to be the result of deliberate 
design for a specific purpose.  For instance, many aquatic animals shared 
certain traits; such as fins, whilst animals occupying aerial environments 
tended to have wings, (e.g. butterflies, birds, and bats).  Animals as diverse 
as blow flies, manatees, octopi, and crocodiles all had eyes.  And the bone 
configurations of bats’, whales’, and humans’ forelimbs seemed to be 
arranged in a similar way to one another.   
 If the similarities of these traits were not accidental, then their 
presence in a wide range of animals required some kind of explanation—
explanations that identified the reason for these similarities.   
 Whereas some traits, like the fins of aquatic animals, appeared to 
share a particular function—enabling the organism to propel itself through 
water—others, like the forelimbs of bats, whales, and humans, served 
different functions.  If these anatomical structures appear to be the same 
structure in different animals even though they do not share similar 
functions, and are not accidental, what is the nature of their similarity?  
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The observed similarities among these diverse structures were due to the 
similar positional arrangement of the bones of their forelimbs and their 
relationships to the other bones of the skeleton.  Rather than functional 
similarity, the reason for their similarity was their shared structural 
configuration.   
 This view led to the classical accounts of the comparable functional 
and structural similarities among organisms.  In these, the reason for their 
similarities was frequently given in terms of their reflection of ideal forms 
(e.g. references to Platonic forms or Goethe’s idealist Naturphilosophie).  
The resemblance of individual traits of different animals to one another was 
explained in terms of their common cause—both traits were the 
approximated reflections of an ideal form or archetypal trait.   
 In 1843, Richard Owen provided the first formal distinction between 
these two kinds of comparative similarity—the functional similarity he 
called “analogy” and the structural similarity he called “homology.”  He 
identified the cause of the similarity of analogous organismal traits in terms 
of the common functions they served:  “Analogue: … A part or organ in one 
animal which has the same function as another part or organ in a different 
animal” (Owen 1843: 374).  Unlike analogy, Owen’s definition of homology 
contained no such causal explanation:  “Homologue: … The same organ in 
different animals under every variety of form and function” (Owen 1843: 
349).  Although his definition referred to homologues as the “same organs,” 
it provided no reason for this similarity and did not explicitly identify in 
what way two organs were the “same.”    
 Although intended to identify the identity of two organs, this notion 
of sameness was not meant to imply the material identity of two organs.  
Owen’s use of “the same” was somewhat ambiguous.  He referred broadly to 
the structural or positional identity of organs.  After Owen formalized the 
definitions of homology and analogy, attempts to provide a causal 
explanation of the similarity of homologues became widespread.  
 One such attempt was that made by Darwin.  Darwin’s theory of 
descent with modification provided a causal explanation of Owen’s homology 
and replaced the classical notion of the similarity of corresponding 
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structures to an ideal form or archetype with that of a common progenitor.  
Homologues were the result of descent and modification from a common 
ancestor.  And so the study of homology was the comparison of traits of 
organisms in terms of their similar correspondence due to shared ancestry.  
The wing of a bat and the arm of a human are homologous to each other 
because these traits were conserved over many generations of organisms 
and descended, with modification, from the same forelimb structure in the 
nearest common ancestor of both bats and humans.  However, the 
explanation of the “sameness” of these forelimbs (i.e. the bat’s wing and the 
human’s arm) is not contained in the identification of their similar bone 
structure.  It is not their structural correspondence per se but their 
historical continuity—the inheritance of a certain feature with modification 
from the same ancestor which is then conserved over generations.   
 This conception of homology as correspondence due to shared 
ancestry may initially seem an unambiguously straightforward conception 
of biological relatedness.  However, little credence should be given to this 
initial impression.   
 Homology is a notoriously elusive concept to pin down (cf. Hall 1994 
and papers therein).  There has been, and continues to be, sustained debate 
over the meaning of homology, the nature of correspondence (e.g. whether 
homology is an all-or-nothing relation or whether it admits of degrees), and 
the units of comparison (e.g. whole organisms, traits as morphological 
outcomes, behavioural activities, biochemical mechanisms, developmental 
processes, or certain properties of traits).   
 Touching on each of these, the focus of my discussion centres on 
extending the meaning of homology from the neo-Darwinian all-or-nothing 
understanding of it.  The all-or-nothing approach takes homology to be the 
relationship between two or more (usually morphological) outcomes that 
fully correspond to each other in terms of their unbroken inheritance from a 
single common ancestor.  If traits correspond in this narrow way they are 
homologues.  If they do not, they are not.  Understanding homology in this 
way means that homology does not admit of degrees.  One consequence of 
this conception of homology is that partial correspondence, either as a result 
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of inheritance of corresponding traits through a broken, interrupted 
ancestor-descendent lineage from a common ancestor, or correspondence 
due to inheritance from more than one ancestor, all count as non-
homologous. 
 But if instead of taking the linear view of evolution assumed by the 
neo-Darwinian approach, we take a mosaic (or “combinatorial”) view, the 
meaning of homology itself must be reconceived and extended to include 
partial and mixed homology (cf. West-Eberhard 2003: Ch. 7, 25).12   
 If the resources used in the construction of organismal traits are 
inherited from diverse genetic, cellular, behavioural, and environmental 
sources, then the traits that result are equally mosaic.  So conceived, they 
are the product of heterogeneous construction from multiple ancestral 
sources.  As a result, any comparison between these traits must necessarily 
be expressed in terms of their partial (or mixed) homology (and/or analogy).   
 Reconceiving evolution and traits as mosaic and homology as mixed 
follows directly from the organism-centred perspective set out in Chapter 
Two.  These are the conceptual consequences that come from thinking about 
organismal form as the product of heterogeneous self-construction and a 
distributed view of organic causation.  When viewed from this perspective, 
the possible mechanisms of inheritance through which resources are 
acquired are extended to include not just the vertical inheritance of genetic 
and extragenetic resources, but also horizontally inherited behavioural and 
environmental resources.   
 Before laying out the details of this reconception of homology, I begin 
with a survey of the early classical conceptions as well as some more recent 
suggestions for a developmental conception of homology.  After this 
historical review, I reveal the underlying linear view of causation relied 
upon by the neo-Darwinists and analyse how this has both shaped the 
meaning of homology and restricted the units of comparison.   
 Next, I discuss some developmental challenges to the linear view and 
the mosaic alternative.  Taking this mosaic perspective to its conclusion, I 
show how traits as units of comparison may be extended from the 
                                                     
12 The linear view and alternatives to it will be introduced in sections 3.4, 3.5 and 
3.5.1.  
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morphological outcomes of developmental processes to comparisons of 
behavioural patterns, developmental processes, and life stages.  Lastly, I 
suggest that if traits are the product of heterogeneous and distributed 
resources inherited from multiple sources, we may find that they can only 
be compared in terms of mixed (or mosaic) homology (e.g. partially 
homologous, partially non-homologous).  
 
 
3.1 COMPARATIVE CONCEPTS FROM BELON (1555) TO DARWIN (1859) 
 
 Although the study of comparative anatomy dates back to Aristotle’s 
system of nature, the earliest record of the explicit structural and positional 
equivalence between the features of different animals can be found in 
Belon’s anatomical illustrations of 1555 (reprinted in Panchen 1994: 43, 
figure 8).  These detailed sketches compared the position and arrangement 
of the bones of a human with those of a bird.  What was of particular 
significance in these sketches was how Belon arranged the bones of both the 
bird and the human skeleton in the same upright position.  The skeleton of 
the bird was shown in an unnatural position that mirrored the normal 
upright standing position of the human skeleton:  its head, neck and spinal 
column formed a straight line and the forelimbs hung down on either side of 
the body ventrally splayed.  Rather than picturing the bones of the bird in 
their natural arrangement in the skeleton of a living bird, the side-by-side 
upright alignment of both the bird and the human skeleton emphasized the 
positional equivalence and corresponding topology of the bones of each 
animal and their similar relationships with the other bones within each 
skeleton.   
 Prior to Owen’s formal distinction between homology and analogy in 
1843, the most influential discussions on comparative anatomy occurred 
during the debates between Cuvier and the idealist Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
(c.1830-1833) at the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle, Jardin des 
Plantes in Paris.13  Cuvier and Geoffroy held different views on what they 
                                                     
13 What seems to be a precursor to Cuvier’s own conception of homology can be 
found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.  Unfortunately I do not have space for a full 
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believed to be the significant relationships among corresponding traits in 
different animals.  A caricature of their positions often given is that Cuvier 
argued that similar functions are the cause of structural similarities, 
whereas Geoffroy argued that structural similarity is the cause of the 
similarity of function.  However this perfunctory description of their debate 
obscures many conceptual nuances between the two views.  
To fully understand the basis for these competing views it will be 
necessary to consider the theoretical bases of their individual positions.  I 
begin with Cuvier’s (1812) theory of embranchements.  This theory claimed 
there to be four basic body plans of animal structure:  Vertebrates (e.g. bony 
fish, birds, and humans), Articulates (e.g. lobsters, horseshoe crabs, and 
dung beetles), Radiates (e.g. sponges, sea anemones, and starfish), and 
Molluscs (e.g. snails, octopi, and cuttlefish).  In positing these four body 
plans, Cuvier’s theory took certain sets of body parts, features, or traits to 
be found together in certain animals.  Traits could not be found in just any 
arrangement or admixture but only within the constraints of one of the four 
basic body plans (cf. Russell 1916: 41).14  
Cuvier’s embranchements were not ideal archetypes—they were actual 
combinations of traits that were found together in particular animals.  
These groups of traits were not just random arrangements of parts but acted 
in cooperation with other traits of the organism towards a particular goal or 
purpose.  The upshot of Cuvier’s theory of embranchements was that only 
sets of traits which act together in this way are those which are actually 
found in nature.  This was because the structure and arrangement of traits 
was dependent upon the environment and conditions for the sake of which 
they were formed in the animal.  Put another way, the traits of animals 
                                                                                                                                                           
prehistory of homology, however, I do want to direct my readers back to my 
discussion (in Chapter Two) of Kant’s conception of common generic capacities of 
organisms (in particular, 2.3 “Concepts of bodily organization: Kant’s schema, 
Cuvier’s embranchements, and von Baer’s types”).  Putting to one side Kant’s anti-
adaptationism, one might view his common generic capacity and “common schema” 
as precursors to the concept of homology in Cuvier’s later work and perhaps even 
Darwin’s.  Kant observes that organisms of the same genera share a common bone 
structure and suggests that this is due to their being related to a “common original 
mother” or “archetype” (Kant 1790: Ak. 419).   
14 I rely here on Russell’s (1916) account of Geoffroy and Cuvier’s theories as it 
remains one of the best (but see also Appel 1987 for a more recently published 
account). 
 98
correlated with the conditions required for the organism’s existence within a 
particular environment. 
Cuvier understood the organism’s functional unity and the 
interconnectedness of structurally identical parts in different organisms in 
terms of their interdependence with other traits towards a telos.  In this 
respect, he was influenced by Kant’s view of organisms as natural purposes: 
Cuvier was indeed a teleologist after the fashion of Kant, and 
there can be no doubt that he was influenced … by Kant’s Kritik 
der Urtheilskraft [Critique of Judgement] … Teleology in Kant’s 
sense is and will always be a necessary postulate of biology.  It 
does not supply an explanation of organic forms and activities, but 
without it one cannot even begin to understand living things 
(Russell 1916: 35). 
 
By conceiving homology teleologically, Cuvier understood the similarity of 
parts between two different animals as due to the similarity of their 
functional goals or purposes.  For him the animal’s mode of living 
determined the arrangement, position, and relationships of its appendages, 
organs, and other features (i.e. traits) of its body.  For instance, if the 
animal lived in the deep sea, it would require a soft invertebrate body plan 
so as to withstand great pressures and suctioned tentacles for easily 
grasping prey in low light.  Thus, a body plan characteristic of Molluscs.  
The purposes for which these traits are used by a deep sea living animal, 
such as an octopus, might include the ability to dive to great depths, 
collapse its body to fit through small openings between rocks, capture 
slippery prey with little or no light, quick propulsion through an aquatic 
environment, and the ability to attach itself to various surfaces.  These are 
what determine their structure (e.g. a soft invertebrate body with eight leg-
like appendages with suckers along the underside attaching to the base of 
the head surrounding the mouth). 
In contrast to Cuvier’s four embranchements, Geoffroy believed that 
there was only one body plan common to all animals.  All animals (and all 
organs, appendages, and other traits) were based on the same shared 
universal plan (cf. Russell 1916: 54-64).  For Geoffroy, the organization of 
animal form was the differential expression of one generalized, abstract, 
universal type.  Homological correspondence between the same organs in 
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different animals could be explained as the result of animals sharing the 
same universal body plan.  Two organs are the same (i.e. homologues) if 
they are located in the same position in the bodies of the two different 
animals being compared.  Any variations among these organs were due to 
the independent modifications of each animal from the universal body plan.   
There may be an infinite variety of modifications observed among 
different animals.  These are different aberrations in the structural form or 
function from the ideal.  Geoffroy expected wide variations in form and 
function of homologous organs.  What mattered in the comparison of 
homologues was only that their position remained constant:  “an organ can 
be deteriorated, atrophied, annihilated, but not transposed” (Geoffroy 1818: 
xxx, as quoted in Russell 1916: 53).   
The centrality of positional continuity formed the foundation of 
Geoffroy’s theory of homology, the keystone of which was his principe des 
connexions.  The homology of organs is determined by their positional 
relationship within the body and its topological relationship to other organs: 
the trunk with its organs can, as it were, move bodily along the 
vertebral column, so as to be found in one class near the front end 
of the vertebral column, in another about the middle, and in a 
third near the end, then I can show you in detail that the 
constituent parts of this trunk are found in all classes to be 
invariably in the same positions relatively to one another 
(Geoffroy 1818: 1, as quoted in Russell 1916).   
 
Whereas Cuvier’s notion of homology focused on whether 
interdependent structures share a common functional goal or purpose in 
different animals and its particular embranchement, Geoffroy’s reliance on 
an abstracted notion of a universal body plan meant that the homology of 
organs in different animals depended ultimately on their relative position to 
other organs and features of the body in comparison to those of another.  
Cuvier’s body plans were discrete and fixed.  There were no transformations 
and no intermediates between the four embranchements.  For Geoffroy, the 
universal body plan was almost infinitely flexible, producing a continuum of 
intermediate transformations and modifications to this body plan.   
Shortly after the debates between Geoffroy and Cuvier, Owen provided 
a formal distinction between homology and analogy:  “Homologue: … The 
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same organ in different animals under every variety of form and function” 
(Owen, 1843: 349) and, “Analogue: … A part or organ in one animal which 
has the same function as another part or organ in a different animal” (Owen 
1843: 374).  Owen believed that although the Geoffroy-Cuvier debates drew 
attention to the importance of the concepts of homology and analogy to 
comparative anatomy, they also beclouded their meaning.  Owen’s aim was 
to provide a clear and consistent definition of homology and analogy, 
something that had not been done previously.  This was necessary as it was 
the habit of Geoffroy to use “homology” and “analogy” interchangeably to 
mean the same thing.  Geoffroy’s (1818) theory of homology was entitled, 
“Théorie des analogues,” but in 1825, Owen showed that Geoffroy’s use of 
“homologue” was identical to his own conception of “serial homology” 
(Geoffroy 1818, as cited in Owen 1848: 5).15  
Despite these criticisms, Owen makes explicit use of Geoffroy’s principe 
des connexions in distinguishing homology and analogy.  Owen’s definition 
of homologues as “the same organs” is intended to capture their positional 
and topological orientation and structural correspondence in different 
organisms.  Homologous organs, such as the wing of a falcon and the foreleg 
of an ox, were identified in terms of their corresponding topological location 
within the falcon and the ox in relation to their other features (e.g. the 
position of the humerus and its attachment by ligaments to the ulnae and 
radii, claws and hooves of each animal).   
In contrast, the biological concept of analogy was defined in terms of 
the functional similarity of two organs in different organisms.  For instance, 
the wings of a blow fly are analogous to the wings of a hummingbird.  These 
are identified as such because of their similar functional role in enabling the 
animal to manoeuvre itself around an aerial environment.  
Owen drew inspiration from Cuvier’s theory of embranchements, as 
well as Geoffroy’s principe des connexions.  Cuvier’s influence was apparent 
in Owen’s conception of a “homological compound” (Owen 1843: 105):   
All those bones which are formed by a coalescence of parts 
answering to distinct elements of the typical vertebra are 
“homologically compound” when developed from more than one 
                                                     
15 I discuss serial homology below. 
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centre, whether such centres subsequently coalesce, or remain 
distinct, or even become the subject of individual adaptive 
modifications, with special joints, muscles, etc., for particular 
offices … the result of a special organising force … [and] 
teleological structure (Owen 1843: 106-8). 
 
But because Owen did not believe that Cuvier’s teleological point of 
view sufficiently explained the similar topological correspondence of organs’ 
positions across a variety of different animals, he augmented it with 
Geoffroy’s notion of the universal body plan—what Owen called the 
“archetype.”16  
Apart from formally distinguishing homology and analogy, Owen also 
provided the first account of the three kinds of homological relationship 
between the compared organs of organisms.  “General homology” was the 
comparison of two or more organs as similar where their similarity to each 
other was caused by their similarity to the same organ in the archetype (cf. 
Owen 1849: 40-42).  “Special homology” was defined as the comparison of 
the same organs within two different organisms.  This relationship does not 
include the comparison to the same organ in the archetype, but consists in 
“the correspondence of a part or organ [as] determined by its relative 
position and connections, with a part or organ in different animals” (Owen 
1848: 7).  The third kind of homology Owen specified was called “serial 
homology.”  Serial homology was the similarity between different parts or 
organs within the same organism (these parts are thought to possess the 
same basic structure).  Serial homologues arose from the repetitive 
construction and development of an iterative part (e.g. the vertebrae or the 
leaves of a plant).   
Comparative embryological studies of the morphological features of 
many organisms’ early anatomy lead both Haeckel (1866) and Darwin 
(1859) to reconceive Owen’s concept of homology in terms of the historical 
continuity of traits over generations of ancestors and descendents.  However 
whereas Haeckel’s historical notion of homology was based on the theory of 
                                                     
16 Although Geoffroy does not explicitly refer to an archetype, his universal 
common type is widely thought (Russell 1916, Hall 1994) to be the precursor to 
Owen’s archetype.   
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recapitulation, Darwin’s was based on the theory of descent with 
modification.   
Darwin was keen to distance himself from the idealism of Owen and 
Geoffroy and their particular use of the archetype.  Avoiding this idealist 
notion meant that in order to integrate the concept of homology into his 
theory of evolution he needed to make some alterations to its meaning and 
reference.  
Although Owen’s special homology made no reference to the archetype, 
it also provided no causal explanation of the topological correspondence of 
organs in different animals.  It was merely a description of their similar 
correspondence.  The only kind of homology characterized by Owen that had 
a causal explanation within its definition was that of general homology—the 
similarity of two corresponding organs in different animals to each other 
was caused by their similarity to the same organ in the archetype.   
Although Darwin sought to avoid these commitments to idealism, he 
does not rely on Owen’s notion of special homology (which does not refer to 
the archetype) for the basis of his own account of homology.  It was instead 
Owen’s general homology that Darwin used.  Looking at the role homology 
plays in Darwin’s theory reveals why.  For Darwin, homology is not just a 
description but a causal explanation; organs correspond to each other 
because they both correspond to the same common cause—a shared 
ancestor.  Darwin’s concept utilizes the same form of explanation as Owen’s 
general homology but interprets the archetype differently—in terms of the 
historic notion of a shared common ancestor rather than the idealist notion 
of the archetype:   
suppose that the ancient progenitor, the archetype as it may be 
called, of all mammals, had its limbs constructed on the existing 
general pattern, for whatever purpose they served, we can at once 
perceive the plain signification of the homologous construction of 
the limbs throughout the whole class (Darwin 1859: 435). 
 
In the above passage Darwin does not shy away from making use of Owen’s 
concept of the archetype in his historical conception of homology.  The 
historical notion of Darwin’s “ancient progenitor” replaces Owen’s idealist 
“archetype.” 
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 According to Darwin’s historical notion of homology, the traits of two 
different organisms are not homologous because of their shared function or 
form—which may differ greatly—and not because of their position or 
orientation.  These traits are homologous because they have both been 
inherited (and modified) from the same trait in an ancestor common to them 
both.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 THE CLADIST CONCEPTION OF HOMOLOGY 
 
 The historical conception of homology has gone through a number of 
amendments.  Initial changes were designed to remove any last traces of the 
idealism of the lingering notion of an archetype.  In the 1960s, Darwin’s 
historical notion was reconceived in terms of an historical-analytic 
conception of homology.  The theoretical basis for this reconception was 
cladism, Willi Hennig’s novel theory of systematics (Hennig 1966).  More 
recent variations to Hennig’s initial cladist conception remain popular (cf. 
Nelson and Platnick 1981, Patterson 1982, and Lauder 1994).   
 Cladism conceives of evolution as a series of speciation events over 
evolutionary time, represented as the branchings of a bifurcating tree.  
According to cladists a natural group is a branch of this phylogenetic tree 
called a “clade.”  A clade is a group of individuals related by a continuous 
common phylogenetic lineage.  Clades include all and only those individuals 
descended from an unbroken ancestor-descendent lineage from a single 
common ancestor (referred to as a “monophyletic” lineage).  
 Understanding homology from a cladist perspective entails different 
restrictions on both the meaning of homology and its application.  These 
restrictions are intended to disambiguate the confused meaning of similarity 
and continuity in the classical and the original historical concepts.  A cladist 
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approach narrows the relationship of homology to that of the corresponding 
similarity of traits due to the unbroken descent from a single common 
ancestor.  It restricts the meaning of homology to traits that are inherited 
through a monophyletic lineage—the result of a continuous unbroken linear 
inheritance from one shared ancestor possessing the ancestral trait to all 
(and only) its descendents:  “homology … is defined not in terms of 
similarity, correspondence, or ancestry but in terms of monophyly” (Nelson 
1994: 127).  Restricting the conception in this way means that traits which 
are the result of broken, non-linear, or mixed inheritance are dismissed as 
non-homologous.   
 Cladists tend to restrict the units of comparison to the morphological 
outcomes or end results of organismal developmental processes.  In addition 
to limiting the units of comparison to outcomes, the cladist view also 
restricts the meaning of homology by taking an all-or-nothing approach to 
homology.  It groups all traits that are not the result of monophyletic 
lineages together—referring to them collectively as “false homologies” or 
“homoplasies”:  “Homoplasy [is defined] as the possession by two or more 
taxa of a character derived not from the nearest common ancestor but 
through convergence, parallelism, or reversal” (Mayr and Ashlock 1991: 
418).   
 Homoplasy refers to the analogical similarity of corresponding traits 
due to inheritance from multiple ancestors through parallel or convergent 
evolution.  But it also refers to structural correspondences of traits between 
organisms that have inherited the trait from more than one ancestor (i.e. 
are polyphyletic), as well as traits inherited through a broken lineage from a 
shared ancestor (e.g. recurrent traits that do not occur in every generation). 
 A clear dichotomy between unbroken (monophyletic) lineages and 
broken lineages means that homology does not come of degrees.  Traits in 
different organisms either share a common ancestor and are therefore 
homologues, or they do not and are not homologues.  There is no room for 
partial or mixed ancestry.  Therefore, partial homology is prohibited. 
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3.3 DE BEER’S CHALLENGES 
 
Vocal critics of the historical and cladist views of homology focused on 
the inability of these views to account for developmental perturbations, 
phenotypic modifications, environmental influences, and the different 
mechanisms by which homological traits were inherited.  Rather than 
focusing exclusively on the phylogeny of organisms or simply black-boxing 
development, Gavin de Beer (1971) reasserted the importance of the role of 
organismal ontogenesis.  What was absent in both the historical and cladist 
concepts of homology was a clear understanding of the causal routes of 
inheritance and modification leading to morphological outcomes from a 
common ancestral form.  Remedying this omission required careful 
consideration of the role of development in the construction of these 
morphological traits in individual organisms.  
In his Oxford Biology Reader, Homology: An Unsolved Problem, de 
Beer identifies particular limitations of these views.  He objects to the 
practice of using corresponding developmental processes or similar cellular 
tissues to justify morphological homology.  De Beer argues that problems 
emerge when one tries to identify similar developmental processes or 
cellular substrata as “evidence” for morphologically corresponding 
homologues.  He reveals these problems using a number of examples.  The 
ontogenetic pathways and processes of different organisms may be used in 
producing what appear to be homologous morphological structures.  
Although these structures may be homologous, their developmental 
pathways or the genetic or cellular resources they use in the construction of 
these morphological structures may not correspond in the same way.  For 
example, the alimentary canal in vertebrates is constructed from the roof of 
the gut cavity in the shark embryo.  However, it is formed from the floor of 
the gut in lampreys, from both the floor and the roof in frogs, and in birds it 
is formed from the lower layer of the blastoderm (de Beer 1971: 10-13).   
Relying on the same underlying cells, the similar position of these cells 
in the embryo, or corresponding parts of the zygote from which the different 
structures are formed, does not guarantee the homology of the 
 106
morphological structures which are constructed from these (de Beer 1971: 
13).  Relying on the homology of these cellular structures as evidence for the 
homology of the morphological outcomes of them also implies that if 
morphological structures are the result of different cellular substrata or 
diverse developmental processes which do not correspond as similar, then 
these morphological structures are not homologues.  De Beer countered 
these assumptions, arguing that this non-correspondence on lower levels did 
not mean that the morphological structures that resulted from these were 
not homologues:  “homologous structures can owe their origin and stimulus 
to differentiate to different organizer-induction processes without forfeiting 
their homology” (de Beer 1971: 13).  
Relying on the same cells, cell position, area of the zygote, or the same 
genes as evidence for homology encourages the erroneous assumption that 
homology at one level (e.g. morphological traits) is caused by the homology 
at another level (e.g. the same cells or genes).  Revealing the falsity of this 
assumption were de Beer’s studies of the incongruities between the 
corresponding similarities of morphological traits, developmental patterns, 
and genes in his studies on eyeless mutants of Drosophila.  Observing eye 
development in fruit flies with the eyeless mutation, de Beer found that 
while some with this mutation do not develop eyes, other eyeless mutants 
develop fully functioning eyes identical to those of the wild type.   
He realized that there were sets of genes in some of these mutants, 
which he referred to as “modifier genes,” that when present, resulted in the 
eyeless mutant developed fully functioning eyes.  Although this result was 
initially unexpected by de Beer, this phenotype was not uncommon among 
the eyeless mutants.  His observations were startling, not only because the 
mutant eyeless fruit flies developed eyes, but because their eyes developed 
through a different developmental route utilizing different genes than the 
wild type.  The different use of the “replacement set” of genes in the 
development of the mutant resulted in the same phenotypic outcome as the 
differently developed wild type.  Studying similar phenomena in both fruit 
flies and other organisms, de Beer’s “modifier genes” have also been referred 
to as “deputized genes” (Roth 1984, 1988, 1991):   
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New genes, previously unassociated with the development of a 
particular structure, can be deputized in evolution; that is, 
brought in to control a previously unrelated developmental 
process, so that entirely different suites of genes may be 
responsible for the appearance of the structure in different 
contexts (Roth 1988: 7). 
 
In this way, the fruit fly’s flexible use of different genes in the construction 
of its eyes means that this trait can become highly conserved over 
generations despite changes to the genetic and developmental resources 
available.  The gross morphology of fruit fly eyes remains continuous among 
mutants and wild types despite their different genetic, developmental, and 
mechanical causes.  This means that at the gross morphological level the 
fruit fly eyes in mutants and wild types are homologous.  But at the 
developmental and genetic level they are not.   
 De Beer’s investigations of the eyeless fruit flies call into question the 
common assumption that the gross morphological similarities or 
correspondences between organisms’ traits is caused by the same 
developmental or genetic mechanisms and the congruity of homology of 
different levels of organization (e.g. genetic homology does not ensure 
developmental homology and, in turn, developmental homology does not 
ensure morphological homology).  The assumption of a clear causal 
connection between genotypes and phenotypes was misplaced:  “homologous 
structures need not be controlled by identical genes, and homology of 
phenotypes does not imply similarity of genotypes” (de Beer 1971: 15).       
 More evidence for the incongruity of different levels of homology was 
revealed in extensive studies on fruit flies in the 1980s and 1990s.  In a 
much cited paper by Stanislav Tomarev et al. (1997), eyeless in Drosophila 
is compared to Pax-6 of the squid.  In this, the Pax-6 of the squid (Loligo 
opalescens) is said to be homologous to eyeless in the fruit fly (Drosophila).  
Pax-6 is necessary for the development of the eyes, olfactory organs, brain, 
and the arms of squid.  When the squid Pax-6 is implanted in the fruit fly 
this leads to the development of ectopic eyes on wings, antennae, and legs.  
Tomarev et al. argue that this is evidence for the conclusion that the Pax-6 
in the squid and eyeless in the fruit fly are homologous genes: 
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Our data support the idea that morphologically distinct eyes of 
different species have arisen through elaboration of a common, 
conserved Pax-6 dependent mechanism that is operative at early 
stages of eye development and that the anatomical differences 
among eyes arose late in evolution (Tomarev et al. 1997: 2426).  
  
The implantation of the squid Pax-6 shows that there may be a homological 
relationship between these regulatory genes.  Within a wide range of 
organisms, including the mouse, and other vertebrates, there are 
orthologues (gene homologues) (cf. Doboule 1994).  But these genes may only 
be considered to be homologous (orthologous) to one another in terms of a 
small role they play in development.  In this sense, this research repeats the 
similar points made by de Beer—one cannot venture beyond homology at 
one level as evidence for homology at another.   
 Although the regulatory genes Pax-6 and eyeless may be considered 
homologous (though this has proved to be controversial; cf. Wagner 2007), 
the regulatory and developmental networks within which these regulatory 
genes function in the squid and fruit fly are not homologous.  The regulatory 
networks and developmental processes of the fruit fly and the squid are not 
homologous because they evolved independently from one another.  Neither 
are the morphological outcomes of the developmental processes utilizing 
these regulatory genes.  The arms of an octopus are not homologous with the 
eyes of a fruit fly.   
 Ever since de Beer revealed that homology at one level does not imply 
homology at any other level of organization, there has been constant debate 
over which level is the source of homology, e.g. genetic, cellular, 
developmental, or morphological.  This debate betrays a complete 
misunderstanding of de Beer’s findings.  There is no privileged level of 
organization which is causally responsible for homology at all other levels.  
It is instead a relationship that can hold independently on a number of 
different levels:  
Homology … is studie[d] at all levels of biological organization 
from molecules through genes, cells, organs, embryos, organisms, 
populations, communities, behavior, even biogeographical regions.  
Homology therefore informs gene regulation, ontogeny and 
phylogeny, morphology and physiology, molecular and cell biology, 
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botany and zoology, systematics and classification, ecology and 
biogeography (Hall 1994: 2).   
 
Homologies at different levels of organization are independent of one 
another (e.g. developmental pathways, morphological traits, regulatory 
networks, or genetic sequences).  Each of these is a potential unit of 
comparison.  Limiting the units of comparison to the morphological 
outcomes (as the historical and cladist views do) encourages the inference 
from an homology at one level to one at another and the assumption that 
there must be a privileged level of comparison or cause of morphological 
homology.     
 
 
3.4 THE LINEAR VIEW OF HOMOLOGY 
 
 What I referred to in Chapter One as the “neo-Darwinian” perspective 
further reconceived the historical notion of homology in light of a new 
synthesis of Darwin’s theory of descent with modification and modern 
genetics.  This gene-centred view understands evolution to be the change in 
gene frequencies (Mayr 1993).  Natural selection is the result of the 
moulding factors in the environment acting on phenotypic traits which are 
coded for in the organism’s genes.  The genes are passed on from one 
generation to the next.  Phenotypic features of the organism are the 
outcomes of continuously inherited genes from ancestor to descendant.  This 
neo-Darwinian conception of evolution and inheritance assumes that the 
historical continuity of phenotypic traits is grounded in an underlying 
continuity of genes or genotypes which serve as the blueprints for building 
these morphological traits.  Implicit in this view is the belief that nothing 
else is reliably inherited except genes.  And so it is the genetic continuity 
which must be the cause of the historical “continuity” of morphological traits 
over generations.    
 This gene-centred perspective of homology relies on an underlying 
preformationist view of trait construction.  Understood from a gene-centred, 
neo-Darwinian perspective, homology is the comparative similarity of the 
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inevitable phenotypic outcomes of developmental processes directed by the 
underlying preformed program contained within the conserved genes.  In 
this sense, each homologue can be traced back to a certain set of genes in 
the genome.  Because only genes are reliably inherited generation after 
generation, they are the replicators of the phenotypic traits that are 
compared as homologues.  This perspective  effectively sees that continuity 
of descent with modification as merely an epiphenomenon of the continuity 
of vertically inherited genes (cf. Roth 1984). 
 Central to the understanding of variation over evolutionary time and 
the diversity of species, this conception of homology enabled the 
reconstruction of phylogenetic lineages by assuming morphological traits 
were underpinned by genetic continuity.  Underlying this view is a 
commitment to preformationism discussed in the previous chapters.  The 
form and structure of traits exists prior to the organism’s life in the world, 
contained in the coding information in its genes.  
 Understanding the study of homology according to this perspective 
commits proponents of the neo-Darwinian view of homology to a linear view 
of causation:  “the linear mapping of genes onto developmental schedules 
and of developmental schedules onto phenotypes” (Minelli 1998: 340).  
Traits are the outcomes of the linear inheritance of instructional programs 
for building phenotypic traits.  Homologues are the phenotypic outcomes of 
the same genes that code for these traits which are vertically inherited from 
one generation to the next in an unbroken ancestor-descendent lineage.   
 This neo-Darwinian view effectively reduces the homology of 
morphological parts to the homology of genes:  “Reducing organ homology to 
gene homology is conceptually and methodologically equivalent to reducing 
species phylogeny to gene phylogeny, a fault of which systematists are 
increasingly aware” (Minelli 2003: 231).      
Conceiving homology in this reductive way both overestimates the 
control of genes over the construction of phenotypes and undervalues the 
role of all other extragenetic processes throughout organismal ontogeny.  It 
sees the genetic level as the basic level of organic causation which directs 
developmental pathways to produce morphological outcomes.  But, as de 
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Beer’s examples have shown, the homology at a so-called higher level of 
biological organization (e.g. the homology of morphological traits) is neither 
explained nor implied by the homology at a lower level (e.g. the homology of 
genes).   
 Morphological traits can be conserved, maintaining their continuity 
in successive generations in spite of basic changes to developmental and 
genetic resources.  The same gross morphological traits may be present in 
two different organisms but each may be the result of different 
developmental pathways and genetic resources.    
 This linear view of organic form conceives of homologues as 
fundamentally underpinned by the unbroken vertical transmission of 
certain genes or gene complexes from a single common ancestor.  Restricting 
homology in this way limits homology to an all-or-nothing relationship 
between traits.  Traits are either homologous or they are not.   
 Opposition to the study of partial homology has been a sustained 
consensus view with few challengers (namely Minelli 2003 and West-
Eberhard 2003).  Partial homology has been vociferously objected to as a 
threat to the Modern Synthesis:  “Partial homology is incompatible with 
standard evolutionary views, according to which structures are either 
homologous or not” (Donohue 1992: 172, cf. Patterson 1987, Lewin and Foley 
2004).  This anti-partial homology consensus is broad.  It includes not just 
neo-Darwinians but some proponents of developmental systems perspectives 
(cf. Griffiths 2006: 7, Ereshefsky [personal communication]).  Even if partial 
homology is accepted with regard to the comparison of genes, it is widely 
believed that “[p]artial homology does not occur with morphological 
characters” (Lewin and Foley 2004: 122).  In the next few sections I explore 
a possible alternative to the linear view of the neo-Darwinian perspective 
and consider the consequences of this alternative view for a reconceived 
notion of homology. 
 
 
3.5 PLASTIC THINKING 
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 An alternative perspective to this neo-Darwinian linear view of 
homology from which evolution can be understood has been suggested by 
studies of developmental and phenotypic plasticity:   
The possible role of phenotypic plasticity in the evolution of 
phenotypic novelties may offer an excellent system in which to 
apply both the experimental and the comparative methods to 
tackle the intimately related problems of homology and the origin 
of new traits (Pigliucci 2001: 377). 
 
 New insight into the developmental plasticity of the ontogeny of 
organisms, as well as its role in facilitating evolutionary variations, has 
forced hard questioning of the widespread assumption that evolution is, for 
the most part, linear.  In particular, recently acquired understanding of the 
role of developmental recombination, phenotypic plasticity, recurrence 
(West-Eberhard 2003, Kirschner and Gerhart 2005), homeosis, deputized 
genes (Roth 1988, 1994), temporal mosaics, and heterochrony (Minelli 2003), 
pose new challenges to the linear perspective of evolution and homology as 
it is currently understood.   
 The plasticity of developmental processes and phenotypes may alter 
our conception of the causes of evolutionary variation, the notion of 
historical continuity, the mechanisms of inheritance, our conception of 
species, and the relationship between traits of organisms and the 
comparison of traits between different organisms.  Recognizing the role of 
plastic development in evolution may affect what are taken to be the units 
of comparison, whether the underpinning of morphological continuity by 
genetic continuity is empirically justified, and also tests the conceptual 
assumptions underlying the linear view of evolution on which the 
widespread opposition to partial homology is based.17   
 If all organismal traits constantly fluctuate throughout their 
ontogenesis and continuously change throughout evolution, then our 
comparison of these traits may only ever be made in terms of varying 
degrees of homology and/or analogy.   
 
                                                     
17 As I will go on to suggest in section 3.7.3 “Degrees of homology,” if understood 
from a developmentally plastic perspective, partial homology—far from being 
incompatible with evolutionary theory—may turn out to be indispensable to it.   
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3.5.1 A NON-LINEAR VIEW OF EVOLUTION 
 
 Viewing evolution linearly means the changes in phenotypic features 
of organisms, understood in terms of the change in gene frequencies, are 
believed to be the result of vertically inherited random genetic mutations 
which have been stabilized under selection.  On a non-linear perspective, 
novel phenotypic variations of traits may also arise from the reorganization 
of developmentally flexible phenotypic features depending on the organism’s 
genetic, extragenetic, and environmental resources:   
Much of the skepticism over the years about the capacity of 
random mutation or genetic reassortment to generate phenotypic 
change has arisen from the assumption that genetic changes must 
create very specific, multiple, complex phenotypic changes.  Our 
view is that specificity and complexity are already built into the 
conserved processes (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005: 142). 
 
On this view, an organism may recombine some of its phenotypic features in 
a novel way or make use of new genetic or extragenetic resources and 
variations within its environment.  The organism rearranges its own 
phenotype using the resources available to it.  Novel phenotypes may be the 
result of the rearrangement and reorganization of old phenotypes and old 
resources linked together in new ways.  Rather than genetic mutation, the 
motor of evolution on this plastic view is the capacity of organisms to 
reorganize and recombine their phenotypic resources:   
[re-]combinatorial evolution raises the possibility that derived 
traits may often contain elements of more than one ancestral 
trait, and that what was formerly seen as a de novo modification 
actually involves the recombined expression of preexisting traits 
(West-Eberhard 2003: 485).   
  
 If the direction of evolution is understood in terms of a non-linear view 
rather than a linear view, certain assumptions, such as the continuity of 
ancestral lineages based on a linear view, may be undermined.  
 
 
3.5.1.1 RECURRENT TRAITS 
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 Homologues are important in determining how closely two 
individuals are related because homologous traits are conserved from one 
generation to the next.  And according to the neo-Darwinian view, two 
individuals that possess homologous traits share a single common ancestor 
from which each has inherited the same trait via an unbroken route from 
the ancestral generation.   
 This is obviously an oversimplified account of the conservation of 
homologues as it is strictly incorrect to say that the “same trait” is 
conserved and passed down from one generation to the next.  Organisms are 
constructed and reconstructed in each new generation.  So what is retained 
or conserved?  And why must it be conserved via an unbroken lineage?  
 The assumption that homologues must be conserved via continuous, 
unbroken ancestral lineages can be questioned.  Phenotypic traits in 
numerous species may be the result of phylogenetically discontinuous 
inheritance over broken lineages.  While some generations of organisms of 
the same species may have one phenotypic trait, this trait may be absent in 
the next generation.  Organisms of the same species may vary their 
phenotypic traits such as their wing patterns, body size, or sexual 
behaviours.  This kind of developmental flexibility enables the organisms in 
each generation to construct various wing patterns depending on their 
particular environmental needs (e.g. to avoid a preponderance of predators, 
enable it to compete successfully with other conspecifics in securing a mate, 
or providing an alternative feeding behaviour if its preferred food source is 
scarce).   
 In some species, or in some pairs of closely related species, a variety of 
phenotypic variations may be possible, but not all exist in any one 
generation.  In these species, traits are not continuous but are “recurrent” 
(West-Eberhard 2003: 358-74, also referred to as “latent homologies” by 
Roth 1988).  Although not all appearing in the same generation, all of these 
phenotypic variations may descend from a single phenotypically and 
developmentally plastic common ancestor.  They may in this sense be 
considered homologues.  However, their discontinuity disqualifies them from 
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being considered homologues according to cladist or neo-Darwinist concepts 
of homology.  For example, we may wish to compare the recurrent wing 
patterns of many Heliconius butterflies that have evolved in two closely 
related species (H. melpomeme and H. erato) (cf. Brower 1994).  
The recurrent identical wing patterns of different species of 
Heliconius butterflies are “convergent” in cladistic terms … but 
they [may be homologous] … in the broader sense of being 
based on shared physiological determinants of wing patterns 
(West-Eberhard 2003: 357).  
 
Recurrence contradicts the impression of concordant 
phenotypic evolution sometimes given by the taxonomic and 
phylogenetic practice of arranging groups of organisms in 
lineal and hierarchical series to approximate a genealogy … 
This may unwittingly encourage a lineal view of evolution, 
when in fact the phenotype often evolves in a mosaic, 
combinatorial and intermittent fashion (West-Eberhard 2003: 
369).   
 
Far from being uncontroversially non-homologous, the recurrent patterns 
among these different species may be due to a shared common 
phenotypically plastic ancestor.  If these butterflies have a set of 
developmental resources—a veritable back catalogue of developmental and 
phenotypic capacities from which their phenotypes are constructed—then 
the recurrent variations are connected by a discontinuous lineage from a 
common ancestor.   
Recurrence is just one example of how evolution may not be conceived 
linearly.  A new plastic approach to evolution and development challenges 
the systematic privileging of unbroken linear descent over non-linear broken 
descent from a common ancestor held by cladist and neo-Darwinian 
perspectives. 
 
 
3.5.1.2 HOMOLOGIES OF PROCESS  
 
 Only within the last few decades has the study of homology been 
extended beyond anything besides morphological outcomes (Gilbert, Opitz, 
and Raff 1996).  Until the recent emphasis on developmental systems 
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perspectives and the reincorporation of development into evolutionary 
theory, this restrictive view of homology was widely accepted.  Restricting 
the study of homology to the corresponding similarities between 
morphological outcomes, as the privileged units of comparison, was the 
result of the lack of attention paid to the role of development in the neo-
Darwinian synthesis.   
 In restricting the units of comparison to outcomes, the neo-Darwinian 
view systematically excludes homological comparison between 
developmental processes, complex mechanisms, life stages, behavioural 
patterns, and constructed environmental artefacts.   
 In opposition to this narrow view of homology, one particularly 
promising suggestion is that rather than thinking of homology exclusively in 
term of the corresponding similarities of static morphological outcomes, we 
can instead view these morphological structures as locations of activity.  
Organismal activities or movements may be slow, like growth and decay, or 
fast, like cell differentiation, digestion, and photosynthesis (cf. Woodger 
1929, Sattler 1994: 451).  In focusing on the correspondence of similar 
morphological structures, the neo-Darwinian and cladist views limit the 
units of homological comparison to the structural outcomes of an organism’s 
developmental processes.  In contrast, a processual view of homology takes 
processes to be the constructive activities of organisms that combine 
different processual activities that result in an organism’s form (Sattler 
1994).  On this process view of homology, developmental processes 
themselves—rather than just the outcomes of developmental processes—
may be considered possible units of homological comparison:   
Whereas classic homology has been one of structure—be it of 
skeletons or genes—the homology of process goes into the very 
mechanisms of development.  Whereas classical homology looks at 
the similarity between entities, the homology of process concerns 
the similarity of dynamic interactions.  The result is that although 
organs (such as the vertebrate and arthropod eye, the vertebrate 
and arthropod leg, etc.) can be structurally analogous, they may 
be formed by processes that are homologous! (Gilbert, Opitz and 
Raff 1996: 364). 
 
 Comparing morphological outcomes relies on abstract static features 
of organisms.  By focusing only on the end products of a particular 
 117
constructive activity of the organism, the neo-Darwinian view assumes a 
static metaphysics of organismal organization.  It conceives the end 
products of an organism’s development as finished stable entities rather 
than dynamic processes.  The comparison of morphological outcomes is the 
comparison of abstract entities.   
 This seems to run counter to our empirical experience of the biological 
world and our understanding of it in terms of descent with modification.  
Organisms constantly change throughout their life cycles from embryo to 
death and throughout the various chemical, cellular, and behavioural 
activities required of living beings.  The homological comparison of traits as 
morphological outcomes amounts to the comparison of temporally 
suspended snapshots of the organisms’ traits at one point during their lives.   
 Rather than relying on morphological outcomes as the units of 
comparison, we may take this suggestion and focus on dynamic processes 
instead.  Morphological outcomes could still be compared as homologues but 
would be compared as “process combinations”:  “a [morphological] structure 
is the process combination” (Sattler 1994: 457).  In this way, two processes 
can be compared as homologues if both processes have been inherited from 
the same common ancestral developmental process, the same combination of 
ancestral processes, or if their complex processes or process combinations 
share some but not all of their ancestral processes.   
 
 
3.5.1.3 MULTIPLE DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS 
 
 De Beer has shown that the assumption that homologous phenotypes 
must be constructed from homologous genes, gene complexes, or 
developmental pathways is untenable.  Homology at one level does not 
guarantee homology at another level of biological organization: “the same 
genes can be involved in the development of nonhomologous characters” (de 
Beer 1971: 15).   
 Morphological traits that are homologous may be the outcomes of 
different developmental pathways and different genes (that are themselves 
 118
not homologous to each other).  Reflecting on de Beer’s work leads one to 
question how the concept of historical continuity can explain the ubiquity of 
these developmentally plastic pathways and whether this affects what we 
mean when we talk about the concept of homology.   
 Given the only recent interest in developmental plasticity, it seems 
the implications of de Beer’s research are only just beginning to be realized.  
However, evidence for de Beer’s conclusions, and criticisms of the historical, 
cladist, and neo-Darwinist concepts of homology can be found as far back as 
the 19th century.  
 During the late 1820s and early 1830s Johannes Müller carefully 
studied the organs of the urogenital system of various vertebrate embryos 
comparing them to the urogenital system in the adult stage of organisms of 
the same species (Lenoir 1982: 103-11).  At the time of his investigations, it 
was widely assumed that there were vestigial organs in the embryos of 
vertebrates which corresponded to adult organs.  These were thought to be 
the primordial tissues from which the adult organ was formed.  For 
example, the Wolffian body (also called the “mesonephros”) was believed to 
be the substratum from which the kidneys and all internal sexual organs of 
both adult males and females began.  Although the mesonephros did indeed 
serve as a kidney in the growing embryos of both male and female 
vertebrates, Müller disputed the causal relationship between it and the 
adult kidneys and internal sexual organs.   
 Through his comprehensive studies, Müller found there to be no 
material or developmental continuity of the tissues of the mesonephros and 
the adult kidney.  Through further investigations, he found that among 
male vertebrates the deteriorating mesonephros was coopted by the 
developing animal as a resource to be used in the construction of its internal 
reproductive organs, e.g. the epididymis, seminal vesicle, and vas deferens.  
However, Müller found that in females the mesonephros simply 
disintegrated.  Not only was it not used in the construction of the kidneys, it 
played no part in the development of the female’s internal sexual organs.  
He found that the ovaries, uterus, and fallopian tubes were formed from a 
completely separate embryological structure, what he named the 
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paranephric duct (now known as the Müllerian duct) (Lenoir 1982: 109).  
Because there was no direct causal connection between the material of the 
Wolffian duct and the adult kidneys, Müller argued—contra received 
opinion at the time—there was no transformation of the cellular material 
from the Wolffian duct into the adult kidneys.  
What both de Beer and Müller’s investigations show is that the 
historical continuity of traits within different organisms may be the result of 
different evolutionarily conserved developmental resources, such as the 
growth of eyes in fruit flies, or the functionally similar but morphologically 
discontinuous development of the embryonic mesonephros and adult 
kidneys in the same vertebrate animal.  In both cases, historical continuity 
or “sameness” of organ is discontinuous—the result of different 
developmental pathways and genetic resources to conserve the 
morphological trait of eyes in fruit flies and the discontinuity of cellular 
matter composing the embryonic kidney and that of the adult kidney.  This 
means that the historical continuity of morphologically homologous traits is 
not due to the sameness of their genetic resources or cellular substrata. 
Throughout an organism’s development there are various genetic, 
cellular, and environmental changes.  The organism may accommodate the 
changes in the resources it uses by recombining different features of traits 
in the construction of new traits.   
One might be able to trace the developmental path of a particular trait 
which is the morphological outcome of its ontogeny through various 
intervening stages of development.  But one would not be able to identify 
the portions of the genome or original cellular material which were the 
causes of the development leading to the eventual construction of the adult 
trait.   
Comparing traits usually identified as functional parts of organisms 
with past ancestral functional traits invites confusion when trying to trace 
their historical continuity over generations (Gould and Lewontin 1979).  If 
there is no genetic or extragenetic substrata underlying the continuity of 
these parts, then identifying the causes of its repeated construction in each 
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generation will not be as straightforward as the neo-Darwinian view 
suggests. 
  More recent evidence against the assumption of material continuity 
and linearity can be found in research on the multipotency and 
bipotentiality of cells.  Different populations of cells retain the ability to 
express different, multiply possible end states of differentiation.  This is 
particularly pronounced in the case of the neural crest, which consists of 
self-renewing multipotent populations of stem cells (cf. Hall 1999, Kirschner 
and Gerhart 2005).  Neural crest cells do not have predetermined cell fates 
that are simply the result of gene action.   
Identification of a cell lineage or cell population is not a 
demonstration of a single state of determination for that lineage.  
Of course, cells only ever do express one differentiative phenotype, 
but many such subpopulations are at least bipotential and may 
remain bipotential even after differentiating along one pathway 
[e.g. lineage tracing does not necessarily equate with 
determination of cell fate] (Hall 1999: 130). 
 
Neural crest cells retain their multipotentiality and have less predictable 
trajectories than other cell types.  These cells are reciprocally responsive to 
other cells within the self-organizing systems of the organism.  Their 
differentiation into cell types is based on their exploration of the organismal 
body plan, cell-cell interaction, and their responsiveness to different 
physiological signals: 
The exploratory nature of the neural crest involves physiological 
variation and selection.  The wide responsiveness of neural crest 
cells to signals and their capacity to undertake any of numerous 
paths of development in response to signals constitute their form 
of variation (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005: 205). 
 
The developmental integration of crest cells means that they act in alliance 
and are flexible with regard to their end cell form.  Morphological outcomes 
are not the result of genetic coding or “genes for” nerve cells.  The flexibility 
of these cells to vary their cell type depending on other cell populations, 
interactions and location in the organism’s body ensures that the organism’s 
phenotype is highly conserved.  This capacity for flexible and responsive 
development means that the organism’s phenotype remains stable despite 
changes in its genetic, extragenetic, and developmental resources.   
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A linear view of evolution, assumed by cladists and neo-Darwinians, 
brings with it a particular understanding of:  the continuity of traits, the 
units of comparison, the nature of the relationship between genes and traits, 
and the meaning and reference of “trait” and “homology.”  These particular 
understandings no longer follow if we cease to take a linear view of 
evolution.   
 
 
3.6 THE HETEROGENEOUS CONSTRUCTION OF MOSAIC TRAITS 
 
 The meaning of homology has been intimately related with what are 
understood to be the natural units of comparison.  The relationship of 
homology, very generally, is an equivalence relationship between two units 
(Goodwin 1994: 233).  Units of comparison are organismal traits.  A trait 
identifies an enduring part of an organism.  Enduring parts are those which 
are conserved over evolutionary time across generations of organismal life 
cycles.   
 According to the gene-centred view of homology, the life of the 
organism itself is transient but its conserved features are not.  These 
enduring features are generated in each generation from the inherited 
genetic program.  Because they are conserved over generations, homologues 
are used to resolve evolutionary relationships and phylogenetic lineages.  
Tracing these homologous relationships between the structures of different 
organisms back to the nearest common shared ancestor enables taxonomists 
to construct phylogenetic trees of evolutionary relatedness.  Homologues, 
defined in terms of their shared ancestry due to unbroken (monophyletic), 
lineage are used to identify organisms as conspecifics. 
 Opting out of both the linear perspective of evolution and the neo-
Darwinian gene-centred conception of homology means homologues so 
construed cannot be used in tracing the ancestral lineages of organisms or 
in deciding whether an organism is or is not a member of a particular 
species.   
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 Taking a non-linear, mosaic perspective on evolution results in a 
restructuring of both our conception of organismal traits and homology.  
This perspective invites a number of questions including: What are the 
natural units of comparison?, What are traits?, What is the meaning of 
homology?, What causes the homology of traits and ensures their 
conservation over generations?, and How have homologues changed over 
evolutionary time?  
 Most of these questions will be addressed in the present chapter.  I 
focus on how a mosaic perspective of evolution and the acknowledgement of 
the evolutionary significance of developmental plasticity begins to open up a 
new possibility space within which natural units of comparison can be 
recognized. 
 
 
3.6.1 THE “DEGREE OF PARTNESS” OF ORGANISMS 
 
 Traits are what I will call the “proper parts” of an organism.  These 
are more commonly referred to as the “characters” of organisms (cf. Wagner 
2001 and papers therein).  Recognizing the significance of development 
means that those pathways and processes previously thought of as 
important only as routes by which genes succeed in building morphological 
outcomes may now be considered proper dynamic features of the organism 
in their own right.  Traits as proper parts can be expanded to include 
developmental processes, mechanisms, behaviours, and other dynamic 
parts, not just the relatively static morphological parts of organisms, like 
forelimbs and vertebrae.  From a mosaic perspective, proper parts are 
conceived of as modular systems rather than structural singularities. 
a [proper] part is a system that is both integrated internally and 
isolated from its surround[ings] … [it] is integrated to the degree 
that interactions among components are many or strong, or both 
… these may be spatially distributed [such as] a hormone-
mediated control system or a local population of crickets chirping 
in synchrony …  Isolation is a reduction in, or termination of, 
integration … Both integration and isolation may vary 
continuously, and therefore the extent to which a system is a 
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part—its degree of partness—is likewise a continuous variable 
(McShea and Venit 2001: 262). 
 
 An organism’s “degree of partness” enables it to make changes to 
certain features while keeping the rest of its body stable.  This means that 
certain features may become sensitive to certain genetic or extragenetic 
resources which do not affect other components of the organism.  These 
features can be understood as discrete units of variability.   
 The compartmentalization of the component parts of an organism into 
relatively discrete units or subunits means that the effects of variations in 
one subunit may be isolated from those of another.  If these are, in turn, 
inherited as subunits, the degree of partness of the organism may increase 
over generations. 
 An organism’s “degree of partness” refers to the relative independence 
of its parts.  The relative independence of an organism’s parts is the result 
of the weak linkages that hold them together.  These weak linkages enable 
greater developmental or phenotypic variation throughout the organism by 
allowing many independent variations to simultaneously occur in each of its 
subunits without adversely affecting others.  They facilitate the possibility 
of differential sensitivity and receptiveness of its parts to different genetic 
and extragenetic stimuli.  Whilst some parts are affected by a particular 
stimulus or resource, others may be buffered, unaffected by the same 
resource (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005: Ch. 4). 
 Organisms with tightly linked, relatively dependent, non-modular 
parts do not have this buffering capacity.  In them, variations in genetic or 
environmental resources may affect all parts.  For instance, a particular 
environmental stimulus (e.g. direct sunlight) may provide an advantage to 
some parts of a leafy plant (e.g. increasing the supply of energy for 
photosynthesis), but they may prove deleterious to others which are 
simultaneously affected (e.g. drying out the soil and preventing the roots 
from taking in enough water).  If the proper parts of the organism are 
tightly integrated with all other proper parts, any positive effects on the 
organism will be thwarted if the deleterious effects on other parts prove 
lethal to the organism.   
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 In an organism with a high degree of partness, the proper parts of the 
organism may vary independently within a particular conserved overall 
structure (e.g. according to a particular body plan).  Independent changes 
may occur in various semi-autonomous parts at the same time without these 
changes proving to be lethal.  If the plant’s leaves can independently vary 
their shape due to the amount of sunlight, for instance, by broadening the 
leaf shape and increasing the size of the leaf without affecting the growth of 
the rest of the plant, this change may increase the likelihood of survival 
through droughts.  The broad leaves may shield the soil below them 
lessening the effect of the sun in drying out the soil where its roots grow.  
The increase in the semi-autonomy of an organism’s parts facilitates an 
increased capacity for this kind of independent adaptation. 
  The benefits (as well as some disadvantages18) of the increase in 
organisms’ degree of partness have been highlighted by what Moss (2008) 
has termed “detachment.”  Detachment is “a measure of the relative 
independence of an entity from a larger milieu” (Moss 2008).  An increase in 
the level of detachment can be understood as an increase in the level of 
closure of the parts in an organic system (or within an organism or 
community) and its connectedness to other parts in the organism’s body (or 
other entities in the world).  A part becomes detached when it increases in 
both complexity and flexibility within a particular domain (Moss 2008).   
 By increasing its level of detachment, the part gains greater 
flexibility because it is able to “buffer itself in relation to possible 
perturbations, to have a history which is a factor in its subsequent 
trajectory, and indeed to dispose itself in some way toward its … future 
possibilities” (Moss 2008).  In this sense, detachment can provide both 
restraints and liberties, both requirements for a stable structure.   
 
3.6.2 THE RECONFIGURABILITY OF MODULAR PARTS 
 
                                                     
18 Moss (2008) refers to this as the “pain of detachment.”  Although I will not 
discuss this here, the pain of detachment will be explored in the final sections of 
Chapter Five. 
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 Degrees of partness may increase when speaking of complex traits.  
Complex traits may be considered “multimodular” or “mosaic” (West-
Eberhard 2003: Ch. 4).  This means that different subfeatures of the same 
trait can evolve independently of others.  They may change in diverse ways 
to the other subfeatures, evolve at different rates, or utilize different 
resources in their construction.  These discrete features may be weakly 
linked to other features of a particular part of an organism.  Because they 
are weakly linked, one feature of the trait may dissociate from it and may 
then be used in association with a different trait.  This “reconfigurability” of 
modular features (as subunits of traits) constitutes a highly conserved core 
capacity of organisms (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005: 136).  In Kantian 
terms, these core capacities are included within the organism’s original 
stock of Anlagen.   
 The possibility of dissociating these modular units and their 
subsequent rearrangement into novel combinations by the organism to serve 
other purposes further increases the organism’s ability to vary its growth to 
meet new needs.  Understood in terms of an organism’s degree of partness, 
variation can then be understood to be the organization and reorganization 
of modular parts.  
 One example of this can be found in studying the sexual organs and 
behavioural characteristics of sexually dimorphic adult vertebrates.  These 
traits are the result of mosaic evolution, the product of diverse resources.  
Both male and female genitalia share the same undifferentiated structures 
in their embryological stages.  These structures may develop differently 
though the organism’s ontogenesis depending on their reciprocal interactive 
processes with a combination of different resources including chromosomes, 
hormones, adjacent tissues, environmental conditions such as temperature, 
number of potential mates, food consumed in early development, maternal 
behaviour, and structural and topological location in the various 
compartments of the organism’s body plan.   Saying that a complex trait 
like the sexual traits of dimorphic adults is mosaic means that it is 
composed of “developmentally dissociable” subunits (West-Eberhard 2003: 
261).  Evidence of this trait mosaicism can be found in the dissociability of 
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the wide variety of primary and secondary sexual characteristics found in 
mammals of the same species.  This variability among the dimorphism of 
mammals is almost infinite, resulting in an array of intermediate 
phenotypic traits between female and male (e.g. body size, musculature, 
hairiness, dominance, aggression, and other behavioural traits) (cf. West-
Eberhard: 260-62).   
 Mosaic traits are organized in their development.  They are 
“choreographed” by the organism “through [different] causal factors giving 
rise to morphological associations” (Atchley and Hall 1991: 137).  Different 
features of the same trait capable of independent variation may have 
different developmental pathways and may be responsive to different 
genetic and extragenetic resources but remain coordinated by the organism.  
For instance, cranial and jaw bone development in rats varies at different 
rates of growth.  In the early development of the rat pup these exist as 
separate and independent structures.  However, in the adult rat they form a 
mosaic complex trait.  These two previously separate bones are now used by 
the organism in a coordinated way so that the length of the jaw correlates 
with the growth of the skull.  Linking the two structures provides the 
organism the means to accommodate the new feeding behaviour it learns 
after weaning.  Instead of requiring morphological structures that allow it to 
suckle milk from its mother, the coordinated growth of its jaw and skull 
enables it to masticate solid food (Zelditch 1988, Zelditch et al. 1992).    
 Another example of the mosaic construction of organismal traits from 
diverse sources is the construction of plant leaves from different histogenic 
layers of the meristem: 
[each histogenic] layer of the meristem makes a [different] 
contribution to the formation of leaves.  In dicots, the L1 layer 
contributes only to the epidermis, whereas the L2 and L3 layers 
contribute to the internal tissues of the leaf.  The contributions of 
individual layers are not strictly lineage dependent, however.  A 
cell from one layer occasionally invades a neighbouring layer, 
where it contributes to lateral organs in a manner characteristic 
of the new layer rather than the original layer, demonstrating its 
lack of commitment (Smith and Hake 1992: 1017).   
 
 The initiation and determination of the organism’s leaves are the 
product of diverse cellular, genetic, and environmental resources and the 
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organization and reorganization of the organism’s patterns of development.  
These include its hormonal changes, rates of cell division, changes in the 
plant’s polarity, position in relation to other leaves, and environmental 
influences (e.g. sun exposure, submersion underwater).  Understanding 
traits as mosaics requires treating them as the product of the heterogeneous 
construction of self-organizing and reorganizing organisms.   
 Using the notion of heterogeneous construction, we can describe many 
traits as constructed by organisms from diverse sources.  Traits are the 
product of contingent processes, the novel recombination of subfeatures or 
units, and the organism-directed choreography of distributed genetic, 
behavioural, and environmental resources.   
 
 
3.7 WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR HOMOLOGY TO BE MOSAIC? 
 
 Taking mosaic evolution and mosaic traits seriously opens up a new 
conceptual possibility space for comparative biology.  Although proponents 
of a new developmental perspective tend to agree with West-Eberhard’s 
suggestion that evolution is mosaic rather than linear, they have not taken 
this combinatorial view to its inevitable conclusion.19  The upshot of this 
mosaic perspective is that the gene-centred, linear conception of homology 
no longer fits our conception of evolution.  To fit, homology must be 
reconcieved according to a mosaic view:   
The traditional idea of homology visualizes a linear series of 
changes whereby an ancestral trait has been transformed into a 
descendent one … By this idea different homologues may appear 
differently modified on different phylogenetic branches, but each 
descendent homologous trait has at its core a single ancestral 
trait (West-Eberhard 2003: 485). 
 
‘Mixed’ homology departs from [the cladist and neo-Darwinist] 
tradition in recognizing that a single derived trait contains parts 
that are collectively homologous with several ancestral ones, not 
just one or a lineal series (West-Eberhard 2003: 491). 
 
                                                     
19 Only West-Eberhard (2003: Ch. 25) and Minelli (2003: Ch. 10) have made this 
suggestion.  
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 Understanding the roles phenotypic and developmental plasticity 
play in mosaic evolution means rethinking the relationship between genes 
and phenotypic traits and the nature of biological causation.  Phenotypic 
traits are not the morphological outcomes of developmental programs 
tightly regulated by genes.  The relationship between genes and phenotypic 
traits is loose.  Traits are developmentally plastic—the dynamic product of 
the organized construction of various genomic, cellular, ontogenetic, and 
behavioural resources by an ecologically embedded organism.   
 So far, I have criticized the neo-Darwinian view of evolution and 
homology. I have suggested that traits are not genetically prefigured 
outcomes.  If traits are not the result of the unfolding of information 
contained in the vertically inherited genes, then the homology of traits 
cannot be determined on the basis of underlying genetic continuity.   
 I proposed that traits are constructed from contingent linkages and 
resources by the organism throughout its ontogeny.  In the remainder, I 
draw out the consequence of this view.  If homologues depend on descent 
from a common ancestor—a shared common cause—how can we reconceive 
the homology of traits if traits are the result of mosaic constructive 
processes of organization and reorganization?   
 
 
3.7.1 DISTRIBUTED CAUSES OF CONTINUITY  
 
 I have tried to show how the assumption of linear evolution and the 
privileging of genes as the ultimate source of continuity underpinning the 
continuity of traits has lead the neo-Darwinian view of homology to 
overemphasize the importance of genes in the development and evolution of 
organismal traits.  Although obviously a resource used in the organism’s 
development, genes do not have the privileged role of directing architect or 
informational blueprint for building a trait.  But if genes do not play this 
role and we cannot rely on genetic continuity to underpin the morphological 
continuity inherited through generations from a common ancestor, what is 
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the cause of this continuity—or more pointedly, what causes the homology of 
traits and ensures their conservation over generations?  
 Genes are not fundamentally responsible for phenotypic form, but 
neither are cells or tissues.  As the examples above have shown, there is no 
one level of biological organization, nor one biological resource (e.g. genes, 
cells, tissues), that can be distinguished from other resources as the 
privileged causal source of homologues’ continuity over generations.  Many 
different genetic, extragenetic, and environmental resources can contribute 
to the conservation of complex phenotypic traits.  The causal contributions 
of the same resources may differ depending on the individual organization of 
the organism or the use it is put to in the construction of particular traits.  
While in some cases small changes in resources may result in large changes 
in the phenotypic traits, in others, large changes in the resources may have 
little or no effect (Pigliucci 2001: 364-66).  
 The use made of a particular resource (e.g. Pax-6) in one organism 
(e.g. a squid), or the use made of it in one part of an organism (e.g. in the 
olfactory organs of a squid), does not determine its use in another organism 
(e.g. fruit fly), or in another part of the same organism (e.g. in the arms of a 
squid).   
 Linear thinking and the privileging of genetic continuity assumes 
that the traits of organisms in each generation are the result of linearly 
passed on genes or genetic networks.  In contrast, distributed thinking 
about the heterogeneous causes of traits takes traits to be the result of 
different developmental processes and reorganizing activities of both 
vertically and horizontally inherited genetic, epigenetic, developmental, 
behavioural, and ecological resources.  Distributed causes are those that 
come from many different sources—not concentrated in one source:  
[M]any heterogeneous components [are] linked together which 
implies that the [phenotypic] outcome has multiple contributing 
causes and thus there are multiple points of intervention or 
engagement that could modify the course of development.  In 
short, causality and agency are distributed, not localized … 
components are linked over time [and space] (Taylor 2001: 316).   
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Genes, cells, tissues, hormones, organ systems, developmental processes, 
and behavioural patterns are all potential causal resources within the 
ecologically-embedded organism’s milieu:  
affecting each [other] in constant succession … To regard one as 
controlling the other is quite illegitimate and introduces that 
dualism of agent and thing acted upon which runs through and 
vitiates all theories of nuclear dominance (Russell 1930: 157). 
   
What causes the continuity of homologous traits is necessarily dependent on 
the organism’s environment and the purposes for which these resources are 
put to use.  This means that what is conserved over generations is 
dependent on the organism-environment context.  Depending on the context, 
it might be the interacting developmental pathways which are conserved, 
cellular connections, the use of other phenotypic or developmental resources, 
or certain generative systems of pattern formation.  
 Outlining how these concepts and causal connections can be 
reconceived in light of the mosaic perspective requires situating the 
organism at the centre of its own self-organized construction.  In doing this, 
we rely on Kantian ideas of purposiveness (organism’s directedness towards 
a telos) and common generative capacity (i.e. the original stock of Keime and 
Anlagen) which provide a generic set of resources available to the organism.  
Understanding the organism’s conserved structures as a consequence of the 
purposes required for its mode of living also reflects a Cuvierian conception 
of homology.   
 The Kantian ideas of purposiveness and common generative 
capacities provide a philosophical basis for understanding the nature of 
distributed causality underlying a new mosaic conception of homology.  This 
perspective conceives of the developing organism “as if it were fulfilling an 
end or purpose—that of arriving at the typical form and modes of activity of 
the species; it tends towards this goal in spite of difficulties, and the end is 
more constant than the way of attaining it” (Russell 1930: 6).   
 What is responsible for the conservation of homologues in particular 
contexts is determined by the use organisms make of certain resources in 
the construction of these traits.   
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 The central point of understanding the construction of traits from the 
organism-centred perspective is that the purpose for which the organism 
uses any particular resource is not specified in advance of its use by the 
organism.  Resources become causes only in the organism’s use of them in 
conserving certain activities or resources for the construction of particular 
traits.   
 Genes, proteins, hormones, cells, tissues, and ecological resources may 
be conserved over generations for this purpose.  However, this is not to say 
that the purpose for which a particular resource was used in past 
generations matches the purpose for which the organism now uses it.  The 
organism may reorganize and recombine the phenotypic and developmental 
resources available to it for building new traits.  To understand and 
compare any two traits as homologues or analogues, we must first 
understand which of the organisms’ constructive activities correspond with 
one another.   
 Comparing the morphological traits or developmental pathways of two 
different organisms may reveal not one but multiple causal sources of 
continuity.  The conservation of homologous traits, especially complex traits, 
may be the result of multiple distributed resources.  These may be used by 
each organism being compared in a correspondingly similar fashion (or not).  
The use of these resources in particular ways by both organisms ensures the 
continuity of the particular phenotypic traits being compared as 
homologues.  If the resources or developmental pathways being compared 
are due to some shared common resources or pathways, then they are 
homologues.   
 By focusing on the directive activities of the self-organizing organism, 
we capture the importance of the role of developmental plasticity as a 
generic capacity for constructing and reconstructing organisms given 
diverse and changing resources.  Predating this perspective, Kant’s ideas of 
fertile flexibility (Tauglichkeit) can be understood in terms of an updated 
discussion of developmental plasticity and his common generative capacity 
corrected and amended by providing cellular specificity and differentiation.  
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 This mosaic, organism-centred view diverges from a strictly Kantian 
approach to organismal organization by extending the resources available to 
the organism in self-construction to include not just the organism’s internal 
stock of Keime and Anlagen but also the environmental resources acquired 
from interaction with other conspecifics, learning, maternal behaviours, and 
horizontally inherited resources.   
  
 
3.7.2 MULTIPLE ANCESTRAL SOURCES 
 
The common ancestor of two or more organisms seems to be something 
that is easily judged.  If one can trace back through many generations of 
organisms in their genealogical/phylogenetic trees to the same organism in 
an earlier generation, one may conclude that these two organisms share a 
common ancestor from which they are both descended.  A similar view of 
shared ancestry is used by the cladist and neo-Darwinian conceptions of 
homology.  This view holds that two traits are homologous if and only if they 
are inherited (through an unbroken phylogenetic lineage) from the same 
trait possessed by a single shared common ancestor.   
 The main difficulty with the neo-Darwinian view of homology is that 
phenotypic traits are not really “the same” traits passed on from one 
generation to the next.  They are constructed in each organism.  Organisms 
may utilize different resources in the construction and reordering of their 
traits.  As a result, the origins of a mosaic trait are not traceable to a single 
common ancestor but are the product of heterogeneous resources inherited 
from multiple ancestral sources.   
 No single linear route of inheritance can be traced to the source of all 
these inherited resources because these may be inherited from a number of 
different genetic, epigenetic, developmental, and ecological routes and from 
diverse ancestral sources.  Mosaic traits may be the product of diverse and 
distributed inherited resources from multiple ancestral features either in 
the same organism or from different organisms.   
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 This means that the ancestry of mosaic traits may be traceable to 
several different sources depending on which feature of the trait is being 
compared as homologous with that of another.  What counts as a common 
ancestor therefore becomes considerably less straightforward once we give 
up the neo-Darwinian approach to linear evolution and a gene-centred view 
of homology.   
 The mosaicism of evolution and traits, the diversity of ancestral 
sources, and the different developmental routes by which organisms may 
acquire these resources in the construction and reorganization of different 
subunits of its complex traits requires a radical reconception of the notion of 
shared ancestry.  Extending the notion of shared ancestry involves including 
not just descent from a common morphological structure but also descent 
from a common ontogenetic pathway or behavioural pattern.  Rather than 
“shared ancestry” a more apt way of describing this relatedness might be a 
shared common cause, resource, pathway, pattern, or source.   
 The morphological structures, developmental pathways, or behavioural 
patterns need not be conserved via the vertical inheritance from ancestor to 
descendent.  The conservation of homologues may be the result of a range of 
common generative sources or mechanisms of inheritance—both vertical 
and horizontal.  Extending the concept of homology in these ways is 
admittedly unique and probably controversial.  I show in the next two 
sections, by discussing a number of examples, that the concept should be so 
extended.  
   Referring to common generative sources or mechanisms of inheritance 
instead of “common ancestry” avoids some, but not all, of the problems 
previous conceptions of homology had in identifying homologues.  Because 
mosaic traits are the result of diverse distributed resources, this notion of 
common ancestry needs to accommodate their mixed ancestry.  Mosaic traits 
may be compared to each other in terms of their common ancestry, the 
common generative sources of the subunits of these complex traits, or they 
may be compared as whole complex traits in terms of their partial homology.  
This amounts to tracing the histories of individual modular units, 
morphological parts, or developmental processes of organisms.  In doing 
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this, we identify which subunits of these modular units “travelled together 
and for how long,” in which organisms and by which routes of inheritance 
they were conserved (cf. Doolittle 1999: 2124-8).  
  
 
3.7.3 DEGREES OF HOMOLOGY 
 
 Neo-Darwinism, together with a focus on morphological outcomes 
assumes an all-or-nothing approach to homology.  This neo-Darwinian view 
took the relationship of homology to be complete correspondence due to 
descent from a common ancestor by an unbroken lineage.  In contrast, 
partial homology is due to some but not complete correspondence due to 
descent from a common ancestor (or some common ancestors) by either a 
broken or unbroken lineage.  Partial homology was, according to neo-
Darwinians, inconsistent with evolutionary biology (cf. Donohue 1992).  
With this kind of condemnation, it is perhaps unsurprising that Louise 
Roth’s suggestion of partial homology (1984, 1988) fell on deaf ears:   
phylogeny has components of both continuity and change. We 
identify the elements of continuity as homologies; the change is 
called evolution … Change occurs by degrees, and “sameness” is 
relative … [Whole traits or structures] can be compared ... in 
terms [of the] … partial homology [of] properties, individual 
features, or aspects of development (Roth 1988: 16-17). 
 
  After Roth’s solitary voice, the partial view was slowly adopted by 
some within botany (cf. Cusset 1994, Sattler 1994, 1996, Sinha 1999, Cronk 
2001, Fisher 2002) and to some extent in comparative genomics (cf. Hillis 
1994).  However, very few proponents of this unpopular view followed Roth’s 
lead outside of botany and genomics (cf. Sattler 1994, Minelli 1998, 2003).   
 This sustained opposition to partial homology meant that the only 
acceptable way homology could be conceived of was in terms of complete 
correspondence:  “Correspondences are perceived as 1:1, hence for the 
majority of homology concepts only total correspondence … is admitted.  
Everything else is either ignored or arbitrarily forced into the mold of a 1:1 
correspondence” (Sattler 1994: 424).   
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 The meaning of partial homology can be expressed simply as some 
correspondence due to some shared ancestral sources:  a morphological 
structure or developmental process may share some but not all properties 
with another structure or process.  Partial homology may exist among the 
complex traits of the same organism, traits of different organisms, or 
properties of traits in either the same or different organisms.  Partial 
homology may be best articulated schematically in terms of a series of 
relationships.  Take, for instance three different traits:  AB, BC, and CD, 
where A, B, C, and D are different properties of these traits:   
BC is [partially] related to both AC and CD because it shares one 
property with each of them.  Such a relation also can be seen as a 
partial correspondence since BC corresponds partially to both AB 
and CD … The trait which exhibits the properties B and C, 
partially corresponds to trait AB and CD because it shares 
properties with both of them (Sattler 1994: 425). 
  
Partial homology occurs when there is some correspondence between 
complex traits; where some but not all properties of certain traits 
correspond to each other.  This may occur if organisms use diverse  
resources, (which may be acquired through a number of different horizontal 
and vertical mechanisms of inheritance), from different ancestral sources in 
constructing these traits.   
 In the next two sections I provide three examples of partial homology.  
I start with the partial homologies which may be found when comparing 
developmental schedules and life stages. 
 
 
3.7.3.1 PARTIAL HOMOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTAL SCHEDULES AND 
LIFE STAGES 
 
 Heterochrony is defined as a difference in the timing and rate of 
developmental stages (West-Eberhard: Ch. 13).  I begin with an abstract 
characterization of a comparison of two organisms in terms of their 
development schedules—the temporal order of developmental stages over an 
organism’s life history.  In this schematic example partial homology will be 
illustrated.  
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 Consider traits x and y of two organisms P and Q.  We may compare 
the individual developmental schedules in P and Q of x and y.  Suppose the 
development of x  occurs later in P than it does in Q.  But the development 
of y occurs earlier in P than in Q. In addition to comparing the individual 
developmental schedules of x and y, we can also compare the overall 
developmental schedules, P and Q. 
 The overall developmental schedules of these two organisms may 
correspond with one another even though the individual timing of some of 
their traits do not.  Because of this, when we compare these two organisms 
in terms of their overall developmental schedules we are comparing 
“temporal mosaics” (Minelli 2003: 59).  The overall schedules of P and Q may 
partially correspond in terms of the timing of certain traits while not 
corresponding with the timing of others, thereby being only partially 
homologous with one another.  
 These differences in the development, timing, and expression of traits 
in the different life stages of organisms may be evolutionarily valuable.  And 
the dissociation and recombination of different heterochronic traits enables 
organisms more developmental flexibility and adaptability in the expression 
of their phenotypic traits resulting in new timing and order of 
developmental stages within an organism’s life history (West-Eberhard 
2003: 241).   
 To flesh out the schematic example above, consider two different eggs 
from different egg masses of the red-eye tree frog (Agalychnis callidryas).  
These two eggs may vary significantly in the timing of certain 
developmental stages when compared to one another.  One egg mass may 
hatch much faster than another, even if these are deposited by the same 
mother on the same plant.  Accelerated hatching behaviour among eggs of 
the red-eye frog is the result of attack by snakes or wasps predating on the 
egg mass as the eggs are one of their favoured food sources.  If the egg mass 
is under attack, some (but not all) eggs may hatch early and drop from the 
leaf the egg mass was clinging to into the water, thus escaping being eaten 
by the predator (Warkentin 2000: 503-10).  The comparison of the timing of 
the stages of embryological development of individuals from the same 
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mother may differ greatly due to whether they are under threat of attack or 
not.   
 The timing of some of the stages of development in both groups of 
eggs may correspond to one another as homologues, while the timing of 
others, such as the time of their hatching, do not.  If the overall 
developmental schedules of both groups of individual’s are compared, the 
timing of stages throughout their life histories would partially correspond as 
similar.  This partial correspondence may be due to a common set of 
developmentally generic capacities and resources.  But because some but 
not all of their stages temporally correspond to one another, their overall 
developmental schedules are only partially homologous.  The plasticity in 
the order of their temporal stages and, in particular, the differential timing 
of their hatching behaviour means that these two individuals do not possess 
the complete correspondence required to be considered homologues 
according to the neo-Darwinian view of homology.   
 However, the partial homology of their overall developmental 
schedules is evolutionarily significant.  Their partial homology can be 
explained in terms of a conserved developmental plasticity of hatching 
behaviour over generations which enables the organism to reorganize 
certain temporal stages of its developmental schedule for the purpose of 
avoiding predation.   
 
 
3.7.3.2 THE INTER- AND INTRA-ORGANISMAL PARTIAL HOMOLOGY OF 
MOSAIC BEHAVIOURAL TRAITS 
 
  The mosaic trait of spoken language in humans is the product of the 
coordinated activities of organisms using distributed causal resources.  
Language learning of human infants begins with the noisy environments 
the infant is born into.  The sounds in its environment include the speech of 
many language users as well as the sounds of other animals, machines, and 
weather conditions.  This environment “furnishes the variable conditions for 
the … self-assembly, in the course of early development, of the 
neurophysiological structures underwriting the child’s capacity to speak” 
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(Ingold 2001: 271).  Because its environment is constantly changing, its 
neurological structures in turn change to accommodate different sound 
patterns or vernaculars of a particular linguistic context.  These changes are 
coordinated with the development of the soft tissues of the mouth (e.g. 
tongue, lips, palate), as well as the jaws, teeth, throat, larynx, and the 
pattern of the organism’s breathing.   
 Language is a complex trait resulting from the coordination of these 
resources over the course of the child’s development.  This trait is 
constructed and reconstructed through repeated practice and learning 
within a particular embedded environment.  It can be compared either as a 
whole mosaic trait or in terms of different decomposable features (e.g. the 
formation of the tongue or larynx, the production of the sound “o”, or the 
utterance of an infant’s first word).  Because the mosaic trait of language 
speaking relies on numerous distributed causal resources used in its 
development, complete correspondence between the language learning of 
one individual and that of another (even if between monozygotic identical 
twins), if not impossible, is highly unlikely.  Partial homology between these 
two mosaic traits is the best we could hope for.  Partial homology also allows 
us to compare as similar the development of this complex trait with other 
complex traits, such as the learning of a signed language, in terms of their 
partial correspondences.     
 Partial correspondence of mosaic behavioural traits may also be the 
result of the organism’s reorganization of certain phenotypic traits for the 
purpose of new behaviours.  In this case, we may compare two different 
behavioural traits of the same individual in terms of their partial 
correspondence.  This may be possible if certain subparts of behavioural 
traits dissociate from their original association with one trait and be used as 
a resource in the production of a new trait.  The combinatorial nature of 
mosaic behaviours has been the subject of much ethological study (cf. Geist 
1978 and Cairns et al. 1990).  This type of change in phenotype is referred to 
as “behavioural heterochrony” and involves the co-option of certain 
behaviours, such as feeding, and the incorporation of these behaviours into 
courtship displays to attract potential mates.  By utilizing known 
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behaviours in the activity of one purpose for that of another, the organism 
exploits the recognition of the associated behaviours in feeding in order to 
attract the attention of potential mates.  For instance, female monk 
parakeets (Myiopsitta monachus) in search of mates behave in a similar 
way to young birds begging for food.  Male birds, respond to these females as 
they would their own young by feeding them.  As a consequent, the females 
acting out this juvenile behaviour are able to entice males into potential 
matings by exploiting the male parakeets associated fatherly feeding 
behaviour.  In doing so, the female parakeets co-opt this behaviour for new 
purposes as part of their courtship behaviour (Geist 1978: 54). 
 In comparing the feeding behaviours of these individuals as young 
birds to their mating behaviours as courting adults, we find some similar 
correspondences in certain characteristics of the behaviour, such as the 
positioning of the body and begging cries, whilst other aspects do not 
correspond, (e.g. the bird to which the begging behaviour is directed differs 
from young birds who direct their begging to parents, and courting females 
who direct their begging to potential mates).  This within-organism 
comparison of the two kinds of begging behaviour shows that although there 
are non-corresponding features of the begging behaviours of young 
parakeets and the courting behaviours of adult parakeets, some aspects of 
begging behaviours do correspond as similar.  This partial correspondence 
means we can consider them to be intra-organismal partial homologues.   
 
3.7.4 A COMBINATORIAL NOTION OF HOMOLOGY FOR PARTIALLY 
CORRESPONDING MOSAIC TRAITS  
 
 Understanding homology from a mosaic, organism-centred view 
means conceiving of traits as developmental combinations.  These traits are 
the product of organismal self-construction from heterogeneous resources 
that are conserved over generations of individuals reflecting the 
fundamentally mixed ancestry and the mosaic nature of their organization, 
generation, and development.  Heterogeneous processes can be compared as 
similar in terms of their homologous developmental pathways, 
morphological structure, use of genes, hormones, cellular activities, or 
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behaviours.  A mosaic view of homology reflects the plasticity and 
heterogeneity of a reciprocal multilevel approach to organismal evolution 
and development.   
 Instead of assuming the continuity of structures from one generation 
to the next, the organism-centred view takes the generationally repeated 
structure of homologues as explicable in terms of the contingent products of 
intersecting processes.  Applying this notion of construction to the 
discussion of homology and analogy allows us to highlight the contingent 
processes which lead to the construction of homologous traits.  The 
conservation of organisms’ homologous traits over a series of ancestors and 
descendents can be explained as the result of organisms’ use of similar 
genetic, behavioural, and environmental resources in the construction of 
traits.   
 Mosaic traits result from the organism’s mixing and recombining pre-
existing phenotypic and developmental subunits for the purpose of building 
new phenotypic traits using novel linkages between these modular 
combinations:   
Homology may involve not just different degrees of similarity, due 
to divergent modification, but may be ‘mixed’ … for example, the 
insect head evolved by the fusion of six ancestral body segments 
… Tracing mixed homologies requires separately [comparing as 
homologous] pairs or series of ancestral and derived states for 
different elements of the same descendent trait, not just lineal 
comparisons focusing on the modifications of a single ancestral 
form (West-Eberhard 2003: 485). 
 
 Mosaic traits correspond to other traits in terms of their partial 
homology or partial analogy.  Their correspondence may be due to the 
recombination of diverse resources from multiple ancestral sources within 
the organism throughout its ontogeny, or due to the horizontally and 
vertically inherited resources from multiple ancestral sources over its 
phylogeny. 
 The organism-centred view of traits as heterogeneously constructed 
provides an alternative to the standard either/or thinking within 
comparative biology—that similar traits are either completely homologous 
or completely analogous.  Until Roth’s (1984) suggestion that homology 
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might be partial, the consensus in comparative biology was that homology 
was a 1:1 relationship of full correspondence of whole traits.  This either/or 
thinking also meant that analogy and homology were seen as dichotomous—
similar traits are either completely homologous or completely analogous.  If 
an organism’s traits are self-constructed from multiple interacting resources 
under similar constraints, a sharp distinction between homology and 
analogy may not be possible.  Understanding organisms as heterogeneously 
constructing their own traits dissolves the distinction drawn by neo-
Darwinists between the two separate and non interacting processes of 
shared ancestry and convergent evolution that are used to identify 
homologues and analogues respectively.  It maintains an ontological 
separation between inherited traits and acquired traits.  It takes the 
correspondence between organismal traits to be either the result of 
inheritance from common ancestors (through transmitted genetic 
information) or the result of environmental pressure.  In doing so it relies on 
a Weismannian dualist assumption that there are two independently 
specifiable sources of form (as discussed in Chapters One and Two).   
 In contrast to the standard either/or thinking about homology and 
analogy, what have been traditionally thought to be independently evolved 
structures (analogues) may actually be the result of a combination of 
various common generative sources (or ancestral traits) combined together 
to form an amalgam trait in the descendent.  Mosaic traits may be the 
“partial descendent” of a number of different ancestral traits.  This suggests 
an alternative to standard dichotomous thinking about homology and 
analogy.  It challenges the assumption that phylogenetic lines of descent are 
ontologically separate from an individual’s ontogenetic life cycle.  
 Although homologues and analogues are traditionally believed to 
arise from two completely separate and non-interacting processes—shared 
ancestry and convergent evolution respectively (inherited, acquired)—these 
processes are two aspects of the organism’s own ecologically embedded 
development. 
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3.7.4.1 MIXED HOMOLOGIES 
 
 The mosaic traits of two different organisms may be partially 
homologous to one another due to their inheritance of a particular 
developmental resource from a shared common ancestor, but not share other 
inherited resources used in the construction of this trait, (such as the genes, 
cells, tissues), or its structural morphology.   
 For instance, the camera eyes of humans and octopi are both mosaic 
traits. The eyes of these organisms possess certain striking similarities of 
general structure and function.  The camera eyes of octopi and humans both 
have lenses and retinae with photoreceptors.  However, the photoreceptors 
of humans face the back of the eye, while those of octopi face the front 
(Nilsson and Pelger 1994: 56).  Some of the ontogenetic origins of octopi and 
human eyes also differ.  Whereas octopus photoreceptor cells differentiate 
from the epidermis, those of humans differentiate from the nervous system 
(Land and Fernald 1992).  Because of these and other differences, octopi and 
human eyes are widely believed to have evolved independently rather than 
being inherited from a common ancestor (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005).  
They are thought to be analogues not homologues.   
 Because of this human and octopus eyes are considered to be 
homoplastic (not homologous).  This conclusion ignores certain aspects of 
similar correspondences of development or structure shared by these 
complex traits.  For instance, the eyes of octopi and humans utilize some of 
the same resources in the construction of eyes in different arrangements.  
Although octopus and human eyes initially appear to be analogous, it is 
perhaps more accurate to understand them as partially homologous due to 
their use of similar tissues, genes, cells, proteins, and organization of their 
visual systems, and partially analogous due to the different ontogenetic 
pathways which lead to the construction of similar outcomes.  Because 
organisms may inherit resources from different ancestral sources used in 
the construction of mosaic traits, they may only ever be partially 
homologous (or partially analogous) to one another.  
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 The traits which organisms inherit are frequently not completely 
isomorphic to one another.  More often, they may be the result of various 
features of different traits inherited from distributed genetic and 
extragenetic sources.  The comparison of these complex traits as whole 
traits then results in some being homologous, some analogous, and some 
neither.  Mosaic homology identifies the numerous pathways and levels of 
organization on which homology can be found for each pair of traits being 
compared.   
 Because novel traits may be the result of reshuffling and new 
linkages between the already-present features of traits or the result of novel 
timing, the distinction between derived and ancestral traits of organisms 
may be less clear than the cladist and neo-Darwinian notions of homology 
have led us to expect.   
 
3.7.4.2 HOMOLOGIZING FUZZY PARTS AND DEVELOPMENTALLY 
TEMPORARY UNITS 
 
 The capacity for developmental and phenotypic plasticity conserved 
in the organism’s original stock of Keime and Anlagen—in particular its 
capacity for exploratory behaviour within a conserved body plan, weak 
linkage, and the dissociation and rearrangement of the subunits of traits—
leads to our recognizing that traits have multiple common causes.   
 Although much has been made of the dissociation of parts or modules, 
defining homologues as independent evolutionary modules (Wagner 1996) 
and assuming that a module is a bounded part insensitive to its 
intracellular and extracellular environment takes this notion of modularity 
too far.  Modularity (West-Eberhard 2003), may invite confusion where I 
think degree of partness (McShea and Venit 2001) or levels of detachment 
(Moss 2008) may not.  These subunits may be developmentally temporary or 
have fuzzy spatial or developmental boundaries, for instance:  “in the 
multilayered mosaic of developmental subunits that we can recognise within 
a developing animal, there is a virtual continuum between the conventional 
germ layers and the clusters of set-aside cells” (Minelli 2003: 252). 
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 Fuzzy bounded developmental or spatial organismal parts was first 
introduced with regard to the delimination of the organismal segments in 
plants, e.g. leaf, stem, root, and in the tagmata of animals, e.g. head, thorax, 
and abdomen.  “Root,” “leaf,” and “stem” are the names for simplified bodily 
organs of a vascular plant.  They demarcate the plant in terms of their 
different structural features.  Although these are often treated as organs 
with sharp spatial and developmental boundaries they often overlap with 
one another.  This has been recognized in the study of botanicals, with the 
result that the fuzzy nature of these organs is now spelled out in the names 
used by botanists:  root, root/stem mosaics, stem, stem/leaf mosaics, and leaf 
(Fisher 2002). 
 Many species of angiosperms produce intermediate growths (between 
what is normally considered a stem and a leaf).  Plants of the genus 
Chisocheton have been studied extensively (Fisher 2002).  These studies 
reveal that many species within this genus have indeterminate leaves—
structures which are neither strictly leaf nor stem.  The structures of C. 
macranthus, C. pentandrus, C. trichocladus, and C. ceramicus (as well as 
other species of this genus) can be best described as either stem-leaf mosaics 
or indeterminate stem-leaves (cf. Fisher 2002 and Fukuda et al. 2003).  This 
kind of indeterminacy may also be seen in the formation of the leaf-stem 
organs of the bladderworts, Utricularia, and the root-shoot organs of the 
perennial river weed Podostemaceae especially Podostemum ceratophyllum 
(Ameka et al. 2003), Zeylanidium lichenoides, and Ledermanniella bowlingii 
(Ota et al. 2001 and Jäger-Zürn 2003), and the leaf-shoots of Asparagaceae 
(Sattler 1984: 383-383).   
 Among seed plants, a caulome is defined as a stem or the axis of a 
flower, whilst a phyllome refers to a lateral appendage, (e.g. leaves, petals, 
or stamens) (Sattler 1994: 432).  Comparing these intermediate structures 
in terms of their similar correspondence with other structures results in a 
variety of partial homologues:    
the position of the leaf and branch may be inverted so that the 
leaf is more distal than the phyllome-conjunct branch … [W]e 
would have to conclude that the inverted leaf is homologous with 
a shoot [of another plant] and the inverted shoot with a leaf … [or] 
the inverted leaf is homologous with a shoot [in terms of its 
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bilateral position] but homologous with a phyllome leaf [in terms 
of morphology] (Sattler 1994: 435).   
 
The possible partial homology can either occur between organisms or within 
the same organism at the same time, at two stages of the organism’s life 
time, or during different ecological conditions (e.g. between different leaf-
stem structures of heterophyllous plants depending on whether they are 
fully submerged in water, laying on the surface, or aerial) (cf. West-
Eberhard 2003: 174 figure 7.6). 
 Fuzzily bounded, developmentally temporary parts of organisms also 
occur among the bodily segments of vertebrates and insects—head, thorax, 
and abdomen.  This fuzziness makes comparing these parts of organisms in 
terms of their similar correspondence with one another less straightforward 
than if these were construed as rigidly bounded, spatially discrete parts. 
 In comparing as similar the corresponding segments of a praying 
mantis and a fire ant, we must distinguish which of the organisms’ body 
segments correspond to each other.  Among insects, the thorax is generally 
defined in terms of the second body segment—between the head and 
abdomen.  The thorax is specifically characterized as the only segment 
which has legs.  But in some arthropods such as praying mantises and 
centipedes, there may be appendages that are located before the legs of the 
thorax but not in the head of the organism (Minelli 2003: 79-81).  These are 
typically used for either capturing prey, tearing and manipulating food, or 
poison containing tools (called “maxillipedes” (Minelli 2003: 81).  In 
comparing the corresponding segments of the praying mantis to the fire ant, 
there are a number of equally possible options:   
from the point of view of the specialisation of the appendages, one 
says that the head of these arthropods [i.e. the praying mantis] 
comprises one or a few segments more than the head of [the fire 
ant] lacking maxillipedes.  On the other hand, [because] segments 
with maxillipedes may [be considered] … non-cephalic …[or 
thoracic], despite the feeding specialization of their appendages … 
Boundaries between conventional tagmata are often less clear 
than anatomists would hope” (Minelli 2003: 81-82). 
 
This becomes even more fuzzy when dealing with organisms such as 
centipedes and millipedes.  There is wide disagreement over how many 
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bodily regions millipedes have, the answer depending on what is counted as 
the thorax and trunk.  If only strictly bounded modules are possible units of 
comparison, homologizing these fuzzy intermediates would not be possible.    
 Comparative biology in general, and homology and analogy in 
particular, are used to compare corresponding traits of organisms as similar 
and to reconstruct their common origins in order to identify organisms as 
members of the same or different species.  
 The next chapter follows on from the previous (the organism-centred 
view) and the present chapter, tying together the heterogeneity of 
organismal trait construction with a mosaic view of evolution in its 
reconception of species.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Reincorporating ontogeny back into a conception of 
Species 
 
 
The observation that different species of organisms have different forms and 
behaviours may seem obvious.  But what exactly does this mean and what 
makes a particular organism the kind of organism that it is?  For instance, 
what makes a fox a fox?  What makes foxes develop the characteristics that 
they do?  What makes fennec foxes have large ears, termites consume wood 
and build mounds, wildebeest migrate, legumes fix nitrogen, or insects 
choose to lay their eggs on the leaves of specific plants?  These traits appear 
to be reliably passed on from one generation to the next among organisms of 
the same species.  These observations lead to the generalization ‘like 
produce like’—organisms produce offspring like themselves.     How these 
forms and behaviours are maintained from parent to offspring within a 
species has been discussed across thousands of years of philosophical 
discussions and natural history.  From antiquity, species have been thought 
of as quintessential natural kinds.  Organisms of a particular kind possess 
essential features, sets of properties, or relationships shared by all 
individual organisms of that kind.   
 This view was found to be less well equipped when it came to 
explaining similarities among different species of organisms.  Many striking 
morphological similarities shared across species were highlighted in 
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Haeckel’s work (1866).  In his ill-fated recapitulation theory, Haeckel 
illustrated the remarkable morphological similarities among the same 
stages of early development in species of vertebrates as different as pigs, 
crocodiles, mice, and platypuses.  He showed that embryos of similar stages 
of development in diverse species have almost identical morphological 
features when compared to each other.  The embryos of these different 
species were shown to be morphologically much more similar to each other 
than to the adult forms of their respective species.  These observations 
challenged the traditional essentialist view that species could be best 
conceived of as sets of similar organisms that share an underlying essence 
or a common set of traits.  
 Haeckel’s observations of the similarities among different species 
introduced two concomitant problems:  members of the same species may 
vary greatly in their morphological features, and organisms of the same 
species may display different morphological features at different stages in 
their life cycle.  The first of these problems is widespread among sexually 
reproducing organisms.  The sexual dimorphism such as that between 
female and male mammals (e.g. women and men, and tigresses and tigers) 
and birds (e.g. peacocks and peahens) mean that the females of many 
species share a number of striking characteristics with females of different 
species (e.g. among mammals:  lactation, pregnancy, menstruation, ovaries, 
uterus) that they do not share with the males of their own species.   
 In addition to these dimorphic variations among individuals of the 
same species, some organisms also vary their morphologies within their own 
lifetime.  A similar observation to Haeckel’s own can be made by any 
amateur Lepidopterist.  Consider the larval stage—the fleshy, leaf-eating, 
crawling, multi-pseudopod form of the worm-like caterpillar—of many 
species of pre-metamorphosed butterflies and moths.  They morphologically 
resemble each other much more than they resemble the form they later 
acquire in both their pupal and postmetamorphic adult stage, in which they 
possess a thin body, six-legs, a long proboscis enabling them to extract 
nectar, large wings, the ability to fly, and (if female) lay eggs.  These widely 
varying morphological characteristics within species make them 
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particularly unwieldy biological kinds to be conceived of in terms of a fixed 
set of features common to all members of the species.  
  What (if anything) is shared by organisms whose characteristics vary 
dramatically between different individuals of the same species, and can 
change depending on a number of different factors, including stage of 
development, season, temperature, food supply, or environment?  As the 
previous chapter on homology showed, there can be innumerable ways in 
which organisms can be described and compared as similar to one another.  
But only a few of these provide generalizations that facilitate the making of 
hypotheses, directing experiments, and providing knowledge about species.     
 Rather than relying on wildly variable morphological traits as the 
essential features of a species, something else was required.  This led to the 
suggestion that what was common among individuals of a particular species 
was their behaviour, in particular, their ability to generate new offspring 
through sexual reproduction with conspecifics.  This suggestion was first 
articulated by John Ray in the 17th century (cf. Sloan 1972).  A century later 
it was revised and reconceived as part of the French naturalist Buffon’s own 
notion of species as groups of organisms whose members interbreed and 
produce fertile offspring.  
[I]t is neither the number nor the collection of these similar 
[organisms] which makes the species, it is the constant succession 
and uninterrupted … destruction and renewal of beings … The 
species is thus only a constant succession of individuals able to 
reproduce together (Buffon 1753: 355-56).   
 
Buffon argued that our knowledge of species lies in our knowledge of the 
behaviour of individual organisms.  We can extend this knowledge of 
individual observed behaviours when our senses detect regular or 
generalizable patterns of activity or form among individuals.  Although this 
appears in many ways a contemporary approach to understanding the 
nature of species, it was conceived a century before Darwin.  Still a product 
of his time, Buffon, like his contemporaries, conceived of species as static 
entities which do not substantially change over time.   
 Changes in species over time by means of descent with modification 
was an idea introduced by Darwin (1859).  Instead of conceiving of 
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individuals of a particular species as essentially similar or sharing a 
homogeneous set of traits, Darwin’s theory of evolution recognized that the 
individuals of a species may vary.  If these variations were of beneficial 
value to the organism—by improving its foraging abilities, skill in avoiding 
predators, ability to entice mates, reproduce, and increase its fecundity 
within particular environmental circumstances—these variations will be 
inherited by the next generation.  If beneficial to this generation, they can in 
turn be similarly passed on to the next generation.  (And conversely, those 
that hinder are not.)   
 Darwin dramatically illustrated his theory in studies of the variations 
among the species of finches during his expeditions of the Galápagos 
Islands.  Evolutionary change over time is dependent upon heritable 
phenotypic variation within species.  Phenotypes among individuals of a 
species can change quickly in a matter of months, depending on food supply 
or shortage, climate, or ecology.  And phenotypes of a species can evolve 
slowly over generations.  The characteristics common to a species at time T1 
can be discernibly different from those at time T2 and even more markedly 
at T10.  Organisms are constantly dying and new organisms are born.  As a 
result, the species is not a static entity, but one that is constantly changing 
its parts (if one’s metaphysics of species is that of individuals) or members 
(if species are groups or sets). 
 Mayr explicitly incorporates both a Buffonian and Darwinian notion 
of species in formulating his own conception of species, the biological species 
concept (BSC) (Mayr 1942, 1968).  In the original form, the BSC stated that:  
“species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural 
populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups” 
(Mayr 1942: 120).  This conception of species answered the question, What 
unifies the members of a species?, in terms of an actual or potential physical 
connection (i.e. in terms of both the copulation of sexually mature organisms 
and in the generation of new organisms that result).  This physical 
connection between members of the same species was thought to support 
the belief that there is indeed a natural division in biology upon which a 
natural classification can be based.   
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 However, there were exceptions to this purely reproductive 
conception of species.  Reproduction can occasionally occur between 
members of different species.  Some of these exceptions were discussed by 
Buffon (1753).  In The Donkey, Buffon discusses the infertility of hybrid 
offspring (e.g. mules) which are the result of the reproductive relationships 
(either through natural copulation or through artificial insemination) 
between two animals of different species (e.g. in the case of the mule, a 
donkey and a horse).  But Buffon argued that this exception did not pose the 
problem for his conception he originally thought as the offspring of the 
donkey and horse was not fertile (Buffon 1753, cf. Gayon 1996: 224-26).  
Later amendments to his conception of species to accommodate this and 
other exceptions shifted the focus onto other behaviours of organisms 
besides reproductive ones.  Their modes of existence and their life activities 
within an ecological habitat were not adopted by Mayr. 
 The problem Buffon raised about hybridity did not go away.  Mayr’s 
solution was to deny that hybridization between organisms of different 
species was evolutionarily significant.  He maintained that the majority of 
hybrids are “totally sterile,” and “successful hybridization is indeed a rare 
phenomenon” (Mayr 1963: 133).   Since hybrids are rare, they only ever 
amount to “evolutionarily unimportant mistakes” (Mayr 1963: 133).  This 
view was echoed by W. H. Wagner:  “hybrids have occasionally appeared, 
but most have been sterile or ill-adapted … [a] kind of evolutionary noise is 
produced” (Wagner 1970: 146).   
 Although mules and other animal hybrids tend to be sterile, many 
plant hybrids are fertile.  Most hybrids are not completely fertile or 
completely sterile but display varying capacities of fertility and sterility that 
fall along the middle of this continuum: 
Although today it is often said that … hybrids are usually or 
mostly sterile, many show a great deal of fertility and it could be 
argued that the majority are fertile to some degree.  In fact every 
stage from complete sterility to complete fertility exists, and it is 
difficult to make generalizations (Stace 1975: 39). 
 
In addition to hybridity, there were further challenges to the reproductive 
concept of species.  Conceived in terms of sexually reproducing organisms, 
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the BSC effectively denied specieshood to asexual species.  Mayr (1970) 
argued that asexually reproducing organisms were an exceptional case.   
 But increased understanding of the activities of organisms within the 
superkingdoms Bacteria and Archaea meant that Mayr’s exceptionalism 
was grossly misplaced (cf. Woese 1987 and Woese, et al. 1990: 4576-79 for 
discussions of Bacteria and Archaea).  Whereas asexual reproduction is 
ubiquitous within two of the three superkingdoms, (Bacteria and Archaea) 
and is common in some kingdoms of the third (Eukarya), sexual 
reproduction only occurs within some (but not all) multicellular organisms 
of the subkingdoms Animalia and Plantae (cf. O’Malley and Dupré 2007: 
156).  Pace Mayr, sexually rather than asexually reproducing species are the 
exceptional case.  The ubiquity of asexually reproducing species added to the 
pressures on the original reproductive conception of the BSC.  This 
eventually led to the reconfiguration of the BSC from a gene-centred 
perspective.   
 After discussing Mayr’s revised gene-centred perspective of species, I 
show how his BSC and other gene-centred views of species are committed to 
dichotomous thinking about ontogeny and phylogeny.  These commitments 
entail three core beliefs about species:  species are the result of linear 
genetic causation; strong preformationism; and the claim that species can be 
best understood by the phenotypes of adults.  In the second half of the 
chapter, I propose an alternative to gene-centred view of species and its 
underlying commitments.  My organism-centred perspective relies on a 
Buffonian conception of species as a succession of individual organismal life 
cycles, a Taylorian view of construction, and a revised Kantian view of 
reciprocal self-organization.  It aims to reintroduce ontogeny back into the 
concept of species.  Reconsidering species in terms of this Buffon-inspired 
view means conceiving of organisms and species as the result of distributed 
resources, generic preformationism, and the activities of organisms over 
their whole life cycle.  Lastly, I consider and dismiss Dawkins’ (1982) 
suggestion that organisms’ constructed environments can best be 
understood as extended phenotypes.  
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4.1 MAYR’S GENE-CENTRED PERSPECTIVE OF SPECIES 
 
 In the middle of the 20th century a new gene-centred understanding of 
natural selection, evolution, heredity, and the stability and variation within 
species became widely accepted (Mayr 1942, 1963, 1970, Dawkins 1976).  
This neo-Darwinism diverged from Darwin’s original conception of descent 
with modification by taking genes as the causally most important factors in 
evolution and in the development of organismal form.  In The Selfish Gene, 
Dawkins described how genes, not organisms, were the “motors of 
evolution.”  Genes build organisms that are vehicles for their own 
replication.  This view was later extended to include all morphological 
traits, behaviours, social relationships, and habitats of organisms; they are 
merely “phenotypic effects of a gene … [they] are the tools by which it levers 
itself into the next generation, and these tools may ‘extend’ far outside the 
body in which the gene sits, even reaching deep into the nervous systems of 
other organisms” (Dawkins 1982: vi).   
 An organism’s phenotype is encoded in the information within its 
genotype.  Genes, as informational programs, code for traits (cf. Moss 2001: 
85-87).  This focus on genes was thought to be self-evident—natural 
selection acts on the genes responsible for building organisms.  Natural 
selection occurs by changing the frequency of genes from ancestral 
generations to descendant generations.  It selects phenotypes that confer the 
greatest fitness.  Because genes code for these phenotypic traits and genes, 
unlike anything else, are reliably transmitted directly from one generation 
to the next, it is genes, rather than anything else, that are the true cause of 
organismal form, variation, and change over time.  This direct, linear 
transmission meant that genes were conceived of as the ontologically prior 
causal force and most important causal factor responsible for organismal 
stability and variability of species over generations.  Ecological and 
epigenetic factors may only indirectly affect the unfolding of the genetic 
program but cannot cause changes to genes.  Linear genetic causation is 
unidirectional—going only from genes to organisms. 
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  The widespread influence of this gene-centred perspective is 
witnessed by the definition of evolution provided in most evolutionary 
textbooks as the “change in gene frequencies” (cf. Grant 1977, Futuyma 
1986, 1998, Ridley 1993).      
 The inheritance of the same genes from one generation to the next 
was thought to ensure the stability of species-specific traits.  Phenotypic 
variation among individuals of a species was ultimately due to genetic 
mutations and genetic variations within the species population.  This meant 
that although species could be considered reproductive or ecological units, 
the true cause of phenotypic variation among individuals of the same 
species was to be found in their genes—a species is a genetic unit.  The BSC 
was reformulated from what has by some been called an interactionist 
perspective: 
This concept stresses the fact that species consist of populations 
and that species have reality and an internal genetic cohesion 
owing to the historically evolved genetic program that is shared 
by all members of the species.  According to this concept, then, the 
members of a species constitute (1) a reproductive community.  
The individuals of a species of animals respond to one another as 
potential mates and seek one another for the purpose of 
reproduction.  The species is also (2) an ecological unit that, 
regardless of the individuals composing it, interacts as a unit with 
other species with which it shares the environment.  The species, 
finally, is (3) a genetic unit consisting of a large 
intercommunicating gene pool, whereas an individual is merely a 
temporary vessel holding a small portion of the contents of the 
gene pool for a short period of time (Mayr 1992: 17).   
 
 The interactionist perspective of biological form (what I have also 
referred to as the “combined view” in Chapter One), is the view that 
biological form is the result of two ontologically separate but interacting 
spheres of activity:  moulding by a naturally selecting environment and the 
unfolding of the information contained within an organism’s genetic 
program.  The selecting environment gradually modifies generations of 
organism’s phenotypic traits on the basis of whether they increase or 
decrease the likelihood of the organism to successfully mate and pass on its 
genes to future offspring.  Those genes that are reliably passed down from 
parent to offspring contribute to the species-specific blueprint for building 
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new organisms of the next generation of the species.  The species gene pool 
is the result of the selecting force of the environment on genetic mutations 
occurring over numerous generations.    
 The organizational form of organisms is preformed—written in its 
genetic code.  The organism’s internal genetic code interacts with the 
external environment through the course of its ontogeny.  Organismal 
ontogeny amounts to translating the information in the genetic code into a 
design blueprint that can be used to build an organism.   
 This interactionist perspective sets up the genetic code and the 
environment as two ontologically separate but interacting sources of 
information.  Although this perspective conceives organismal organization 
as the result of both genes and the environment, these are not equal 
interactants.  Genetic causes are systematically privileged as the primary 
source of causal power, whereas extragenetic causes or environmental 
causes are considered secondary or as contributory to these.  They are 
bracketed off as background conditions within which genes operate.  This 
results in the genes, rather than every other causal factor, being most 
important (Griffiths and Gray 2001: 195).  Mayr emphasizes the 
fundamental gene-centred perspective of species:  
it is important to focus on the basic biological meaning of the 
species:  A species is a protected gene pool.  It is a … population 
that has its own devices (called isolating mechanisms) to protect it 
from harmful gene flow from other gene pools (Mayr 1992: 17). 
 
 This perspective systematically privileges linear genetic causes of 
species as providing the “internal genetic cohesion [and] genetic program 
that is shared by all members of the species” (Mayr 1992: 17).  Mayr 
explicitly states his belief in anti-essentialist and anti-typological thinking 
from the start.  Because of the variability among organisms of any species 
there can be no set of traits which all organisms of a particular species 
share (Mayr 1992: 16).  Ostensibly, this anti-essentialism commits him to 
the belief that there are no essential species-specific traits common to all 
individuals of a particular species.   
 However, I argue that Mayr’s interactionist revision of the BSC does 
not escape this kind of essentialist-thinking.  He commits himself to two 
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kinds of essentialism.  Firstly, he essentializes genes and gene pools:  
“species have reality and an internal genetic cohesion owing to the 
historically evolved genetic program that is shared by all members of the 
species” (Mayr 1992: 17).  Secondly, he essentializes the sexual reproductive 
relationships among members of the same species:  “animals respond to one 
another as potential mates and seek one another for the purpose of 
reproduction” (Mayr 1992: 17).  Consequences of these commitments will be 
explored with regard to the assumption that species are cohesive entities 
over the next few sections.    
 
 
4.1.1 ESSENTIALIST-THINKING AND THE ASSUMPTION OF SPECIES’ 
“GENETIC COHESION” 
 
 Essentialist-thinking about genetic programs and reproductive 
relationships is entailed by the underlying ontology of the gene-centred 
perspective of the BSC.  The shared species-specific genetic program is both 
the cause of a species’ cohesion and gives a species its metaphysical reality.  
The genetic cohesion of a species is maintained through actual or potential 
gene flow between its members; this provides a physical connectedness of 
individual organisms to other conspecifics.  Mayr emphasizes the 
importance of this exchange of genes because he believes “mixing the genes 
of two different species leads to a high frequency of disharmonious gene 
combinations; mechanisms that prevent this are therefore favored by 
selection” (Mayr 1992).20  As such, species are properly understood as 
protected gene pools.  The protection of a species’ gene pool is ensured by 
what Mayr calls “cohesive mechanisms” that “protect it from harmful gene 
flow from other gene pools” (Mayr 1992: 17).  Organisms that share the 
same gene pool are thought to have access to any genetic mutations which 
may arise in individuals throughout the species population.  Because 
genotypes are causally determinative of phenotypes, if the gene pool is 
                                                     
20 As I will discuss later, the opposite has been observed with regard to bacterial 
species.  In some, it is in the combining and exchanging of genetic materials with 
heterospecifics that allow individuals of a particular species to acquire resources 
enabling them to construct evolutionarily advantageous phenotypes. 
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shared so is the phenotypic expression of these genes.  If the phenotypic 
expressions of the organisms were relatively homogeneous, then natural 
selection would act uniformly in the population.  This would ultimately 
mean that natural selection would restrict the possibility of persistent and 
stable polymorphisms among subgroups which could eventually lead to 
speciation. 
 Reliance on the restriction of gene flow between members of different 
species is based on an assumption that unrestricted gene flow between 
members of different species cannot be sustained.  If there is unrestricted 
gene flow between members of different species, the current diversity of 
species would cease to exist.  Such unrestricted gene flow would result in 
the two species becoming less genotypically and phenotypically distinct.  
Increased gene flow between individuals of different species would 
eventually result in the two previously separate species merging to form one 
genetically and phenotypically amorphous species (Mayr 1970).  If 
reproductive relationships and gene flow were not restricted to conspecifics, 
an increasingly homogeneous gene pool shared by organisms of different 
species would result.  By producing an increasing homogeneity of both 
genotypes and phenotypes of organisms as the boundaries between species 
eroded, Mayr worries this would result in a decrease in the biodiversity 
(Mayr 1982). 
 In contrast, new species are formed when populations become 
reproductively isolated from one another and gene flow between these 
groups stops.  Species are separated from one another “by a complete 
biological discontinuity” (Mayr 1992: 20).  It is this complete separation 
from other species which “protects [the species] from harmful gene flow from 
other gene pools” (Mayr 1992: 17).  Different species are sharply demarcated 
from one another by what Mayr calls a “gap.”  This gap “exists between 
populations that coexist … at a single locality at a given time which delimits 
the species … one finds each species clearly delimited and sharply separated 
from all other species” (Mayr 1992: 19).  He highlights the crucial 
significance of this sharp discontinuity between species:  “Most important, 
no hybrids or intermediates [are] among these [different] species … each is a 
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separate genetic … system separated from the others by a complete 
biological discontinuity, a gap” (Mayr 1992: 20). 
 A similar notion of cohesion forms the basis for an historical 
conception of species as a lineage of organisms—an evolutionary unit of 
organisms that is “held together by cohesive forces” and responds to natural 
selection as a unit (Williams 1970: 357).  Mayr, following Williams, 
understands these cohesive forces in terms of gene flow, genetic 
homeostasis, and common selective pressure (cf. Williams 1985 and 
Ereshefsky 1992: 385-87).   
 Viewing species as genetically cohesive units is not unique to the 
BSC.  A number of other conceptions of species including the isolation, 
cohesion, mate recognition, phylogenetic, and cladist conceptions of species 
share this view.  The BSC, isolation, reproductive, and mate recognition 
conceptions of species explicitly rely on the importance of potential or actual 
physical relationships of sexual reproduction and the exchange of genes 
between conspecifics it facilitates as justification for internal species genetic 
cohesion and genetic isolation from members of other species.  Reproductive 
relationships and genetic cohesion are implicitly relied upon as necessary 
for the neatly bifurcating pattern of unbroken and unreticulated lineages 
central to both cladistic and phylogenetic species concepts (PSC).  Genetic 
cohesion and genetic isolation are assumed by these species concepts in 
their definition of species as an unbroken lineage—a lineage maintained by 
a sequence of reproductive relationships restricted to conspecifics and 
ensured by exclusive vertical transmission of genetic material from one 
generation to the next.  
 PSCs conceive of species in terms of the bifurcating branching tree 
pattern of evolution.  In its weaker form, a PSC conceives of a species as “a 
lineage (an ancestral-descendent sequence of populations) evolving 
separately from others and with its own unitary evolutionary role and 
tendencies” (Simpson 1961: 153).  In its stronger form, it relies on 
identifying species in terms of a group of organisms which share a 
monophyletic lineage (McKitrick and Zink 1988).  A monophyletic lineage is 
an unbroken sequence of ancestor-descendents that includes all and only the 
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descendents of one common ancestor.  By ruling out polyphyletic lineages, 
the PSC denies specieshood to any groups of organisms that are the 
descendents of more than one common ancestor.  By ruling out paraphyletic 
lineages, it denies specieshood to groups of organisms which includes some 
but not all of the descendants of a common ancestor.   
  Although intended to explain the unifying features of a species (as 
well as those separating species from each other), talk of species 
cohesiveness, cohesive mechanisms, and genetic cohesion does not succeed 
in explaining this unity of (or the disunity between) species but succeeds 
only in presupposing it (cf. Ereshefsky 1992: 381-87).  The assumptions of 
species cohesion and the apparent circular arguments on which they are 
based are held not just by the BSC but by other gene-centred concepts of 
species as well.   
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 THE ONTOGENY/PHYLOGENY DICHOTOMY  
 
 Gene-centred and interactionist perspectives of species take the 
genetic program to be the essential species-specific inheritance shared by all 
members of the species.  Because they are mortal, organisms are “merely 
temporary vessels” rather than “immortal replicators” of the species (Mayr 
1992, Dawkins 1989).  The persistence of a species generation after 
generation is therefore not dependent on the lives of individual organisms 
but on the transmission of the species-specific genetic program from one 
generation to the next.  This view replaces Buffon’s view of species as the 
succession of individual life cycles with the gene-centred perspective.  
Organisms do not make species, genetic programs do.   
 This view effectively separates an organism’s phylogeny from its 
ontogeny—organisms are the species they are not because of their ontogeny 
but only because of their phylogeny.  They inherit their species-specific 
features from an unbroken series of ancestors.  An organism’s phylogeny 
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traces the ancestor-descendant relationships as the route by which 
information contained in the species-specific genetic program is inherited.  
Phylogeny is the history of inherited genotypes.  It is the transgenerational 
transmission of information that is thought to ensure the stability of the 
organizational form of members of the same species.  And it is the reliable 
passing on of the species specific information of the genetic blueprint from 
which genes build an organism.  This provides a set of instructions for 
building an organism according to a particular species format that is 
independent of any environmental context.  Conspecifics share something 
like a species-specific homeostatic genotype that encodes the information to 
build organisms with the same basic phenotypes regardless of most external 
environmental perturbations (cf. Ehrlich and Raven 1969, Mishler and 
Donoghue 1982).   
 This dichotomous thinking about phylogeny and ontogeny construes 
the evolutionary causes of species to which an organism belongs to be 
ontologically distinct and separate from the causal sources of its ontogeny.  
This often results in the role of phylogeny emphasized almost to the 
complete exclusion of the role of ontogeny among many of the conceptions of 
species discussed above.  The commitment of the gene-centred perspectives 
on species to dichotomous thinking about phylogeny and ontogeny entails 
three core beliefs about species:  linear genetic causes are metaphysically 
distinct and privileged over all other extragenetic distributed heterogeneous 
causes, strong preformationism, and an adult-centred view of species.  These 
are discussed in turn.   
  
 
4.1.2.1 LINEAR GENETIC CAUSATION 
 
 What I call “linear genetic causation” is the metaphysical view that 
the causes of species-specific organismal organization are passed on in a 
direct unidirectional flow of energy or information (cf. Taylor and Haila 
2001: 522).  The direction of causation is either unidirectional from gene to 
organisms or from the natural selective factors in the environment.  A gene-
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centred perspective of species holds genes to be the privileged cause of 
evolutionarily significant variation among species—Dawkins’ replicators.  
Privileging linear causation over other directions of causation has been 
referred to as “linear thinking” (Bateson 2001: 149).  Linear thinking and 
the particular metaphysical view which underlies both the gene-centred 
perspective and gene-centred interactionism—linear genetic causation—
takes genes to be the most important causal factors shaping the organic 
organization of organisms.  These views accept that genes do not act alone.  
They interact with and utilize internal epigenetic factors and external 
factors in the environment in building an organism.  These form the raw 
materials that are used in the execution of the genetic program.  But unlike 
epigenetic and ecological factors, only the genetic information coded within 
the organism’s genes is directly transmitted from parent to offspring.  This 
direct transmission justifies the apportionment of causal priority to the 
genetic factors over all other factors.  This kind of linear thinking takes the 
causes of organismal organization to be one-way.   
 The environment is simply a constant repeatable context which can 
easily be bracketed off.  It constitutes the usual conditions of development 
which facilitate normal development, ceteris paribus.  By bracketing off all 
causes but genetic ones, it characterizes evolution solely in terms of the 
change in gene frequencies.  This emphasis on linear genetic causation leads 
to a systematic overestimation of the causal contribution genes make: 
It … assume[s] that the distribution of characters of organisms in 
an evolving population reflects the frequency of particular 
naturally selected genes currently found in that population.  A 
consequence of this approach is that only a genetic currency [is 
used] when describ[ing] evolution (Laland, Odling-Smee, and 
Feldman 2001: 125). 
 
Privileging linear genetic causes as most important in the construction of 
species specificity systematically excludes the role of other kinds of causes. 
 
 
4.1.2.2 STRONG PREFORMATIONISM OF SPECIES-SPECIFIC FORMS 
 
 162
 These gene-centred conceptions of species are committed to a 
preformationist notion of species-specific form.  An organism’s species-
specific form is preformed in two ways:  in the inherited information 
contained in the genetic program that exists prior to the organism’s life in 
the world, and in the monophyletic pattern of its species tree tracing the 
unbroken ancestor-descendant relationships from a single common ancestor.  
I focus on the former source of preformationism:  the genes or genetic 
program.    
 Genes, or rather genotypes, are conceived of as the inner directing 
forces organizing the form and development of the organism.  The heritable 
information contained in the genes codes for all the species traits that are 
transmitted from parent to offspring, ancestors to descendents.  An 
organism’s species-specific form is preformed in the genetic program as a set 
of instructions for building an organism of a particular kind:  “development 
is the execution of the genetic program for the construction of a given 
species of organism” (Davidson 1991: 11).  It is determined independently, in 
advance of the organism’s life and development in the world.  The form of 
the organism is contained preformed in the information within the 
genotype:   
Recent results indicate that for several well-studied organs there 
is a single gene or a small set of genes that specifies the basic 
form of the organ.  These genes are expressed early in 
development in wonderfully complex patterns that prefigure the 
complex form the organs will take … [T]heir key role [is] in 
generating organic form (Krasnov 1997: 235-6). 
 
 
4.1.2.3 THE ADULT-CENTRED VIEW 
 
 The third core belief of the gene-centred, linear perspective of species 
is that the genetic program is a program for building a complete adult 
organism.  This focus on the adult stage of the organism rather than the 
embryo, juvenile, adolescent, or metamorphic stages is partially justified by 
claiming that we must base our species concept on adults as it is the 
reproductive capacities of sexually mature adults that are responsible for 
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propagating the species.  Viewing natural selection as acting only on the 
traits of sexually mature organisms that improve or diminish their 
fecundity means the proper judgment of an organism’s form is a judgment of 
its adult fitness.  This perspective construes natural selection as an external 
force that designs organisms.  Instead of locating the “agency for the 
acquisition of adapted form in ontogeny—that is, in some theory of 
epigenesis, [this] view … expels all manner of adaptive agency from within 
the organism and relocates it in an external force … as ‘an algorithm’ of 
natural selection” (Moss 2003: 6).  One that is applied only to adult forms.  
 
 
4.2 AN ORGANISM-CENTRED CONCEPTION OF SPECIES 
 
 The division between phylogeny and ontogeny, the preference for 
relying on the former over the latter in conceiving of species, and the three 
core beliefs that follow from the dichotomous thinking of a gene-centred 
perspective are not the only, or even the best, ways of conceiving of species.  
In the following I propose an alternative to the gene-centred and 
interactionist perspectives of species.  I argue that the phylogeny of a 
particular species is neither ontologically distinct nor separate from the 
individual ontogenies of organisms’ life cycles.  In place of these gene-
centred, interactionist perspectives, I argue for an organism-centred 
perspective that conceives of species as the recurrent succession of 
organismal life cycles which are causally connected in a spatiotemporally 
ordered series.  Understanding species in this way draws its main 
inspiration from the conception of species found in Buffon.  This organism-
centred view also relies on reciprocal self-organization of organisms (Kant 
1790), the acquisition of resources from distributed rather than 
concentrated sources, and the metaphor of heterogeneous construction 
(Taylor 2001). 
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4.2.1 SPECIES AS A SUCCESSION OF INDIVIDUAL ORGANISMAL LIFE 
CYCLES 
 
 Buffon is perhaps best known for his criticisms of the classification 
system of his more famous contemporary, Linnaeus.  In particular, he 
criticized the Linnaean system for not being based on real biological entities.  
Buffon considered it an abstract piece of complicated terminology 
constructed to facilitate the memorization of plants and animals by giving 
each a name:  “it is at the very most only a convention, an arbitrary 
language, a means of mutual understanding.  But no real cognizance 
[connaissance réele] of things can result from it” (Buffon 1749: 104).  
Although admitting that this abstract system was obviously useful as a tool 
to remember organisms in terms of a hierarchically ordered set of names, he 
argued that it did not reflect any physical reality or order in the world.  The 
classes of the Linnaean system—kingdoms, phyla, orders, families, and 
genera—were merely fictions.  Only species were “real” concrete biological 
entities (Buffon 1749, Gayon 1996: 215-25).   
  Buffon’s natural philosophical project was to reveal the physical 
reality of a species considered in time:  “[a] species … exists only when we 
look at Nature in its temporal succession” (Buffon 1753: 99).  In pursuit of 
this he relied on extensive observations and descriptions of individual 
organisms.  He argued that it was only after we have studied all the 
minutiae of an organism’s organization and behaviour that it would be 
possible to order these facts spatially and temporally, within a particular 
historical sequence.  The generalized facts we glean from these naturalist 
studies on individual organisms are the “physical truths” of a species.  These 
physical truths are only acquired through the precise description of an 
organism’s morphology, internal activities (digestion), external activities 
(locomotion), and its mode of living within its environment—not from ideal 
abstract knowledge or universal truths (Buffon 1749: 100-11).  This view of 
species was revolutionary.  Buffon was the first to conceive of species 
ecologically, as spatio-temporally extended, environmentally embedded 
series of life cycles:    
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[organisms’] conception, the time of gestation, [the] birth, the 
number of young, the care shown by the parents, … the places 
where they live, their nourishment and their manner of procuring 
it, … their hunting, and finally, the services which they can 
render to [them] and all the uses which [they] can make of them 
(Buffon 1749: 111).  
 
This material connectedness of each individual life cycle—of generation, 
growth, metamorphosis, maturation, reproduction, and death located 
temporally within a perpetual series of individual life cycles of organisms—
constituted the nature of species as real biological entities.21   
 A Buffon-inspired conception of species as the recurrent succession of 
organismal life cycles that are causally connected in a temporally ordered 
series is the basis for a new organism-centred perspective.  It takes as 
central the whole organismal life cycle, focusing on manifold dynamic 
processes and developmental changes over its lifetime.  
 
 
4.2.2 THE SELF-CONSTRUCTION AND SELF-ORGANIZATION OF SPECIES 
 
 
 Rather than privileging relationships of reproduction, a shared 
genetic program, gene pool, or a set of morphological traits over other 
factors, this view conceives of a species as a series of self-constructed and 
reconstructed organismal life cycles.  A species is the succession of 
organisms that share common capacities for sustaining a particular form of 
life by repeated generative and developmental processes, relationships, and 
modes of life.  Organisms self-construct and self-organize themselves 
throughout their lifetime utilizing similar heterogeneous resources in 
similar ways.  What resources count as causes of its construction are 
ecologically embedded and dependent on the temporal stage of the 
organism’s development.   
 Whereas the gene-centred and interactionist views of species take 
evolution to be the change in gene frequencies, this constructive organism-
                                                     
21 For Buffon, only species (not genera, phyla, classes, families, or kingdoms) are 
naturally unified in this way.     
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centred view takes evolution to be “phenotypic change [that may] involve 
gene frequency, not [characterized by] just gene frequency alone” (West-
Eberhard 2003: 28, italicization her own).  The organism self-constructs its 
phenotype utilizing genetic, epigenetic, physiological, cellular, behavioural, 
and environmental resources and organizes these over the course of its life 
cycle.  Organismal self-construction and the summed self-construction of 
species (construed as a succession of life cycles) are the products of 
distributed causes.  The succession of organismal life cycles organize their 
own construction by selecting similar resources in similar ecologies to 
preserve similar ways of living utilizing similar generative capacities.  In 
this way, species are generically preformed.  They share common capacities 
that facilitate the stability of species-specific traits, plasticity in their 
development, and variability among individuals of the same species.   
 
 
4.2.3 RECONSIDERING SPECIES ONTOGENETICALLY  
 
 An organism-centred, self-constructive view dissolves the sharp 
distinction between ontogeny and phylogeny that has been used to justify 
the privileged use of the latter in preference to or in place of the former in 
conceiving the nature of species.  Conceiving species from an organism-
centred perspective means understanding them as the succession of 
ecologically-and-temporally embedded organismal activities.  This view 
integrates the individual organism’s ecologically embedded ontogeny back 
into the conception of species.   
 There is no significant metaphysical distinction between linear 
genetic factors and extragenetic or ecological causal factors that justifies 
privileging one over the other.  The apportionment of causal priority to 
genes as the informational program responsible for the phenotypes of 
organisms is based on a confusion.  It takes a preformationist conception of 
genes as an “instrumental expression used as if they cause phenotypes” to 
provide a specific molecular sequence which is responsible for constructing 
that phenotype (Moss 2001: 87-88).   
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 The confused view that genes code for traits arises when we conflate 
two distinct gene concepts:  Gene-P and Gene-D (Moss 2001, 2003).  “Gene-
P” and “Gene-D” refer to completely distinct kinds of things.  Whereas Gene-
P is a heuristic for speaking about a relationship to a particular phenotypic 
trait, Gene-D is a specific molecular sequence—a “developmental resource” 
that is phenotypically “indeterminate” (Moss 2001: 88).  Once these two 
concepts are distinguished, the confused basis for privileging genetic causes 
ceases to exist:  “Gene-D is ontologically on the same plane as any number of 
other biomolecules, that is, proteins, RNA, oligosaccharides, and so forth, 
which is only to say that it warrants no causal privileging” (Moss 2001: 89).  
 Species construct themselves from a combination of these and other 
resources.  All of these resources can be conceived of as potential causes of 
organismal construction and organization depending on which ones are 
used, how they are used, and when and in what combinations they are used 
during the course of the organism’s life cycle.   
 Resources may be inherited vertically or horizontally, they may be 
acquired at birth, learnt as a juvenile or acquired from interacting with 
other conspecifics.  Sources of resources may be distributed over space and 
time:  “genes are transmitted by ancestral organisms to their descendants, 
… but in addition, phenotypically selected habitats, phenotypically modified 
habitats, and artefacts, persist, [and] are actively ‘transmitted,’ by these 
same organisms to their descendants via their local environments” (Laland, 
Odling-Smee, and Feldman 2001: 120).  These acquired habitats, 
behaviours, and artefacts are all conceived of as possible causes, resources 
that can be used by an organism in its self-construction and in the 
successive multigenerational constructions of life cycles of organisms.  This 
constructive process is ongoing.  As a succession of life cycles, a species is 
constantly constructed and reconstructed utilizing similar genetic, 
extragenetic, and environmental resources and similar capacities and 
activities of organisms that are both vertically passed on to offspring as well 
as horizontally among conspecifics. 
 Three principles follow from this organism-centred view:  circular and 
distributed causation; generic preformationism; and the organism as 
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understood in term of the whole life cycle.  These are alternatives to the 
linear genetic causation, strong preformationism, and adult-centred view of 
the gene-centred perspective.   
  
 
4.2.3.1 CIRCULAR AND DISTRIBUTED CAUSES 
 
 Rather than locating the causal source of species’ forms internally 
within the genes, externally within the selective power of the environment, 
or a combination of the two, the organism-centred view rejects the view 
common to all of these:  that there is a localized cause of species specific 
form.  Rather, the direction of organic cause is circular not linear and the 
sources of organic cause are distributed across a number of different 
resources rather than concentrated only in one or two sources.  This view of 
organic causes draws on Kant’s own account of causal circularity in the 
Critique of Judgement (Kant 1790).  He illustrates the causal circularity of 
organic self-organization referring to a species of tree:  
a tree generates another tree … the tree it produces is of the same 
species.  Hence with regard to its species the tree produces itself:  
within its species, it is both cause and effect, both generating 
itself and being generated by itself ceaselessly, thus preserving 
itself as a species.   
 The leaves, too, though produced by the tree, also sustain it in 
turn; for repeated defoliation would kill it, and its growth depends 
on their effect on the trunk (Kant 1790: Ak. 371, 372). 
 
The causal circularity Kant discusses is threefold.  Firstly, the organism is 
both the product of a previous tree’s reproduction and the producer of a 
succeeding tree; it is both cause and effect of its own species.  Secondly, as 
the organizing agency determining which resources are used in the self-
construction of an organism, the organism is both cause and effect of its own 
individual development.  And thirdly, it is both cause and effect of the 
integrated structure and maintenance of its parts (e.g. leaves, boughs, roots, 
branches, seeds).   
 This last type of causal circularity can explain the self-organized 
growth of organisms.  Take fruit trees as an example.  Fruit trees organize 
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their own growth by controlling how different resources are used in different 
tissues at different times, e.g. they allocate energy first to the construction 
of new roots; then, as the plant establishes an equilibrium between fixation 
of carbon and energy from the atmosphere and uptake of water, it directs 
energy to leaves, then flowers and finally to fruit.  Carbon fixed after this 
goes to roots or is stored as starch.  The starch it holds back serves as a 
reserve to buffer itself from root or foliage damage by insect attack or fire.  
Nutrients are recycled from foliage which has dropped to the ground and 
decomposed as humus.  Trees shield their roots from being decomposed by 
constructing them out of the more rigid material lignin instead of cellulose 
which decays more easily (cf. Berg 1986, Aber and Melillo 1991).   
 The fruit tree’s inherited resources and its capacities for fixing 
carbon, metabolic use of sunlight for photosynthesis, and the storage of 
starch are all partial causes of the tree’s self-organized construction within 
its embedded environment. 
 The organism-centred view rejects the division which locates the 
principal source of causal power in the active genes or genomes, bracketing 
off other factors as the stable environment—the passive background 
conditions of the activities of the genes.  Viewing the environment as a 
stable set of background causes that either facilitate or frustrate the 
primary genetic cause assumes that there is a single unidirectional flow of 
inheritance facilitated by the vertical transmission of genes from one 
generation to the next.  
 Oyama criticizes this view arguing that there are no unique 
replicators or vehicles of species constancy:  “[t]here is no vehicle of 
constancy (even though the coined term, ‘interactant’ may have an 
unfortunate particulate connotation), unless the organism and its niche, as 
they move along time’s arrow, are so conceived” (Oyama 2000:27).  
 Genes are not exclusive in their reliable inheritance over generations.  
A diversity of genetic, extragenetic, ecological causal resources and 
generative capacities are reliably inherited contributing to the organism’s 
organisation over its life cycle and passed on similarly and over a series of 
organismal life cycles.  Certain phenotypic traits are constructed by 
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organisms from resources (Keime) and capacities (Anlagen) of the self-
organizing organism.  The organism explores the developmental possibilities 
of the resources available to it in time and space and utilizes its capacities 
for organizing and reorganizing these resources.  These resources and 
capacities partially constrain the organism’s developmental activities but 
these constraints allow it to maintain a relatively stable form.  This stability 
facilitates the possibility of novel variations in the organism’s self-
construction and development. 
 Rather than systematically privileging genetic factors as most 
important in the development of an organism’s specific form, the organism-
centred view denies that the apportionment of causal significance to any 
particular resource—whether they be genetic, cellular, nutritive, or 
ecological—can be judged in advance of the organism’s life.  It is dependent 
upon the organism’s use of these resources and its building on the results of 
past constructive activities over time.     
 These resources are potential causes of organismal construction and 
species construction.  Causes are contingent; they  
vary according to historical trajectories that have led to them; … 
particularities of place and connections among places matter; … 
time and place is a matter of scale that differs among species; 
variation among individuals can qualitatively alter the ecological 
process; … interactions among the species under study can be 
artefacts of the indirect effects of other ‘hidden’ species (Taylor 
2001: 327). 
   
 Resources used in repeatedly constructing and reconstructing stable 
environments over life cycles and successions of life cycles are not limited to 
the vertical inheritance of genes from parent to offspring.  There is a 
panoply of resources that can be inherited both vertically and horizontally.  
A selection of these will be considered. 
 
 
4.2.3.1.1 VERTICALLY ACQUIRED RESOURCES 
 
 Many resources are acquired vertically besides genes.  One example 
is the vertical inheritance of epigenetic resources.  During the development 
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of the organism, cells differentiate to become muscle, nerve, cardiac, lung, 
skin, liver, brain, and blood cells.  Whilst these cell types all contain the 
same DNA base-sequences, when they divide they produce more cells of the 
same type—liver cells produce liver cells, blood cells produce blood cells.  
The function of these new daughter cells is passed on to them by the parent 
cells epigenetically rather than by any information in the genes.   
 This type of epigenetic inheritance may be passed on through a 
number of different pathways.  One such route of inheritance is the passing 
on of a particular developmental or ecological stimulus that affects gene 
activity—genes may either be turned on or off by the cell in response to the 
stimulus.  If these genes are turned on in the parent cell, the genes in the 
daughter cells and in subsequent descendants will continue to turn those 
genes on.  The result is that there may be “genetically identical cells [that] 
can be in two alternative states (‘on’ and ‘off’), and both states can be self-
perpetuating” (Jablonka 2001: 104).  These cell lineages can continue to 
produce offspring that are “on” even when the original stimulus is no longer 
present.  This continues “as long as the products of the self-sustaining cycle 
do not fall below a critical threshold” (Jablonka 2001: 104).    
 What are being passed on are the activities of ancestor cells in each 
cell cycle.  Although the different states within each cell cycle are limited, 
cells may have numerous different cell cycles.  Because of this, there can be 
an exponential number of possible cell variant states.  Cells can also inherit 
their structure from parent cells epigenetically.  For instance, the pattern of 
cilia on their cell membranes, pattern of growth (e.g. fractal), or chromatin 
marks on protein or RNA complexes that affect methylation patterns (cf. 
Jablonka 2001: 103-9). 
 In addition to epigenetic resources, behavioural and ecological 
resources can also be inherited vertically.  Oviposition and the building of 
galls or nests are some ways many female insects construct the 
environments of their offspring—either by choosing to lay their eggs on a 
particular plant or by constructing galls.  The plant on which the female 
insect lays her eggs (or the gall she constructs) becomes the nutritional 
source and the habitat for her developing larvae.  The larvae vertically 
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inherit this environment from their mother.  Like the vertical inheritance of 
genetic and epigenetic factors, it is one of many resources passed from 
parent to offspring.  These resources are utilized in constructing and 
reconstructing the environments and ecological artefacts of a succession of 
organismal life cycles.  These “constructed components of the environment 
are both products of the prior evolution of organisms and, in the form of 
[ecological inheritance], causes of the subsequent evolution of organisms, 
both products and causes of evolution” (Laland, Odling-Smee, and Feldman 
2001: 125).   
 The construction of nests and galls is dependent on circular and 
distributed causes because these organic artefacts are the constructed 
product of contingent interconnected causal resources supplied by the tree, 
climate, the female insect, and her larvae.  The female insect does not 
construct her gall on her own.  The development of galls is contingent on 
such things as whether a plant has a particular susceptibility to galling 
from certain insects:  “specific properties of the plant genome or 
environment must play a role … not all [plants] are hospitable or responsive 
to galling insects” (West-Eberhard 2003: 109).   
 
 
4.2.3.1.2 HORIZONTALLY ACQUIRED RESOURCES 
 
 Vertical inheritance is only one route by which organisms can acquire 
resources.  Genetic and extragenetic resources can also be acquired 
horizontally.  Organisms can exchange genes, extragenetic, and ecological 
resources either with organisms of their own species as well as with those of 
different species.  These horizontal routes of resource acquisition may be 
facilitated by hybridization between organisms of the same genera 
(interspecific hybridization) or in some cases between organisms of different 
genera, orders or families (supraspecific hybridization).  The exchange of 
genetic material can occur horizontally among different species of 
organisms, e.g. between parasites or symbionts and their hosts.  
Extragenetic, behavioural, and ecological resources can also be inherited 
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horizontally.  These include gut microflora, endosymbionts, learned 
behaviours or preferences, and constructed habitats.  
 
 
 
4.2.3.1.2.1 HORIZONTALLY ACQUIRED GENETIC RESOURCES 
 
 Unlike Buffon’s example of the mule, among botanicals, especially 
flowering plants such as orchids (Orchidaceae), berries (Ribes), cacti 
(Cactaceae), vascular plants, and many species of grasses and ferns, hybrids 
are both frequent and often fertile (Stace 1975).  But although hybridization 
among animals occurs less frequently than among plant species, in some it 
is especially common.  For instance, 35% of the butterflies in the genera 
Heliconius hybridize (Mallet 2007).  The two interspecific butterfly species, 
Heliconius erato and Heliconius himera live within a similar ecological 
niche and frequently exchange genes through hybridization.  Despite 
regular hybridization and overlapping gene pools, these species remain 
separate phenotypically distinct stable species.  H. erato and H. himera 
have distinct behavioural characteristics, phenotypes, choice of host plant, 
and different microhabitat, even though they share a larger ecological niche.  
Lepidopterists and taxonomists do not consider these to be one intermixing 
species, but two separate species which frequently hybridize.  In doing so, 
they do not conceive of species using the BSC, which would lump these 
hybridizing species together into one large polymorphic species.   
 Hybridization among the different species of Heliconius butterflies 
has provided a horizontal route by which butterflies of different species have 
acquired resources that have enabled them to construct their phenotypic 
features in such a way as to minimize their predation from birds.  Some 
species of Heliconius butterflies are mimics that model their phenotypes on 
the wing patterns of other species of Heliconius butterflies.  The black and 
white banded H. cydno is a mimic which mimics the model species H. sapho 
and H. eleuchia.  The model species that H. cydno chooses to mimic depends 
on where it lives.  H cydno live in different parts of West Ecuador and 
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Columbia.  The different colour patterns which are present on the H. cydno 
wings are controlled by the same loci as other species of Heliconius 
butterflies (both mimics and models) which occupy diverse ecological niches 
(Kapan 2001, Kronforst et al. 2006).  These model species of Heliconius are 
less likely to be eaten by predator birds that have learned that these 
butterflies are particularly foul-tasting.  Birds recognizing the particular 
colour pattern on the wings of foul-tasting butterflies are avoided.  Species 
of Heliconius which are palatable to birds have acquired the same wing 
colour pattern to those which are foul-tasting.  Hybridization between 
species of foul-tasting models and palatable mimics has facilitated the 
acquisition of certain genetic and extragenetic resources that have provided 
species such as H. cydno the means to construct its phenotype mimicking 
those of the foul-tasting butterflies.  Living in similar environments with 
similar risks of predation means these mimics enjoy similar protection from 
bird attack because the mimics share almost identical colour patterns on 
their wings as those of the foul tasting species (Jiggins et al. 2001, Gilbert 
2003).   
 Whilst some non-hybridizing species of sexually reproducing animals 
may still be definable in terms of a conception of species based exclusively 
on reproductive relationships and genetic isolation, it fails for hybridizing 
species such as those discussed here.  But its deficiency does not end with 
hybridizing species.  It fails for the majority of species in the world.  In 
particular, the BSC faces significant problems when dealing with microbial 
and bacterial species.  Bacteria reproduce asexually by budding or the 
binary fission of the single parent cell into two daughter cells rather than by 
the formation of a zygote, the product of two gametes.  Bacterial species do 
not produce gametes and do not go through meiosis.  Genes are passed 
vertically in asexual reproduction from parent to offspring but they can also 
be passed horizontally between different bacterial species by means of 
transformation, transduction and conjugation.22  These provide other means 
of resource acquisition in addition to vertical inheritance.   
                                                     
22 Transformation is the process by which bacteria pick up DNA from their 
environment.  Transduction is the process by which bacterial DNA is moved from 
one bacterium to another by means of a bacterial virus (bacteriophage).  
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 Organisms of one species exchanging genetic material with an 
organism of another is not accommodated easily by the BSC’s conception of 
species as groups of organisms sharing a genetically isolated gene pool and a 
species specific set of genes.  The difficulties for the BSC raised by the 
horizontal transfer of genetic resources are not confined to bacterial species: 
bacterial and viral DNA are constantly being integrated in the 
chromosomes of plants and animals today, by the known genetic 
mechanisms of conjugation, transformation, and transduction, (in 
evolutionary terms, retroviruses and other … viruses are exact 
parallels of bacteriophages).  It can be concluded that eukaryotes 
possess the same capacity and similar mechanisms for effective 
horizontal gene transfer as prokaryotes do (De la Cruz and Davies 
2000: 132). 
 
Although significantly rarer, horizontal gene transfer (HGT) has been found 
to occur between organisms belonging to different kingdoms such as 
between eukaryotic species and bacterial species.  Eukaryotes may obtain 
genes horizontally from mobile genetic elements in the food they consume, 
retroviruses, and disease causing parasites such as trypanosomatids (cf. 
Doolittle et al. 1989, Doolittle 1998 and Hannaert et al. 2003).  Although 
striking, it is a mistake to overemphasize the role of HGT.  Not all genes can 
be horizontally transferred, in fact, only a small minority of genetic 
sequences are able to be horizontally transferred.  However, HGT is notable 
because it provides organisms with another route by which genetic 
resources can be acquired.  And it provides bacteria important access to 
genes from a number of different organisms (either of a similar species or 
even of a different kingdom).  They contribute widely distributed genetic 
resources that the organism can use in its self-construction.   
 One of the most conspicuous and widely studied examples of HGT is 
the acquisition of virulence.  Some plasmid and bacteriophage vectors carry 
the genetic materials necessary for virulence.  The resources necessary for 
the construction of the virulent phenotype are horizontally transferable.  
These chunks of genetic resources are called “islands of pathogenicity” 
(Hacker et al. 1997).  These islands of pathogenicity can be passed 
                                                                                                                                                           
Conjugation is the transfer of genetic material from one living bacterial cell to 
another and requires physical contact between the two cells (De la Cruz and Davies 
2000: 132; cf. Timmis and Scott 1984). 
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horizontally from a virulent bacterium of one species to a non-virulent 
bacterium of another species.  The acquisition of these pathogenicity islands 
by the recipient bacterium provides it with the resources to become virulent.  
This dramatic change in the bacterium’s phenotype (from non-virulent to 
virulent) means that it can now occupy an entirely new ecological niche.   
 
 
4.2.3.1.2.2 HORIZONTALLY ACQUIRED EXTRAGENETIC AND 
ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES 
 
 
 Organisms horizontally acquire various extragenetic resources.  For 
example, some organisms acquire microorganisms horizontally.  Ruminant 
mammals such as cattle and sheep and other mammals inherit symbiotic 
microflora that they utilize in digestion.  These microflorae are inherited 
from multiple sources (both horizontally and vertically).  These may include 
ingesting the milk from the mother; from other related and unrelated 
conspecific females of the same group (e.g. within prides and packs); in the 
regurgitant of carers, siblings or other conspecifics peers (or other 
individuals besides parents); or the ingestion of faecal matter that is the 
product of different organisms (which may include both conspecifics and 
heterospecifics).  In cattle, the symbiotic microflora live within one of the 
stomachs, the rumen.  The microflora aid in digestion of the copious amount 
of rough vegetation cattle consume.  These symbionts partially decompose 
tough plant tissue allowing the cow to absorb energy and nutrients from 
cellulose that would otherwise be indigestible (Aber and Melillo 1991: 230-
31).  This increases the amount of energy the cow gains from the vegetation 
it consumes.   
 The acquisition of beneficial resources that may be used in the 
construction and organization of organisms is not limited to mammals.  The 
horizontal transfer of γ-proteobacterial endosymbionts occurs among many 
insects especially the microsporidia that are present in a wide variety of 
arthropods and the parasitic fungi of several plants (Werren 2005: 291).  
The symbiotic microorganisms of termites quicken the rate of decay of high-
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lignin substances.  Termites use this to their advantage.  This quicker decay 
rate facilitated by their symbionts allows the hosts to consume large 
amounts of wood.   
 These symbionts can be passed on from one organism to the next 
exclusively by horizontal transfer, but they can also be passed on by a 
mixture of partially vertical and partially horizontal inheritance.  
Symbionts such as the nitrogen-fixing bacteria Rhizobium of some legumes, 
algae-bearing symbionts of some corals, and the γ- and α-proteobacteria 
Rickettsia and Wolbachia of arthropods and nematodes are acquired 
through a mixture of heritable routes (Werren 2005: 290-98).   
 Some of the most well-known horizontally transferred symbionts are 
of those of the bacteria Rhizobium.  These are acquired when the bacteria 
infect the roots of leguminous plants (e.g. peanuts and soybeans) causing 
the plant to grow root nodules.  These root nodules serve to protect the 
acquired microbes from the acidic conditions of the surrounding soil (Aber 
and Melillo 1991: 149).  In this protected environment, the microorganisms 
carry out the fixation of nitrogen gas from the atmosphere.  By doing so, 
they provide the plant a greater amount of this valuable nutrient than is 
possible from the regular uptake of nitrogen by the plant from the soil in the 
absence of these microorganisms.   
  Behavioural resources may also be inherited horizontally as well as 
vertically.  In addition to the vertical acquisition of food preferences by 
oviposition or through the mother’s placenta, or in her milk, these 
preferences may be acquired horizontally (perhaps “diagonally” is better) 
among organisms that cross-feed.  Horizontal acquisition of behavioural 
patterns such as nut burying of squirrels and chipmunks, the waggledance 
of honeybees (used to communicate the location of food sources to other bees 
in the hive), the courtship behaviours and songs of grasshoppers and 
crickets, or the acquisition of a particular signed language from one’s 
conspecifics, are widespread.  These behaviours are stabilized within the 
species if they increase the viability and fecundity of the organisms using 
them. 
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 Learned behaviours may also include the avoidance of certain types of 
prey or the avoidance of some highly dangerous predators on the basis of 
their phenotypic features.  After learning from experience, from copying the 
behaviour of parents or peers, a bird may be able to recognize and avoid 
eating the bad-tasting prey, such as H. sapho butterflies, on the basis of 
their wing patterns.  Or it may learn to avoid the red, yellow, and black 
striped markings characteristic of the many highly venomous coral snakes 
(e.g. the Texas coral snake Micrurus fulvius and the Arizona coral snake 
Micruroides euryxanthus).  As discussed above, other species may exploit 
these learnt behaviours by mimicking the phenotypes of the model species 
that are already recognized by predators.  The result of this on the 
behaviour of the birds learning to avoid the phenotypic markings of the bad-
tasting butterfly or venomous snake is that both the models (e.g. H. sapho, 
H. eleuchia and the coral snakes) and mimic species (e.g. H. cydno, the 
Scarlet King snake, Lampropeltis triangulum elapsoides, and the Colorado 
Desert Shovel-nosed snake, Chionactis occipitalis annulata) are 
systematically avoided by birds that have acquired this learned recognition 
and avoidance behaviour (Stebbins 2003). 
 Lastly, organisms may also pass on environmental resources or 
constructed environments such as webs (spiders), dens (foxes), nests (wasps, 
robins), galls (mites), warrens (rabbits), dams (beavers), song dialects 
(whales), or libraries (humans).  These may be passed vertically or 
horizontally, or may even be a resource acquired from different species (e.g. 
hermit crabs’ shells, a rattlesnake’s use of tortoise burrows, bats’ use of 
bears’ caves, and generations of earthworm burrows that produces the 
topsoil in which other organisms also live).  These resources are used in the 
construction and reconstruction of environmental niches by organisms of a 
particular species in a similar way. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3.2 GENERIC PREFORMATIONISM 
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 The gene-centred interactionist position of the BSC, PSC, and related 
concepts is doubly preformationist.  It relies on there being a common 
informational program for species specific traits contained within the genes 
such that development is merely the unfolding of this preformed program.  
And it conceives a pre-existing niche as selecting and moulding the traits of 
species.  Rather than conceiving of a species as a group of organisms sharing 
a common genetic program, according to the organism-centred view a 
species is conceived of as sharing common generative capacities, common 
resources, and a common way of life within similarly constructed 
environments.  Instead of viewing organisms as outcomes of the causal 
forces of its genes or its environment, (e.g. understood as either the result of 
factors present in a pre-formed program, a pre-existing environmental 
niche, or a combination of these), an organism-centred view suggests we can 
view organisms as well as species as both cause and effect of their own 
construction.  Species are not strongly preformed or predetermined; but they 
are generically preformed.   
 Whereas strong preformationism considers an organism’s form to be a 
“mere educt,”23 the result of an unfolding preformed form, generic 
preformationism takes an organism’s form to be a “product” which is 
generated anew in reproduction.  However, this product is not generated de 
novo from “crude … unorganized matter” (Kant 1790: Ak. 424).  The form of 
a species is “preformed virtualiter in the intrinsic purposive predispositions 
[Anlagen] imparted to the stock” (Kant 1790: Ak. 423).  The organism is 
constructed in part from these generically preformed Keime and Anlagen.  
But, as my discussion and extension of Kant’s generic preformationism 
suggested, organisms also utilize resources acquired from their environment 
and through their interaction with other organisms (Chapter Two).     
 An organism-centred view of species suggests that traits are not the 
result of a preformed form contained in the unfolding informational program 
                                                     
23 An educt is understood by Kant to be in contrast to a product.  Whereas a 
product’s form is generated or “brought forth,” an educt already has its form.  An 
educt’s form is simply “brought out” rather than “brought forth” (Kant 1790: Ak. 
372).   
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of the genes.  Genes are just one resource the organism uses for its self-
construction, one of many resources that it acquires from heterogeneous 
sources by different pathways of inheritance.  Environments do not shape or 
choose the traits of species.  Resources in the environment are used in the 
self-construction of an organism over its lifetime.  Successive generations of 
organisms of the same species construct themselves and their niches from 
similar sets of resources in similar ways.   
 A species, as a sequence of generically preformed ontogenies, relies on 
understanding each individual life cycle as contributing to it.  As such, the 
species is a process of constant reconstruction where organisms come into 
being with certain resources and capacities (Keime and Anlagen).  Their 
constructive activities shape their environment, interactions with 
conspecifics, and the resources and capacities of future generations of 
conspecifics.  The tendency for like to produce like is not a necessary 
tendency that is set within the genes or the environment.  In many cases, 
like does not produce like.  Whether like produce like is contingent on the 
varying phenotypes of different life stages of organisms, whether the 
offspring have similar genetic, cellular, metabolic, ecological, and 
behavioural resources and whether these are organized in a similar way in 
the self-construction of the offspring as they are in the parents, 
grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.  Organismal form and organization 
is the result of common generic capacities and shared resources.  
Understanding organic matter in terms of common generative capacities for 
the self-organization of organisms and species means focusing on the 
capacities and activities of organisms that facilitate developmental and 
phenotypic variation.   
 Generic capacities facilitate both phenotypic plasticity and stability of 
form across organisms of the same species.  The plasticity of organisms is 
their ability to use the same resources in constructing different phenotypes, 
or in utilizing different resources in constructing similar phenotypes.  The 
stability of organisms is their ability to develop and maintain their growth 
throughout their ontogeny according to a conserved body plan and the 
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ability of successive generations to use the same resources in constructing 
similar phenotypes.   
 Phenotypes are at once plastic and stable.  Phenotypes of organisms 
are plastic insofar as they are responsive to the continual variation within 
their environment.  Phenotypes of organisms are stable insofar as they may 
develop reliably despite changes to the organism’s resources.  Organisms 
may change their features depending on a number of factors.  These changes 
are attributable to the self-organizing capacities of organisms in selecting 
which resources, in what order, and in what combination, are utilized as 
causes of their own development:  “the origin of species differences, and of 
novel phenotypes in general, involves the reorganization of ancestral 
phenotypes … this is developmental recombination” (West-Eberhard 2005: 
6543).  Organisms are able to coordinate the resources used in their own 
development because they are: 
richly endowed with a capacity for facilitating variation, a small 
input of random mutation would lead to a large output of viable 
phenotypic variation … Instead of a brittle system, where every 
genetic change is either lethal or produces a rare improvement in 
fitness, we have a system where many genetic changes are 
tolerated with small phenotypic consequences and whereas others 
may have selective advantages, but are also tolerated because 
physiological adaptablity suppresses lethality (Kirschner and 
Gerhart 2005: 226). 
 
The organism is the author of its own variability.  Its generic capacities may 
constrain deleterious variation or enhance variability that may be 
advantageous to the organism.  Using these capacities, organisms may 
either buffer or enhance any variations to their genetic or extragenetic 
resources or perturbations in their environmental resources.   
 An organism has both constraints and de-constraints on the 
variability of its phenotype.  Its capacity for variation allows it to maintain 
itself across a wide range of conditions.  The organism’s potential for 
different developmental variations lie in its capacity to self-organize its 
genetic and extragenetic resources.  The organism’s common stock of generic 
capacities (Anlagen) and resources (Keime) can be understood as its 
“phenotypic repertoire” (West-Eberhard 2003: 146).  The organism’s 
generically preformed capacities include a number of highly conserved core 
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processes:  inter-cellular signalling and cell sorting (Goodwin et al. 1993); 
the capacity for weak linkage, exploratory behaviour, spatial patterning, 
compartmentation and modularity of the body plan (cf. Kirschner and 
Gerhart 2005); the capacity of tissues to segment or form hollow tubes (cf. 
Minelli 2003); and the capacity to learn and remember (West-Eberhard 
2003: Ch. 3, 7, 18).  A thumbnail sketch of some of these may be useful.    
 The capacity for weak linkage allows organisms to utilize a small 
number of mechanisms relying mostly on the ability to reconfigure these as 
and when necessary for different functions.  But because these linkages are 
weak, they are often retraced and duplicated by other pathways or circuits 
to strengthen them.  The use of weak linkages means that there is higher 
versatility with which the organism can use to alter these pathways when 
necessary.  If these were strong, static and unchanging linkages, the 
organism would be arguably less fit to adjust to different environmental 
situations (Kirschner and Gerhart 2005: 136-7).  In the course of evolution 
small changes result in wide variability and novelty.  Weak linkages can be 
formed in many kinds of interactions, such as those between cells, cell 
populations, tissues, organs, organ systems, and behaviours.  Because these 
linkages are weak, individual organs, cells, tissues, or behaviours may also 
change independently.   
 The exploratory behaviour of organisms is their responsiveness to 
different inputs and outputs.  In building such things as neural networks or 
circuits, the organism begins by constructing a large number of alternative 
pathways.  The best of these alternative pathways are selected and 
stabilized.    
 The form of an organism’s body plan is generically preformed.  A 
conserved body plan—one that is retained over a succession of individual 
life cycles of organisms—enables independent variation of some features 
without adversely affecting others.  It does so by compartmentation of the 
body plan into semi-autonomous functional and structural parts.  This 
modularity of the organism’s parts increases its capacity for variation as 
changes in one subunit do not greatly affect others and thereby reduces the 
possibility of lethal variations.  The more modular these subunits become, 
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the greater the possibility of variation and specialization of these structural 
and functional units within the organism.   
 The generic capacity to learn provided certain motivating factors, 
such as the absence or presence of certain resources needed in the 
construction of a particular phenotypic trait or the performance of certain 
processes or behaviours (e.g. metabolism, reproduction, locomotion, speech), 
enables the organism to vary its phenotype  over its lifetime given a range of 
different contexts.  Organisms may learn about their resources and 
environment by sight, by what they hear, smell, taste, or touch.  They may 
manipulate the objects within their immediate habitat, investigate new 
resources or interact with new organisms (e.g. prey, potential mates, carers, 
symbionts) within this habitat or search for a new one.  Certain types of 
activities may result in some benefit or hindrance to the organism (e.g. 
better access to food, protection from weather, increased sociality or 
reproductivity).  Activities that effectively increase or substantially decrease 
resources are remembered and repeated or avoided.  Species-specific learnt 
behaviours may be passed from parent to offspring or among conspecifics 
peers by learning and copying.   
 These generic capacities allow organisms to vary their own 
development and the phenotypes they construct depending on how resources 
are utilized within their environment.  The differences between organisms 
are not consequences of species-specific genes.  Genes do not build species 
specific body plans according to a species blueprint.  As the previous chapter 
showed, homologous genes occur in many different organisms that are used 
in constructing completely different structures and paralogues within the 
same organism can serve different purposes.  
 
 
4.2.3.2.1 SLIJPER’S GOAT 
 
 Generic capacities provide the possible means for an organism to 
change its phenotype depending on the resources available to it, its stage of 
life, or its different ecologically-embedded conditions.  Organisms of the 
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same species may develop similar phenotypes despite variation and 
environmental change.   
[Organisms have the capacity to] develop functional phenotypes 
despite variation and environmental change via phenotypic 
accommodation—adaptive mutual adjustment among variable 
parts during development without genetic change … Phenotypic 
accommodation occurs regardless of the cause of variation, 
whether genetic or environmental, normal or pathological (West-
Eberhard 2003: 52).   
 
 Probably the most widely discussed, if not the most striking example 
of phenotypic accommodation is the bi-pedal goat studied by Slijper in the 
1940s (cf. West-Eberhard 2003: 6545).  Slijper’s goat started life with a 
congenital defect that meant it was born without forelegs.  As a result, it 
was unable to use these in supporting its weight quadrapedally.  Over time, 
the goat learned to walk on its two hind legs with particular skill.  Its novel 
bipedal phenotype was not caused by any genetic mutation, but was the 
result of the reorganization of the goat’s own body for locomotion.  The goat’s 
bipedal gait resulted in muscular and skeletal changes that were 
morphologically and functionally more similar to the development of 
muscularity and skeletal arrangements of other bipedal mammals, such as 
kangaroos and humans.  Over its lifetime walking on two legs instead of 
four, the goat’s pelvis grew wider, its tongue grew longer, it developed 
increase muscle mass in its thighs and its spine grew straighter with a 
slight S-curve.  These secondary modifications were not random but the 
result of developmentally flexible muscles, tendons, and bones.  They were 
the result of the goat’s developmental self-reorganization utilizing the 
resources available to it.   
 The defect in one part of the goat’s phenotype—the absence of 
forelegs—led to correlated changes in its locomotive behaviour, 
musculature, and bone structure and density.  These changes in the goat’s 
phenotype were not the result of billions of years of natural selection over 
generations of goats or written into its inherited genetic program; they were 
instead the result of highly organized and integrated behavioural, 
functional, and structural changes that occurred over the short one-year life 
span of the goat.  The goat’s bipedal phenotype was the product of its 
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capacity to reorganize its mode of locomotion and in restructuring and 
reorganizing the resources available to it to developmentally accommodate 
its novel ability to walk on two legs.   
  
 
4.2.3.2.2 GENERIC CAPACITIES FACILITATING STABILITY AND 
PLASTICITY OF PHENOTYPES WITHIN SPECIES 
 
 
 Although the case of the bi-pedal goat is itself exceptional, the 
developmental processes which lead to the extraordinary reorganization of 
the goat’s behaviour and development are not.  Less dramatic but equally 
exciting examples abound.  One is the reduction in spines of the three-spine 
stickleback Gasterosteus aculeatus.  Marine sticklebacks have a large pelvic 
spine which prevents other animals in their environment from eating them.  
However, this spine is missing in freshwater sticklebacks who do not suffer 
from the same predation that befalls their fellows in the marine 
environment.  Within the marine environment the sticklebacks have more 
access to calcium than the freshwater sticklebacks have.  The reduced 
threat of predation and the reduction in calcium are two factors that partly 
explain the absence of the pelvic spine among the freshwater fish.   
 Despite the phenotypic differences between marine and freshwater 
sticklebacks, both share similar resources, including the gene Pitx1.  Pitx1 
is utilized in the reduction of limbs in some animals.  But in some, (mice) 
mutations of Pitx1 are often lethal (cf. Shapiro et al. 2004).  Pitx1 
provides a resource that can partially explain the variation among 
sticklebacks.  The protein coding region of Pitx1 was found to be identical 
between marine and freshwater sticklebacks; however the use of this gene is 
different in both.  In the freshwater fishes, with no pelvic spine, Pitx1 is 
utilized in other areas of the fish but not in any of its appendages.  This 
results in the loss of the pelvic spine.  Loss of the pelvic spine does not result 
in lethality for the freshwater fish.  The compartmentation of the 
stickleback body plan allows for a number of variations to it which include 
the presence or absence of the pelvic spine.  This variability allows the 
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marine fish the ability to construct the pelvic spine using the higher levels 
of calcium available to it thus providing increased protection from 
predation.  It allows the freshwater fish the option of not constructing a 
pelvic spine in an environment which the calcium resources available for 
this added bone growth are limited and the need for the protection the 
pelvic spine would provide from predation not required. 
 Sharing common generic capacities also allows organisms of the same 
species to dramatically change their phenotype depending on different 
environmental conditions or resources available.  For example, water fleas 
(Daphnia) have inherited a generic capacity to construct large helmet-
shaped structures.  Although this structure protects the water flea from 
predators, constructing it requires a great deal of the water fleas’ 
developmental resources.  To assess whether the helmet is a worthwhile 
investment, the flea assesses its environment for chemical traces of its 
predator (Agrawal et al. 1999).  If chemical traces are found in its 
environment, it constructs a helmet, if no traces are found, it does not.   
 Although West-Eberhard (2003, 2005) and Kischner and Gerhart 
(2005) have drawn much attention to phenotypic plasticity and 
developmental accommodation, these ideas are not new.  Kant observed 
something similar among organisms:   
if [organic] beings are injured, nature aids itself, and the loss of a 
part that was needed to sustain adjoining ones is made up by the 
rest; if birth defects occur, or deformities come about during 
growth, certain parts, on account of their deficiencies or 
impediments, form in an entirely new way so as to preserve what 
is there (Kant 1790: Ak. 372).   
 
If there are omissions or additions in the set of resources available for the 
organism, it may rely on different pathways and resources in the 
construction of its traits within its generically preformed capacities.   
 Another example of an organism that preserves a particular 
phenotypic feature despite omissions in the resources available was 
discussed in the previous chapter—the different developmental networks 
used by fruit flies in the construction of eyes discovered by de Beer (1971) 
and Tomarev, et al. (1997).  Some fruit flies possess the gene “eyeless” in 
place of other genes that are normally used in the construction of eyes in the 
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wild type.  Despite the omission of these genes, these fruit flies develop fully 
functioning eyes.  They utilize other genetic resources and alternative 
developmental pathways in the construction of their eyes.  Their resultant 
phenotype is similar or identical to that of the wild type even though the 
ontogenetic pathways and resources utilized in their construction vary.  The 
developmental plasticity of the fruit flies has effectively stabilized this part 
of their phenotype (i.e. their eyes).  The stability of this phenotypic trait is 
maintained by different organisms of the same species by varying their 
developmental pathways and the genetic resources they use to construct 
eyes depending on those available to them. 
 Developmental flexibility utilizing common generic capacities in the 
stabilization of certain phenotypes has also been observed in humans.  
Individuals who suffer from an increase of cerebrospinal fluid in their 
craniums often have brains that are severely reduced in size in comparison 
to those who do not have this fluid pressure on their brain tissue.  Some 
sufferers’ craniums are filled 95% with cerebrospinal fluid.  This severe 
hydrocephaly reduces brain size to just 10% of non-hydrocephalic brains.  
Although half of these individuals suffer profound mental impairment, half 
have IQs over 100—some as high as 126.  A “substantial proportion of 
patients appear to escape functional impairment in spite of grossly 
abnormal brain structure” (Lewin 1980: 1232).  These individuals are 
functionally indistinguishable, having the same mental capacities as those 
with “full size” brains.  Utilizing different developmental resources, different 
paths of neurological growth and linkages, cell-cell interactions, and 
variations of brain activity, these human organisms construct brains with 
normal mental functioning.   
 Generically preformed capacities such as weak linkages, exploratory 
behaviour, and a conserved compartmentalized phenotype made novel 
developmental variations possible from the reduced resources available.  
This developmental plasticity enabled these organisms to maintain the 
stable human phenotype of normal mental functioning.    
 Phenotypic variations in development, structure, and behaviour may 
also arise as the result of different competitive frameworks.  The 
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development of the spadefoot toads Spea bombifrons and Spea multiplicata 
depends on both the diet available and the presence of the other species 
within the same environment.  Tadpoles of both species may either be 
omnivorous feeding on pond detritus or carnivorous feeding exclusively on 
small crustaceans.  Their morphology accommodates this variation in 
feeding behaviour—the jaws of the crustacean crunching carnivores grow 
larger than those of the omnivores.  However, if either species detect the 
presence of the other within the same environment, their feeding behaviours 
change.  S. multiplicata becomes exclusively carnivorous.  Learning that S. 
bombifrons is sharing its environment, S. multiplicata increases the number 
of carnivore morphs and suppresses production of its own omnivore morph 
in successive generations.  Eventually all S. multiplicata become 
carnivorous.  The opposite strategy is pursued by S. bombifrons which 
becomes exclusively omnivorous, increasing generations of omnivores while 
suppressing its own carnivore morph (Pfennig and Murphy 2000).  Learning 
that that the other species shares its environment, each species changes 
both its foraging behaviour and morphology.  If food in the shared 
environment becomes extremely scarce, the carnivorous morph of S. 
multiplicata changes its feeding behaviour once again, this time by using its 
muscular jaw to cannibalize the omnivore morph (Elgar and Crespi 1992).     
 The Galápagos finches are perhaps the most famous instance of 
variation instigated by differences in learnt feeding behaviours.  These 
include, “hunting on branch surfaces, probing branches, extracting 
caterpillars from leaves, probing dead leaf litter, nectar feeding from 
flowers, and ground feeding on seeds and insects” (West-Eberhard 2003: 
345).  As Darwin observed, the body sizes of the finches were very similar, 
as were the habitats in which they hunted.  Individual feeding preferences 
of finches are learnt early in the bird’s life.  Young birds observe the 
behaviours of adult birds of their own and other species in exploring the 
various ecological opportunities for prey and copy their feeding behaviours.  
They begin by pecking at everything, including branches, leaves, bark, 
flowers, the ground, and any small moving object.  This exploratory phase of 
learning continues 12-25 days after fledging.  In this phase,  
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fledglings of different species associate with each other and 
appear to copy each other’s feeding behaviours, sometimes 
attempting to feed in ways that adults of the same species do not.  
But eventually they drop these heterospecific behaviours from 
their repertoires (West-Eberhard 2003: 346). 
   
Young birds may take up to a year before eventually learning the species-
specific food preferences and foraging behaviours.   
 These food preferences are developmentally accommodated over the 
growing finch’s lifetime.  The form of its beak is the result of its learnt 
behaviours and the organism’s self-organized construction to meet its own 
specific foraging specialization.  Large, hard seed foragers develop thick 
blunt beaks, larger muscles, and greater skull thickness whilst those 
foraging small seeds develop small fine beaks, and do not gain the thicker 
muscles of the hard seed foragers.  The intestinal morphology and digestion 
of these finches also varies (Hinde 1959).  These phenotypic accommodations 
to the learned behaviours of the finches mirror those of the bipedal goat’s—
variations that arise from the organism’s self-constructed phenotype to 
accommodate these behaviours utilizing species specific generic capacities—
not simply the result of random genetic mutations. 
 
 
4.2.3.3 THE WHOLE LIFE CYCLE 
 
 Focusing on the adult form rather than the whole life cycle of the 
organism for classifying species belies an essentialist notion of organisms—
the belief that organisms only fully manifest their species form or essence in 
adulthood.  It is justified by arguing that if new generations of a species 
were not reproduced by the adults of the present, the species would become 
extinct.  The gene-centred neo-Darwinian perspective of species 
overemphasizes the importance of phylogeny and ignores the ontogeny of 
organisms:  “[it is] a ‘theory of adults’—one which has failed to address the 
diversity of ontogeny” (Buss 1987: 65). 
 The systematic emphasis on adult organisms and the focus on the 
reproductive relationships of adults within a population rather than the 
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organism’s whole life cycle, disregards the developmental changes (and in 
the case of HGT, genetic changes) to the organism over its lifetime.  The 
continual changes over the organism’s life cycle and in each of its different 
developmental stages are required for the succession of the species, not just 
the adult stage.  In focusing exclusively on the adult organism and 
reproductive relationships between sexually mature individuals, the so-
called biological conceptions of species seems to  
ignore the ‘immature forms’ under which many [organisms, e.g. 
arthropods] spend most of their lives … and disregard[s] ontogeny 
as the dynamic process leading these organisms through 
successive and discrete steps from birth to reproduction (André 
1988: 136-37).   
 
 Species experience growth through a number of stages.  During some 
stages, some aspects of the organism’s morphology may be similar, or 
homomorphic, to other stages, whereas other features in other stages may 
be distinct, or heteromorphic, from earlier or later stages.  These stages may 
occur in different temporal orders in different organisms.  Even the 
ontogenetic stages of organisms within the same species may occur in a 
different temporal order (these are referred to as “disharmonic”).  Such 
disharmonic ontogenetic stages occur frequently:  
while a given ontogeny, under normal conditions, tends to repeat 
the form-sequences of its predecessors, it is liable to changes in 
every part of the life cycle—positively, by equipping the larval and 
adult stages for the changing conditions of their various careers, 
or with greater efficiency for the same conditions and negatively, 
by abbreviating the formative processes to the uttermost 
(Garstang 1922: 82). 
 
 Sequential polyphenism occurs in most phyla where there are 
different developmental stages, e.g. embryo, larva, nymph, juvenile, 
chrysalis, pupa, adult.  Some of these stages are quite dramatic going from 
caterpillar to butterfly, or metamorphosing from newt to damselfly, or from 
tadpole to frog.  One suggestion is that because there are dramatic 
morphological differences between juveniles and adults of the same species, 
we should classify these as different species (cf. van Emden 1957).  Whilst 
recognizing the diversity among phenotypic features over an individual 
organism’s life cycle, this suggestion goes too far.  Classifying juveniles and 
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adults differently would pose a new set of metaphysical difficulties.  A 
minimal requirement of any conception of species must be to treat an 
organism as a living being that may change over time but is the same 
individual throughout its life cycle.  
 Incorporating ontogeny into the conception of species as a succession 
of organismal life cycles, the organism-centred view considers the whole 
self-constructed, temporally extended life cycle of organisms rather than 
concentrating simply on the adult stage.  This is a much different view than 
that proposed by the BSC.  Mayr’s reliance on gene flow as facilitated by 
reproductive relationships of conspecifics meant that the focus of the BSC is 
on one stage of an organism’s life cycle—sexual maturity.  The focus on 
sexually mature adult organisms is justified by the view that natural 
selection acts on adult organism’s fecundity.  In focusing on adults rather 
than the whole life cycle it treats natural selection as something that only 
affects adult organisms.   
 But when we consider the adult stage of the organism’s development 
we can’t but help to also focus on the stages that came before.  The adult 
stage of the organism has a life history.  Its embryological form, juvenile 
structures and development, and the learned behaviours and interactions of 
earlier stages all contribute to the phenotypes and behaviours that are 
retained within its adult stage.  The adult stage, like any other 
developmental stage is “a kind of temporal slice through the life cycle.  It 
carries the evidence of past gene transcriptions, mechanical influences 
inside and outside the organism, results of past activities, nutrition or lack 
of it, and so on” (Oyama 2000: 161).  
 Incorporating ontogeny back into our concept of species first requires 
reintroducing the historical contingency of life stages of organisms back into 
the concept of an organism.  Each developmental stage of an organism’s life 
cycle has its own ontogeny.  The phylogeny of a species is then simply the 
history of a specific series of contingent self-constructed individual life 
cycles.   
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4.2.3.3.1 PHENOTYPIC ALTERNATIVES WITHIN SPECIES AND STAGE-
SPECIFIC PHENOTYPES   
 
 
 Relying on the adult form as central to conceiving the characteristics 
and behaviours of a particular species also proves difficult because there 
may be multiple alternative adult phenotypes (e.g. sexually dimorphic and 
multiple morphological forms).  These include the strikingly different 
morphologies and behaviours between the super fertile queen and the sterile 
workers of colonial insects like ants and bees.  Neither the worker nor the 
queen may be identified as the typical morph of the species.  In colonial 
insects, no single adult phenotype is species-typical.  Nest-building, defence, 
food foraging, egg-laying, and larvae care are constructed and organized 
communally in the cooperative efforts of highly specialized morphs.  Even 
reproduction is the product of interactions among these morphs (e.g. 
between a physogastric queen, workers, and soldiers in termites, cf. West-
Eberhard 2003: 174).  
  In addition to the alternative phenotypes among adult organisms of 
the same species, there are also widespread morphological, physiological, 
and behavioural variations among the phenotypes of different stages of the 
same organism over its life cycle.  Some of the most obvious of these are 
those of metamorphic species, such as the changes from larval caterpillar to 
pupa, chrysalis, and adult butterfly, or the hormonal and morphological 
changes of sexual maturation, growth, and pregnancy in mammals.  Other 
phenotypic differences that occur within an organism’s life cycle may 
include the change of skin colour as camouflage (e.g. chameleons) or the 
seasonal whitening and moulting of fur (e.g. arctic animals such as hares 
and foxes).  Organisms may migrate (e.g. Canadian geese, wildebeest), or 
hibernate underground (e.g. desert toads), or have an extended life cycle 
(locusts), change their sex (e.g. reef fish), change their diet (e.g. the tadpoles 
of spadefoot toads may be omnivorous whereas as adults they may be 
carnivorous or vice versa), alternate their leaf forms, seeds. and flower 
colour (e.g. the heterophyllous aquatic plants producing different 
morphologies depending on whether they are growing in an aerial or 
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underwater environment), or change their morphology and behaviour 
according to their immediate ecology (e.g. various stages of parasitic 
nematodes, such as Pseudoterranova decipiens, that begin with a free 
swimming larvae, attachment to tissues in the peritoneal cavity of a 
crustacean host, migration to the muscle tissues, which, when ingested by a 
predator marine mammal develops into the adult form of the nematode and 
produces eggs) (cf. Anderson 1996: 1-5).  
 Some of these alternative phenotypes are constructed by organisms 
using environmental cues, dependent on their own developmental growth, 
interactions with other conspecifics, or with heterospecifics.  Both 
chameleons and arctic hares change their phenotypes to avoid detection by 
potential predators.  But whilst the former may do so many times in a single 
day, the latter does so seasonally.  Migration and hibernation are two 
different ways organisms change their habitats and organize their resources 
to meet their needs.  Migrating geese travel great distances to access better 
fishing waters or other foraging habitats,  better breeding grounds or access 
to mates, and warmer or cooler climates than the one that they are 
migrating from.   
Hibernating animals such as snakes, bats, squirrels, toads, and to 
some lesser extent, bears, alter their metabolism, body temperature and 
breathing in a stage of inactivity.  This period of inactivity enables the 
organism to conserve its energy resources especially in times of scarcity, to 
avoid predation or exposure during a particular season (usually winter).  In 
some mammal species, animals gestate whilst hibernating.  This provides 
further protection and enables parents to give birth at a time (spring) when 
there is more food available for them to feed their young.  The Sonoran 
Desert toad (Bufo alvarius) hibernates in rodent burrows or utilizes the 
underground passages of other small mammals during dry periods to avoid 
dehydration and exposure to extreme temperatures.  They emerge shortly 
before or just after the first rain of the summer which starts the monsoon 
season.  Using temporary large puddles of rain water as its aquatic 
environment, these toads are able to both feed and reproduce (Secor 2005: 
2595-608). 
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Other animals may change their morphologies and behaviours over a 
much longer life cycle.  The most dramatic among these is the extended life 
cycles of the 13 and 17-year cicadas of the appropriately named genus 
Magicicada.  These cicadas grow as nymphs, go through five stages where 
they moult and stay immobile before tunnelling out of their underground 
home after 13 or 17 years (depending on their cycle).  Their emergence is 
synchronized with the rest of the brood in an effort to increase survival by 
providing an overabundance of insects to possible predators.  When out of 
ground the cicada moults one last time becoming an adult and seeks a mate 
to reproduce (Williams and Simon 1995).   
Changes in morphology, behaviour, and even sex are common among 
echinoderms, crustaceans, molluscs, and fish.  Reef fish of the family, 
Pseudochromidae, can change sex depending on the sex of other fish in its 
school.  For instance, if a small all-female schools of reef fish (called a 
“harem”) loses its solitary male, the largest female changes sex to become 
male.  This fish changes its female morphology and physiology to the 
colouration, behaviour (including those of defence and courtship), and 
physiology of a male.  Although able to produce sperm after ten days, its full 
transformation from female to male takes a minimum of eighteen days.  
Male to female transformations take more time to complete—a minimum of 
52 days.  The changes in sex of reef fish are bi-directional as the same fish 
may change back and forth between female and male forms throughout its 
lifetime depending on the sex of other conspecifics whether living in schools 
or not (cf. Wittenrich and Munday 2005).    
 At different stages in the life cycle, various organisms may display 
different morphologies or behaviours associated with a particular stage or in 
a specific environment.  Among most organisms ontogeny involves constant 
changes.  On the adult-centred view of species, development over an 
organism’s life cycle is understood as the processes necessary in building an 
adult.  Species are conceived in terms of the final output of this process—the 
adult organism.  The life cycle of an organism is treated as the means 
necessary for building an adult which is then the object of species 
classification and study.  In contrast, the organism-centred perspective 
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conceives species in terms of a sequence of constructed and reconstructed 
self-organizing activities of organisms over their life cycles which include 
the phenotypic changes over each of their stages—not just the adult stage. 
 
  
4.3 THE GENE-CENTRED VIEW OF SPECIES REVISITED  
 
 A consequence of the Buffon-inspired, organism-centred view of 
species discussed in this chapter is that the boundary between organism 
and environment is dissolved.  I am not the first to suggest this dissolution.  
Such a dissolution has been suggested by Dawkins in his conception of the 
extended phenotype (Dawkins 1982, 1994).  In The Extended Phenotype, he 
characterizes the development of behaviours and the construction of niches 
that include foraging behaviours and nest-building as simply the expression 
of certain genes within the organism lengthening their reach outside the 
boundaries of the organism’s skin.  Because these artefacts of organismal 
construction increase the organism’s fitness, (and so guarantee the 
replication of its genes), the genes for nest-construction are reliably passed 
on from one generation to the next.  The incorporation of this kind of niche 
construction within Dawkins’ extended phenotype has been highlighted by 
Kim Sterelny:    
[the] environment … should be seen as part of the phenotype of 
the engineering organism, for these are the effects through which 
the responsible replicators have been selected.  The single best 
reason for taking the gene/vehicle conception of evolution to be a 
genuine alternative to the standard genotype/phenotype 
conception is the fact that the systematic, evolutionary significant 
phenotypic effects of genes are not confined to the body of the 
organism carrying them (Sterelny 2001: 335). 
 
Retaining a gene-centred perspective, Dawkins’ view, as well as Sterelny’s, 
takes the constructed environmental niche to be an extension of the 
information contained within the organism’s genes.  Not only is there a 
blueprint for building an organism, there is also a blueprint for the 
construction of nests, niches, and behaviours contained in the genes.  Nests, 
like organisms, are just vehicles for gene replication—they are extended 
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vehicles (Dawkins 1994).  No practical distinction exists between the 
environment outside the genes but within the boundaries of the organism’s 
skin and the environment outside of it.   
 The extended phenotype view may dissolve the distinction between 
organism and environment, but it preserves the strong Weismannianism of 
the gene-centred view which holds that there are genes and there is 
everything else.  Relying on a linear genetic conception of causality, 
Sterelny argues that epigenetic, behavioural, symbolic, and cultural 
channels of inheritance do not constitute unique mechanisms of inheritance 
(Sterelny 2001: 336).  These are just genetic inheritance—the product of an 
extended genetic replicator.  The causal importance of cultural inheritance 
is not as significant as that of genes.  Towards the end of his arguments, he 
partially concedes that 
cultural inheritance is a key part of the explanation of human 
evolution.  But it is not a phenomenon of much general 
evolutionary significance.  Genetic inheritance … is the core 
inheritance mechanism (Sterelny 2001: 337).  
 
I think this contains an element of anthropocentrism.  If cultural 
inheritance makes such a difference in human evolution, why does it make 
none to the rest of the organisms in the world? (cf. Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 
Ch. 5).  And on what basis can humans overpower the linear genetic 
tyranny that the rest of the inhabitants of the world are ruled by?  
 As a conceptual sequel to the selfish gene perspective, the extended 
phenotype or the extended replicator perspective has as its centre the belief 
that genes are the primary cause of organismal form, development, and 
evolution.  The claim that genes are immortal replicators, that they are the 
most important factor in development and evolution, and the privileging of 
genetic inheritance over all other mechanisms of inheritance, rely on an 
underlying commitment to linear genetic causation.  Organisms, 
constructed artefacts, and environmental niches are the environments 
within which genes compete with other genes in other organisms and 
environments to replicate themselves.  They are the constructed vehicles of 
gene replication.  
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 Although the dissolution of the boundary between the organism and 
the environment in Dawkins’ and Sterelny’s gene-centred view is similar to 
my own, it is based on a wholly distinct set of commitments.  Whereas their 
dissolution is based on the primacy of linear genetic causation and a 
commitment to strong preformationism in conceiving species, I rely on 
circular and distributed causes and generic preformationism.   
 The organism-centred view of species started by accepting vertical 
genetic inheritance as one of many routes by which resources are acquired 
by organisms and passed on to subsequent generations of organisms of the 
same species.  Genetic, epigenetic, behavioural, and cultural inheritance all 
provide different pathways by which resources can be acquired by successive 
organisms to construct themselves over their lifetimes.  These routes may 
furnish resources from conspecifics vertically, or between either conspecifics 
or heterospecifics horizontally.  Resources may also be acquired by means of 
a combination of these routes.  The organism’s generic capacities and stock 
of genetic, extragenetic, and ecological resources enable it to construct itself 
according to a similar way of life using similar resources in similar 
environments to its parents and offspring.  Self-organization and 
reorganization of these resources is possible through the use of the generic 
capacities for learning, phenotypic plasticity, and developmental 
accommodation.  Therefore, organisms are both cause and effect of the 
construction of its own species.  This is because an organism is both the 
product of a previous organism’s reproduction, the constructor of itself over 
its lifetime, and the producer of a succeeding organism.   
 In Chapters Two, Three, and Four I have used the organism-centred 
view to reconfigure the meaning and reference of “organism,” “trait,” 
“homology,” “analogy,” and “species.”  I suggested that the form and 
organization of organisms can be understood as the result of their self-
constructing activities rather than the preformed information contained in 
their genetic program or the selective factors in their pre-existing 
environmental niche.   
These constructive efforts (over an organism’s lifetime, within its 
embedded environments, in community with con- and heterospecifics, and 
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over successive life cycles) involve physical engagement within the world.  
Organisms literally build their bodies and their environments from diverse 
resources.   
In the next chapter I move from the constructive activities of 
organisms’ physical being to the constructive activities of their psychological 
being.  In particular, I focus on a constructive activity that is unique to 
human organisms—the construction of race identity.  The self-constuction of 
a psychological identity may initially appear orthogonal to the physical 
instantiations of organismal self-construction discussed in earlier chapters.  
However, I suggest the organism-centred view offers a novel perspective on 
this kind of self-constructive activity as well as others.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Re-constructing racial identity 
 
 
5.1 RACE IS THE SIMILARITY, IDENTITY, OR CONTINUITY OF WHAT? 
Similarity and the continuity of similarities have informed biological 
research from before Cuvier and Geoffroy to the present.  This has been 
especially true within comparative morphology and more recently within 
comparative genomics.  But how do similarities and the continuity of 
similarities provide empirically useful information about the world, and 
which kinds of similarity are informative?  Preceding chapters have 
discussed the structural or functional resemblance among characteristics of 
different organisms (homology and analogy), the correspondence of parts or 
characters within the same organism (serial homology), and the similarity of 
the behaviours, environmental niches, and modes of living among 
individuals of the same species (and other conserved species specific traits).   
 Understanding something as similar to something else means there 
exists some relationship, property, or structure that they both share.  
Therefore, it is important to understand in what ways the identification of 
continuity among morphological, behavioural, environmental, and genomic 
similarities prove scientifically informative, facilitating predictions of other 
shared characteristics and dispositions. 
 In his “Seven Strictures of Similarity,” Nelson Goodman maintains 
that “every two things have some property in common … two objects are 
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similar when they have at least one property in common” (Goodman 1972: 
443).  There are an infinite number of comparisons we can make between 
any two things, such that any two things, no matter how different, can be 
understood as similar in some respect.  But if everything is comparable to 
everything else in terms of some common feature, then saying something is 
similar to another is just stating what is trivially true.  Pointing out that 
two individuals are the same in some way without qualification is stating an 
empty, uninformative truism.  In speaking of the luggage left at an airport 
at check-in, Goodman suggests,  
the spectator may notice shape, size, color, material, and even 
make of luggage; the pilot is more concerned with weight, and the 
passenger with destination and ownership.  Which pieces of 
baggage are more alike than others depends not only upon what 
properties they share, but upon who makes the comparison, and 
when (Goodman 1972: 443).   
 
Judgments and comparisons can only be made with regard to a particular 
set of contextually specified standards.  For similarity and resemblance to 
be explanatory, a more specific understanding of the relation of sameness is 
required.  Our selection of which items we choose to compare and which 
relations of sameness are relevant in making these comparisons are 
dependent on relevant conditions of our environment as well as our own 
interests at that time.  Comparison is always “relative, variable, and 
culture-dependent” (Goodman 1972: 438) occurring, as it does, within the 
layered contexts of our situated experience. 
 This contexualized understanding of the similarity among different 
individual objects or subjects is widely criticized as both ontologically and 
epistemologically lacking.  It does not provide a fixed theoretical foundation 
on which to secure either metaphysical or scientific investigations.  A belief 
in some underlying form, structure, or essence within individual substances 
or subjects that determines their nature pervades philosophical and 
scientific theories concerning both the very nature of being and our ability to 
refer to it:   
essence (or a natural/metaphysical defining characteristic) is 
discovered as part of our general epistemic activity.  The Putnam, 
Kripke, Donnellan causal theory of reference explains how the 
discovery of the ‘essence’ of such a natural kind can be spread 
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rapidly [such as] ...  Putnam’s famous example concern[ing] the 
discovery that the essence of water is H2O.  Once it has been 
established that water really is H2O then any apparent instance 
of water can not be water unless it is in fact H2O (Gillett and 
McMillan 2001: 137). 
   
Setting up his causal theory of reference, Hilary Putnam uses the 
example of water to ask how we can know that a sample of colourless, 
tasteless, potable liquid is water.  He argues that we know it is water when 
we discover its underlying structure or essence.  All samples of water, 
whether solid, liquid, or vapour, have the same underlying structure.  We 
grasp what water really is when we learn that its chemical composition is 
H2O.  Every molecule of water has two hydrogen atoms that are covalently 
bonded to a single oxygen atom.  Given any sample of ice, turgid liquid, or 
vapour we can judge whether the substance is water or not by discovering if 
its chemical structure is H2O or something else.  Knowledge of the chemical 
composition of water facilitates our predicting how it will behave in various 
circumstances; e.g. its freezing and boiling points, its electrical properties as 
an insulator, its low conductivity, its density in different forms, its cohesion, 
surface tension, and how it reacts when mixed with other substances.   
Claiming that H2O is water’s underlying structure has been taken to be 
a paradigmatic case of revealing something’s essence.24  The idea that the 
essence of chemical substances is given by its chemical composition has been 
extended to living beings.  The essence of an organism—what makes it the 
organism that it is—is its underlying microstructure.  For both Putnam and 
Saul Kripke, the sameness relation that holds between two organisms is 
dependent on this underlying microstructure.  Kripke famously muses, 
“whether science can discover empirically that certain properties are 
necessary of cows, or of tigers, is another question, and one I answer 
affirmatively” (Kripke 1978: 128).  With the advances in genetics and 
genomics research, this underlying structure is identified as the organism’s 
genomic complement of DNA, one that it shares with all other organisms of 
                                                     
24 Arguing that water’s essence is its chemical structure H2O and using it as a 
template for a natural kind is dubious.  Even what is considered to be pure water 
includes more than just H2O, including OH-, H3O+ and many other ions (VandeWall 
2007: 906-19). 
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the same kind.  Just as water’s chemical composition determines its 
dispositional properties and behaviours, organisms too have “certain 
essential properties [that] determine the[ir] nature … and how they will 
behave in any situation” (Ellis 2001: 3).  In contrast to Goodman’s 
characterization, the development of the characteristics, behaviours, and 
dispositions of organisms are determined by its DNA.  The similarity 
between any two organisms, for instance two tigers, is the result of their 
chemically defined essence.  This determines their nature independently of 
where they live, their individual ontogeny, how they were brought up (in the 
wild or in a zoo), or their diet.  Tigers “behave as they do … not because of 
any external constraints that force them to, but because this is how they are 
intrinsically disposed to behave in the circumstances” (Ellis 2001: 3).  All 
tiger behaviours, physical features, relationships within other members of 
the pride, and interactions with other animals and humans, are understood 
as having a single underlying cause—their DNA.   
If there can be some underlying essence (either DNA or something 
else), a fixed definition of what makes a tiger a tiger, analogous to the 
identification of water with H2O, is possible.  When used as the basis by 
which living organisms are classified in terms of crucial similarities or 
relationships, it is thought to provide an immutable foundation on which to 
group things according to their non-accidental properties.  A classification 
system based on underlying essences would take all (or at least most) 
organisms thought to be of a particular kind as sharing the same underlying 
microstructural properties or relationships. 
 As previous chapters have revealed, trying to establish the criteria for 
membership within one group or another on the basis of uncovering 
essential underlying properties or relationships of resemblance has proved 
an often confused and misguided project.  The confusions that arise when 
one attempts to decide the essential elements or relationships one should 
use to identity different natural kinds of individuals are many.  If not the 
most evident, the most controversial cases where these confusions occur are 
in the various attempts to classify human beings into races on the basis of 
what are purported to be their essential properties.  Many properties and 
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relationships from a wide range of disciplines, from philosophy, biology, 
anthropology, and sociology to politics and religion have been suggested as 
the continuities and sameness relations essential to revealing an 
individual’s race.   
 “Race” has been the name under which people have been grouped on 
the basis of their phenotypic traits, (e.g. hair texture, skin colour, nose and 
lip shape), religion (Muslim, Jewish, Yoruban), cultural heritage (Inuit, 
Mestizo, Romany), geographical origin (Pacific Islander, sub-Saharan 
African, Amazonian), mitochondrial DNA, y-chromosome (distant Viking, 
Native American ancestry), language (Welsh, Hadza, Creole), or whether 
one is likely to be resistant to malaria, give birth to a child with Tay-Sachs 
disease, or suffer from cystic fibrosis (Black, Ashkenazi Jew, or White 
respectively).25   
 Sustained attempts throughout history and across disciplines have 
provided scores of possible divisions of humanity into races.  Darwin, 
writing in 1871, lists the number of races as ranging from two to a sixty-
three.  Writing more recently, Lucius Outlaw emphasizes the challenges 
faced in selecting the criteria used to identify individuals according to their 
race.  Both highlight the lack of agreement around conceptions of race,  
Man has been studied more thoroughly than any other organic 
being, and yet there is the greatest possible diversity amongst 
capable judges whether he should be classed as a single species or 
race, or two (Virey), three (Jacquinot), four (Kant), five 
(Blumenbach), six (Buffon), seven (Hunter), eight (Agassiz), 
eleven (Pickering), fifteen (Bory St. Vincent) … or [as many as] 
sixty-three, according to Burke (Darwin 1871: 62). 
 
there is no settled consensus among persons … in answer to 
questions of whether and if so how (and if not, why not), it is 
possible to characterize and classify racial and ethnic groups, and 
thereby identify individuals with precision as members of a 
particular racial or ethnic group, on the basis of real, objective, 
shared features, in rigorous accordance to the most settled norms 
governing the production and validation of empirical knowledge 
(Outlaw 1996: 15). 
 
                                                     
25 In section 5.2.1.2 I argue that equating these biomedical factors with racial 
ascriptions is both highly contentious and based on some spurious metaphysical 
assumptions about identity. 
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 The various conceptions of race each bring with them their own 
criteria for identifying races.  These amount to different ontologies of race; 
they posit basic categories and relationships which are then used to define 
individuals or types of individuals.  They suggest a number of categories of 
racial conspecificity according to which all peoples can be classified.   
 The perspective set out in this chapter offers an alternative to these 
ontologies of race.  My own organism-centred perspective utilizes the 
metaphor of heterogeneous construction.  I suggest we construe the human 
organism as the centre of its own racial ascription.  An individual organizes 
and interprets his or her own morphological, cultural, and historical 
embeddedness, directing his or her experiences, and making historical and 
causal linkages among these various factors.  Racial identity is reciprocal 
and dynamically caused by one’s own ascription and the ascription given to 
one by other groups and individuals.  It embraces both the multiplicity and 
changeability caused by one’s temporal, spatial, and cultural-situatedness 
and how these are manifest in one’s racial identity(ies).  Before articulating 
my own ontology of race, I begin with a condensed conceptual history.  This 
will highlight some recurring concerns and underlying assumptions about 
race.  Responding to these, I critically discuss six current conceptions of 
race.    
  
 
 
 
5.1.1 EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF RACE FROM BERNIER TO BOAS 
 
 One of the earliest accounts of race as a category by which 
humankind could be divided into different categories was written 
anonymously in 1684 with the title, “A New Division of the Earth” 
(Bernasconi and Lott 2000: viii).  This monograph was later attributed to 
François Bernier.  Bernier and other European travellers at the time were 
particularly struck by morphological differences among the various peoples 
observed on their travels across Europe, the New World, Africa, and the Far 
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and Near East.  Given that the original depictions of indigenous peoples 
were reports from upper middle class gentlemen travellers, Bernier’s as well 
as later reports tended to read a bit like travelogues rating the 
attractiveness or otherwise of the inhabitants (especially the females) of 
various “exotic” lands they visited.  Most conspicuous to these travellers 
were what they perceived to be the striking differences in the forms of the 
bodies, facial features, skin and hair colour of the inhabitants of these lands 
in contrast to the form and pallor of the more familiar European faces and 
bodies.  
[I]n the Indies … they are beautiful brunettes … some are 
coloured of ever so little a yellow, who are very much prized, 
and whom I found also very much to my taste; for that shade of 
yellow is vivid and brilliant, and has none of that ugly and livid 
paleness of jaundice.  Imagine to yourself a beautiful and 
young French girl, who is only just beginning to have the 
jaundice, and instead of that sick, pale visage, and those 
yellowish eyes  … give her a healthy face, soft, laughing, and 
beautiful … amorous eyes, and you will have as near an idea of 
them as I can given you (Bernier 1684: 3). 
 
Bernier believed that these morphological differences signified underlying 
essential differences between human beings which suggested that they 
could be divided into different groups or races on the basis of these 
differences.  Although Bernier’s reliance on skin tone is of paramount 
importance to him and other gentlemen, the justification for this is left 
unstated.  In “A New Division of the Earth,” Bernier proposes that the 
world’s human population can be divided into four or five races.  Bernier 
draws a number of distinctions between these races on the basis of skin 
colour as well as the morphological features of the face.  He is careful to 
discriminate those that are manifest within the individual arising “by 
accident” from those arising “by nature.”  In some individuals, a dark 
complexion is accidental, as it is due to excessive sun exposure.  If these 
individuals were taken out of the sun, their skin would lighten.  He 
contrasts individuals whose skin colour is accidental and individuals whose 
dark skin colour remains dark regardless of sun exposure.  The latter’s skin 
colour is a feature essential to them.  Bernier’s emphasis on racial divisions 
is later taken up by Linnaeus (1735) and Kant (1777).  Although intending 
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to set out a natural classification based purely on biological differences 
among human beings, Linnaeus’ four races (or subspecies26)—White 
Europeans, Yellow Asians, Black Africans, and Red Americans combine skin 
colour with nationality (Banton and Harwood 1975).   
 Following Linnaeus, Kant also sought a division of races based 
principally on the morphological characteristics of human bodies.  He 
intended his concept of race to form a natural division amongst individuals, 
in the same way that species and genus do, on the basis of heritable 
biological variations.  However, instead of focusing on describing and 
classifying races like Bernier and Linnaeus, Kant was keen to explain the 
origin27 of racial differences and their perpetuation along racial lines.  In “Of 
the Different Human Races,”  he explains that the origin of racial 
differences is in the “special seed or natural predisposition [and] is to be 
found in organic creation … that necessarily pass on the same characteristic 
features that they have inherited” and that produces, generation after 
generation, those characteristics associated with race (Kant 1777: 14).  Kant 
is careful to note that sun exposure and diet, on their own, do not cause 
changes in the growth of human beings.  Any changes they do cause are 
conceived of as Bernier did, as accidental rather than essential features.  
Sun and diet alone cannot cause growth or modification of a human being’s 
development unless an ability to change and modify is already present 
within the human being.  “Any possible change with the potential for 
replicating itself must instead have been present in the reproductive power 
so that chance development appropriate to the circumstances might take 
place according to a previously determined plan” (Kant 1777: 14).  In 
distinguishing the artificial from the essential traits of humans, it is only 
the latter characteristics which are the result of an inherited stock of special 
seeds (Keime) and dispositions (Anlagen).  Kant’s claims broke with the 
                                                     
26 At this time, racial classifications were commonly used as a further taxonomic 
specification although they were often used interchangeably with both species and 
subspecies. 
27 Although beyond the scope of this chapter, there were heated debates between 
those who argued that the races were created from one initial race (monogenesis) 
and those who believed they were created separately (polygenesis).  Kant (1777), 
Blumenbach (1776), and Darwin (1871) argued for monogenesis, whereas Voltaire 
(1766) and others argued for polygenesis. 
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traditional view that the morphological differences associated with race in 
different groups are fixed.  Instead these differences were due to “numerous 
seeds and predispositions [that] must lie ready in human beings either to be 
developed or held back in such a way that we might become fitted to a 
particular place in the world” (Kant 1777: 14).   
 Kant dismissed the idea that race was the result of the unrolling of a 
fully preformed form.  Human beings also inherit dispositional qualities for 
living in particular environments which are passed on from one generation 
to the next.  Race is instead a generically preformed property of human 
beings.  Because humans have ranged all over the world and settled in 
vastly different environments from arctic to desert, they have acclimatized 
to a range of different conditions.  They have inherited a variable set of 
dispositions for the purpose of facilitating a way of life within a particular 
climate.  Humans with these climate-specific dispositions remain in the 
climates they were born to, thus ensuring the continuity of races over 
generations.   
the growth of the spongy parts of the body had to increase in a hot 
and humid climate.  This growth produced a thick, flat nose and 
thick, fatty lips.  The skin had to be oily … to lessen the too heavy 
perspiration.  Besides all this, humid warmth generally promotes 
the strong growth of animals.  In short, all of these factors account 
for the origin of the Negro, who is well-suited to his climate, 
namely, strong, fleshy, and agile (Kant 1777: 17). 
   
 As the above passages of Kant, Bernier, and Linnaeus show starkly, 
the importance of skin colour and morphology was believed to be self-
evident, as plain as the nose on one’s face, easily judged to be narrow, broad, 
flat or projecting.   
 Influenced by both Bernier and Kant, and his studies of various 
human subjects at the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle, Cuvier (1824-1847) 
proposed that there was an underlying nature which determined the 
different cultures of races.  To discover what this was, Cuvier studied a 
variety of what he believed were racially “pure” individuals.  In studying 
them, he hoped to uncover which morphological traits were held in common 
among races and which varied.  One of the most famous individuals he 
studied was a Khoi-San woman named Saartjie (Sara) Baartman.  
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Originally a servant in South Africa, Baartman went to England after it was 
suggested that she could gain considerable wealth by exhibiting herself 
around Europe.  In England, her exhibitors displayed her under the title, 
the Hottentot Venus.28  She was treated as a curiosity at the time as some of 
her morphological features, in particular her steatopygia (large buttocks) 
and sinus pudoris (elongated labia minora), as they were thought to be 
remarkable in comparison to those of European women (Fausto-Sterling 
1995: 19-48).  Although Baartman refused to display her genitals while she 
was alive, they were preserved and displayed along with her skeleton and 
brain in Paris’s Musée de l’Homme until 1974 and were only returned to 
South Africa to be buried along with her other remains in 2002 (Sadiah 
2004: 242-51). 
 Cuvier’s own studies of Baartman were as a taxonomic archetype of a 
pure race.  Through his observations of Baartman, both during her life and 
of her remains after her death, Cuvier concluded that there were just three 
pure races:  Whites, Yellows and Blacks.  All other races were variations or 
“hybrids” of these pure types (Cuvier 1812). 
 A common belief in the 17th and 18th centuries was that the 
morphological features so readily distinguished, and often judged lacking in 
comparison to those of the European travellers themselves, were taken to be 
external indicators of other characteristics of temperament, intellectual 
capacities, and vigour.  The categorization of peoples on the basis of their 
morphological characteristics as a way to judge a whole host of non-
morphological qualities was based on the assumption that these physical 
attributes and their temperament, behaviour, and intellectual capacities all 
had a common cause in their essential nature.  
 In his seventh chapter of The Descent of Man, “On the Races of Man,” 
Darwin lists some of these morphological and intellectual capacities among 
human beings which he believes are of “no doubt:”  
the texture of the hair, the relative proportions of all parts of the 
body, the capacity of the lungs, the form and capacity of the skull 
… The races differ also in constitution, in acclimatization, and in 
                                                     
28 The Khoi people were called “Hottentots” by the 19th century Europeans due the 
sound of the clicks in the Xhosa language they spoke (Ladefoged and Maddieson 
1996). 
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liability to certain diseases.  Their mental characteristics are 
likewise very distinct; chiefly as it would appear in their 
emotional, but partly in their intellectual faculties.  Every one 
who has had the opportunity of comparison, must have been 
struck with the contrast between the taciturn, even morose, 
aborigines of South America and the light hearted, talkative 
negroes (Darwin 1871: 56). 
   
Human variations in skin colour, anatomical form, facial features, disease 
susceptibility, emotional and intellectual development, and nationalities 
were features that were widely thought to naturally coincide.  Darwin 
believed, like Cuvier, that these variations fell into obvious pure categories 
of race, and intercrosses or blends of these (Darwin 1871: 58-61).  
Augmenting Cuvier’s description of pure races, Darwin explained how a race 
can be continuous over generations if there was no (or little) blending.  
Human beings who live hundreds of miles apart may be of the same race 
because their “general resemblance [is due] to descent from a common stock” 
(Darwin 1871: 71). 
 One of the first theorists to challenge the racist assumption that one’s 
skin colour and morphological characteristics could be causally correlated to 
one’s temperament, intelligence, or emotional capacity, perpetuated in many 
of the early accounts of race was Franz Boas (1911, 1940).  Boas’ 
contribution to the conceptual history of race was to create a clear division 
between what were considered to be the “biological” and the “cultural” 
characteristics of race.  He argued that, apart from being based on racist 
assumptions, explaining one’s biological features by relying on one’s cultural 
features or vice versa was an ontological mistake and “any attempt to 
explain cultural form on a purely biological basis is doomed to failure” (Boas 
1940: 165).  This separation of the biological and the cultural remains in 
many, if not most, race concepts today.  Often, theories of race are grouped 
as belonging to one of two different categories depending on whether they 
employ criteria from the putatively natural sciences or the putatively social 
sciences.   
 The preceding discussion has focused on the origins of many of the 
most controversial and persistent concerns for those attempting to form or 
re-form a conception of race:  belief in race as natural kind or essence; 
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reliance on morphological features conceived in contrast to the (often white) 
observer; the cause of racial continuity among generations; the belief that 
raced morphological features, behavioural, and intellectual capacities are 
linked; the idea of racial purity; and the separation between the putatively 
biological and putatively cultural characteristics of race.  In doing so, it 
serves as the contextual setting within which both the subsequent 
discussion of current conceptions of race as well as my own 
reconceptualization can be understood. 
 
 
 
 
5.2 TWO CATEGORIES OF RACE CONCEPTIONS:  NATURAL SCIENTIFIC 
AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC  
 
 
 In the following, I discuss six conceptions of race separated into the 
two categories to which they are usually understood to belong.  The first is 
composed of those conceptions which have been understood to be based on 
(putative) natural scientific evidence.  The second is composed of those 
based on social scientific evidence.  Natural scientific conceptions have been 
variously identified as physical, biological, or absolutist (the latter by their 
detractors).  The social scientific conceptions have been called 
anthropological, historical, and relativistic (the latter by their detractors).  
The natural scientific conceptions seek to order the contents of the world 
systematically on the basis of the physical measurements and distribution of 
biological variation among human bodies, whereas the social scientific 
conceptions focus on the phenomena of race as the product of cultural and 
behavioural interactions among persons. 
 The natural scientific category of race conceptions includes:  1) the 
morphological race concepts which emphasize the proportions of the face 
and skin colour, 2) biomedical race concepts which use recent techniques for 
obtaining medical information concerning such traits as whether individuals 
are tolerant to lactose in adulthood, are resistant to malaria, or on the basis 
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of chromosomal information (e.g. y-chromosome, mDNA) as evidence for a 
biological basis to race, and 3) population race concepts which focus on the 
effects of migration and mutation on different groups of people. 
 The social scientific category of race conceptions includes:  1) the 
developmental and behavioural concepts of race which hold that it is our 
characteristics and actions rather than our morphology which give meaning 
to “race,” 2) the familial concepts which hold that race is passed down 
directly from grandparent to parent to child, and 3) the cultural concepts, 
which rely on the relationships and shared history of individuals within 
societies and communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1 NATURAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTIONS OF RACE  
5.2.1.1 MORPHOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF RACE 
 
According to a morphological conception of race, people of the same 
race share certain intrinsic properties.  These conceptions rely on supposed 
correlations in morphology.  For example people from continents with hotter 
climates are believed to have darker skin, darker eyes and darker, curlier 
hair; people from colder continents, lighter skin, lighter eyes, and lighter, 
straighter hair. 
In some morphological accounts these bodily features are believed to be 
visual indicators of deeper unseen differences in character and behaviour.  
Bernier, Kant, and Darwin’s divisions of humanity into races discussed 
above are examples of morphological accounts of race.  They connect the 
named divisions—Black, White, Yellow, Red—classifying human beings on 
the basis of their colour, facial and bodily structure, as well as the 
temperament and behaviour supposedly associated with these divisions.  
Certain behaviours and temperaments were thought essential to all 
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individuals whose bodily features were perceived characteristic of a 
particular race; thus certain behaviours became racialized stigmas such as 
“taciturn, even morose, aborigines of South America” (Darwin 1871: 56), or 
“the Black Negro, who is well-suited to his climate, namely, strong, fleshy, 
and agile.  However because he is so amply supplied by his motherland, he 
is also lazy, indolent, and dawdling” (Kant 1777: 17).  Approaching race 
morphologically means that individuals are understood to have nameable, 
discrete, objective, and immutable racial identities that are discoverable 
purely on the basis of their external physical appearance.   
Morphological race groupings divide individuals into groups sharing 
physical bodily traits judged to be indicative of a particular race type.  They 
take it as given that one can distinguish any Nordic person from any person 
from sub-Saharan Africa since the contrasts in bodily and facial features 
(e.g. musculature, hair texture, nose and lip shape, skin and eye colour) are 
so great.  These accounts propose that racial difference is either entirely or 
mostly caused by one’s physical anatomy rather than being 
environmentally, behaviourally, or culturally caused.  Our physical anatomy 
is the ultimate determiner of who we are.  My race is somehow written on 
my body—conceived of as an essential and inescapable fact of who I am.  
Because our bodily and facial features are perceived as more natural and 
essential to us, it is believed to be more worthy of attention and provides a 
more justifiable basis on which to classify humanity according to what are 
conceived to be natural divisions.   
 Not all morphological conceptions presuppose that physical features 
can be used as indicators for behavioural, intellectual or emotional traits.  A 
recent example of a morphological conception of race of this kind has been 
presented by Armand Marie Leroi.  Leroi suggests that, taken as individual 
traits, skin colour, body, nose shape or eye colour do not tell us anything 
about a person’s race or country of origin.  However, if we take these 
characteristics together we can make a number of correct predictions about 
a person’s other physical traits, country of origin, or even their genetic 
constitution.  This is because  
certain skin colors tend to go with certain kinds of eyes, noses, 
skulls and bodies.  When we glance at a stranger’s face we use 
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those associations to infer what continent, or even what country, 
he or his ancestors came from—and we usually get it right.  To 
put it more abstractly, human physical variation is correlated; 
and correlations contain information (Leroi 2005).  
  
 In this quote, Leroi clearly takes morphological variation to be the 
main determiner of one’s racial categorization.  Although writing more than 
a century earlier, but just twenty-six years after Darwin’s “On the Races of 
Man,” W. E. B. Du Bois (1897) provided what can now be understood to be a 
particularly enduring analysis of the problem with relying on morphological 
features in determining an individual’s race.  If we consider Du Bois’ “The 
Conservation of Races” we can begin to uncover the persistent morphology-
centred thinking that leads to Leroi’s conception of race.  Du Bois questions 
the appropriateness of any classification of race based on morphological 
indications such as skin colour, head shape, or the type or amount of facial 
or body hair.  He argues that although there may be differences in these 
respects, there is so much diversity among individuals within a particular 
race that relying on these morphologies produces an inadequate basis for 
racial differences and similarities. 
 Du Bois argues that variations in morphological features do exist, and 
if they tended to co-occur with each other then we would be able to use them 
to classify humans into races on the basis of these.  However, they do not.  
Variations in the colour of skin, texture of hair, shape of the head do not, 
pace Leroi, naturally “tend to go with each other.”  They can be found 
separately in some individuals and in all sorts of combinations within a 
variety of different peoples such that any classification on the basis of them 
would prove useless.   
All these physical characteristics are patent enough, and if they 
agreed with each other it would be very easy to classify mankind.  
Unfortunately for scientists, however, these criteria of races are 
most exasperatingly intermingled.  Color does not agree with 
texture of hair, for many of the dark races have straight hair; nor 
does color agree with the breadth of the head, for the yellow 
Tartar has a broader head than the German (Du Bois 1897: 109). 
  
Du Bois is quick to point out that any classification that takes these 
physical characteristics to be the basis of its racial divisions fails in its aim 
of being based on universally held or essential traits.  Physical 
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characteristics such as head shape or skin colour do not determine one’s 
race.  Although these types of physical variation are intended by 
morphologically based classifications to be common to all human beings of a 
particular race, they are only mere descriptions of observed variations 
among individuals by someone with certain features.  Race cannot be 
characterized in terms of shared morphological characteristics of some 
group of individuals because the physical features shared do not fall into 
categories but are, as Du Bois describes “intermingled.”  He denies that 
knowing that an individual has light skin and light straight hair provides 
enough information to allow us to make reliable predictions about her other 
morphological (or behavioural traits).  These morphological variations (in 
skin colour, hair texture, and head shape etc.) do not form the basis on 
which we can ground generalizations or predictions because they do not 
necessarily coincide with one another.  That is, morphological traits are 
nonconcordant with one another and with other supposedly racialized traits 
(e.g. of behaviour and intelligence).   
While it is undoubtedly possible to group human beings on the basis 
of morphological traits, it is a mistake to think that the resultant groupings 
form natural or “pure” homogeneous kinds of the type Cuvier or Leroi 
assume.  This is because there is no metaphysical basis for the belief that 
individuals grouped on, say, the basis of hair texture and head shape 
necessarily coincide with individuals grouped on the basis on, say, of skin 
colour and eye colour.   
 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2 BIOMEDICAL CONCEPTIONS OF RACE 
 
Du Bois and others have shown that race, if it exists at all, cannot be 
sufficiently based on morphological features.  However, this has not 
dissuaded Leroi and others (cf. Sesardic 2005) who still seek to secure a 
natural scientific conception of race.  The identification of individuals on the 
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basis of biomedical, genetic, or genomic data relies on the assumption that 
racial identity is based on unique biomedical phenotypes or genotypes.  
Seeming to trade on the idea that the underlying essence of water is H2O, 
this view holds that different kinds of human beings can be identified in 
terms of their similar biochemical make-up.  Instead of just relying on the 
external similarities and variations within different peoples, the biomedical 
conception of race seeks evidence of biologically determined racial 
differences within epidemiological and genomic data.  
Instead of using outwardly recognizable morphological characteristics 
to identify individuals as belonging to one race or another, there is now 
growing interest in the view that racial differences are written in our genes.  
There has been an increasing belief that the new genomic data sources 
developed in the Human Genome Project will secure a gene or set of genes 
that are the ineluctable determinants wholly (or mostly) responsible for who 
we are.  Knowledge of our genetic information means that we can find out 
whether we have a particular gene or if we are a carrier of a particular 
disease.  Who we are is then fully available to us when we uncover our 
genetic codescript.  According to a Putnam-Kripke approach to essences, we 
now have access our own underlying microstructural essence—the definitive 
causal source that determines who we are.  This genetic determination has 
been vigorously sought by those wanting to find a “Black gene,” “Native 
American gene,” or “Inuit gene” in order to prove or uncover their racial 
identity (Langdon 1995).  Reliance on genes as the most important cause 
underlying one’s racial identity effectively essentializes these complex 
identities.  It assumes who we really are is wholly contained within the 
information encoded in our complement of genes.  The increasing array of 
genetic and medical tests being offered to us to find out more about 
ourselves, where we really come from, and who we really are attests to the 
prevalence of this view of race. 
One of the minor pleasures of this discovery is a new kind of 
genealogy. Today it is easy to find out where your ancestors came 
from—or even when they came, as with so many of us, from 
several different places. If you want to know what fraction of your 
genes are African, European or East Asian, all it takes is a mouth 
swab, a postage stamp and $400 (Leroi 2005). 
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 Although this way of speaking is pervasive in the various media, 
what does it really mean to say that a person’s race can be fractioned, as 
being 14% African, 12% European, 8% Iroquois, or 20% Inuit?  Interpreting 
an individual’s racial ancestry in this way assumes race is something to be 
uncovered, like an essential underlying property (or oddly, a percentage of 
properties) of being a particular kind of human.  It assumes that there are 
genes that can be objectively identified as indicators of one’s racial identity, 
and provide what fraction of one’s genes are attributable to which races.    
 Conceiving of race in terms of the presence or absence of certain 
genes, or “what fraction of your genes”, are for instance, Iroquois, also 
trades on the often unspoken premise that there are individuals who are (or 
could have been) racially pure.  As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the idea of pure lines was originally formulated by Cuvier (1812), 
and taken up by Darwin (1871).  They held that there are a few pure types 
and all other races are merely hybrids or intermediates whose racial 
identity is not pure.29  If someone can be 8% Iroquois, then there at least 
seems to be the possibility that someone else might be 50%, 60%, or even 
100% Iroquois.  If we (as Leroi suggests, literally) buy into the idea that we 
can find our racial heritage in this way, then we also must believe that there 
is indeed the possibility that there may be an individual who is 100% 
Iroquois.  Identifying someone as 100% Iroquois would be tantamount to 
identifying them as a racial archetype or type specimen to which all other 
individuals would then be compared as tokens which have a certain 
percentage similarity to that type.  The purity of racial lines or of the 
archetypes they use as “pure” type specimens has been most aggressively 
pursued by those interested in establishing a genetic basis for a Jewish 
identity among the Falasha of Ethiopia, the Lemba in South Africa, and the 
right to claim Native American identity in some North Americans.  For 
instance, both serotological and genetic data using the y-chromosome have 
been used to judge whether individuals are Cherokee or not (Pollitzer et al. 
1962), and have also been used in determining the inclusion or exclusion of 
                                                     
29 More problems surrounding the idea of pure lines will be discussed towards the 
end of this chapter. 
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individuals in other Native American tribes (Harpending and Ward 1982, 
Dupré and Hauskeller 2007).30   
 What race someone belongs to has often been understood to be a 
crucial property of who she is, and her identity as a person.  In this respect, 
medical and genetic testing could be taken to justify the reality of natural 
racial groupings that were originally decided on the basis of morphology.  
There are a number of genetic variations within human beings that have 
been of particular interest in the search for a biological basis for race.  
Uncovering certain biomedical differences has proved especially compelling 
for those who seek biologically determined racial differences.  However, 
deciding what kind of biomedical data is central to someone’s race has not 
been straightforward.  This data could include autosomes, x- and y-
chromosomes, introns, exons, deletions, duplications or insertions, 
mitochondrial DNA, or susceptibility to sickle cell anaemia, lactose 
tolerance or intolerance. 31   
 Two biomedical phenotypes that have frequently been suggested as 
candidates which could be used to group individuals into races are the 
resistance to malaria (often purported to be specific to a relatively high 
incidence of sickle cell disease among black-skinned people of African 
descent) and the ability to tolerate lactose (purported to be specific to white-
skinned people of European descent).   
 Sickle cell disease is the name given to a range of disorders, including 
sickle cell anaemia.  Sickle cell anaemia is thought to be most common to 
those peoples who live in hot and tropical climates which make malaria a 
real threat to survival.  Although it can affect persons of any race, it is less 
frequently found in northern climates where malaria does not affect people.  
                                                     
30 These data have also been utilized by those interested in discovering race-related 
genetic diseases and prenatal testing (Hauskeller 2004: 285).   
31 Genetic and biomedical research has proved important not, in the way Leroi 
specifies, for resolving an individual’s racial composition and therefore identity, but 
for improved biomedical testing for inherited diseases.  Although not designed to 
provide any causal connection between disease and racial identity, some have 
seized upon these biomedical tests as providing evidence for objectively defined 
racial categories.  It has also become increasingly popular to rely on racial 
categories for health policies and distribution of resources, a practice which has 
been called “racial profiling” (Satel 2002). 
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Sickle cell anaemia is caused by a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP).32  
In individuals without sickle cell anaemia, the nucleotide GAG is usually 
present.  In individuals with sickle cell anaemia, GUG is present (Ashley-
Koch et al. 2000).  SNPs are common and most do not cause any deleterious 
consequences.  However, this is not the case in this instance.  This single 
change affects the shape of the red blood cells causing them to form long 
thin spikes or sickles. Because red blood cells contain haemoglobin, the 
protein that carries oxygen from the lungs to the rest of the body, this 
causes problems in sickle shaped blood cells that do not affect normal round 
blood cells.  Not only do these sickled cells live shorter lives than non-sickled 
ones, which causes anaemia, they do not flow through the blood vessels as 
well as the normal round cells.  These sickled cells have a tendency to stick 
together causing potentially life threatening conditions due to lack of 
oxygen, vascular occlusion, and stroke (Desai and Dhanani 2004).   
 Sickle cell disease is present in homozygotic individuals (who inherit 
two alleles, one from each parent).  Heterozygote carriers have no anaemic 
symptoms, but because there is incomplete penetrance, heterozygotes posses 
some sickle shaped red blood cells (although not as many as homozygotes).  
When an heterozygote individual lives in an area where the malaria 
parasite is present in the gut of mosquitoes, she has a level of malarial 
resistance.  The misshapen red blood cells of the sickle cell carrier hamper 
the ability of the Plasmodium falciparum, which is the most virulent 
plasmodium responsible for malaria, to reproduce.  When not in the gut of 
its mosquito host, the malarial parasite spends most of its life within the red 
blood cells where it multiplies.  The thinner and more fragile sickle shaped 
red blood cells are not conducive to the life cycle of the plasmodia (Pearson 
1977).  This results in the resistance to malaria of those individuals with 
sickled red blood cells.  
Although sickle cell disease is common among many West Africans, it 
is also found in some North and South Americans living in areas where 
malaria is a threat.  But malaria also occurs in individuals of the 
Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, and the Middle and Far East.  Although 
                                                     
32 There are four bases:  guanine, adenine, cytosine and thymine that combine to 
form nucleotide triplets that make up the rungs along the double helix of DNA.   
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people in these areas do not suffer from sickle cell anaemia they do have a 
resistance to malaria due do the presence of alpha-, beta- and delta-
thalassaemia (Lau et al. 1997).   
Malarial resistance is treated as a racial trait caused by sickle cell 
anaemia.  On the basis of the racialized phenotype of malarial resistance, 
the grouping of individuals resistant to malaria is believed to form a racial 
group—black Africans and those with black African ancestry.  However, if 
we were to classify individuals in terms of their resistance to malaria, we 
would actually obtain a very different grouping of individuals—one which 
would not align with other racial divisions (e.g. based on skin colour:  black, 
yellow, white, red; or geography:  Africans, Asians, Europeans, Americans).  
Individuals within populations of the Mediterranean, such as some Italians, 
Greeks together with some Africans, Southeast Asians, Arabians, and those 
of the Far East would be members of the group resistant to malaria.  The 
Northern Europeans and the Xhosas of South Africa would be grouped 
together as non-malaria resistant.  When speaking of malarial resistance, it 
is simply not explanatory to say that the reason someone has malarial 
resistance is because they are black.  This is because the groups identified 
using morphological concepts of race do not overlap with those identified 
using this biomedical conception of race. 
 The second candidate criterion for grouping people into different 
races on the basis of biomedical traits is lactase persistence.  The presence 
of the enzyme lactase enables individuals to digest the main carbohydrate, 
lactose, which occurs in milk.  Nearly all infant mammals possess the 
enzyme lactase but later, after weaning, lose the ability to digest lactose 
later in life.  The persistence of the lactase enzyme after weaning until 
adulthood arose when humans began domesticating cows, sheep, goats, 
camels and buffalo for their milk.  Although the presence of lactase has been 
associated with milk drinking in Northern Europeans, it cannot be 
attributed to something like the presence of a racial white gene.  In fact, if 
we group people in terms of their ability to drink milk in adulthood due to 
their retention of lactase from infancy, this group would include Northern 
Indians, some Africans such as the Fulani, and Central and Northern 
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Europeans; whereas those who are not able to digest lactose include 
Southern Europeans, East Asians, Native Americans, and some Africans 
(Tishkoff et al. 2007).   
 At least in terms of the morphological and national/geographical 
divisions of race, classifying peoples using both malarial resistance and 
lactose tolerance in adulthood as criteria results in groupings that are 
wildly nonconcordant.  As with malarial resistance, lactose tolerance is a 
trait that does not align with any of the traditionally understood, 
morphologically defined groupings of race.   
 What may be more explanatory are:  the ecological conditions which 
were conducive to mosquitoes thriving, the transfer of plasmodia among 
mosquitoes, or the agricultural practices and dairying within particular 
communities.  These biomedical phenotypic traits are more likely to be 
endemic to social organization and agricultural practices (cf. Livingstone 
1958 and Weiss et al 1984).  Malarial resistance may be interesting not 
because it is correlated with dark skin but because the incidence of malaria 
occurs among certain groups who share similar agricultural methods or live 
near swamplands.  For instance, different groups of individuals may share 
similar techniques in crop growth, irrigation, or fertilization.  They may 
choose to cultivate their crops on drained swaps.  These practices are 
conducive to the breeding activities of mosquitoes, whose larvae require an 
aquatic environment.   
 Race (morphologically construed) is not the explanans to the 
explanandum, why does this group of people have malarial resistance?  In 
order to determine an individual’s race, it must first be necessary to identify 
a race group.  Identifying a particular race group is often based on selecting 
individuals whose morphological traits or genes fit with those of interest to 
the researcher (e.g. malarial resistance or lactose tolerance).  This is done by 
a set of factors which the classifier has pre-selected on the basis of their 
possible co-occurrence in commonly understood racial groupings (often 
known as “racial-profiling”).  This means that the researcher must first have 
criteria other than an individual’s country of origin or distant ancestry to 
initially select individuals thought to be members of the same race, i.e. the 
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researcher’s initial recognition and attribution of the person’s morphological 
characteristics as belonging to a particular race.  If the researchers findings 
then suggest that the ancestry of a particular individual reveals her race, it 
does so by proving to be evidence in support of the researcher’s initial racial 
ascription—not the necessary correlation of a biomedical trait, e.g. lactose 
tolerance with race.    
 Attributing causal or correlative biomedical features to one’s racial 
identity is at best dubious.  This does not mean that there is nothing that 
might explain the occurrence (or origin) of these biomedical phenotypes.  
Following the above suggestion, what might explain these are the common 
agricultural practices of peoples and their shared ways of living.  Human 
beings are not classifiable into a particular race on the basis of their 
propensity to a particular disease or their having a particular gene, but this 
information may be used by someone as contributing to their own racial 
identity.  However, this is based on the appropriation of biomedical or 
genetic features into one’s psychological identity of their own racial 
ascription, a theme I will explore later.  
 
5.2.1.3 POPULATION CONCEPTIONS OF RACE 
 
 If environmental and geographic locations can provide information for 
predicting more characteristics of a person’s makeup than purely 
morphological or biomedical features, perhaps a better candidate by which 
to understand race might be found in the population conception.  These 
accounts demarcate human beings in terms of the ecological groupings or 
migration of populations.  Knowing the agricultural history and geography 
of the place from which an individual originated only provides partial 
information and cannot on its own explain the presence or absence of certain 
phenotypes such as one’s hair texture, lactose tolerance, or malarial 
resistance.  In addition to agricultural and ecological information, the 
population conception relies on migrational routes from and to other 
geographical areas, the trade between different groups, and the political and 
social groupings that may have affected whether two groups living in the 
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same area interacted with one another, whether they were in fact 
adversaries who avoided each other at all costs, or were friendly, 
cohabitated, and intermarried with one another.  
 According to population conceptions of race, migration, rare genetic 
mutations, and genetic drift are thought to cause evolutionary differences 
between populations.  This approach takes race to be a feature of group 
relationships.  On this view, population differences may result due to a 
number of reasons.  For instance, populations tend to genetically diverge 
when they are (reproductively or geographically) isolated from one another.  
This divergence halts when two previously separated populations merge and 
share a gene pool.  Populations also change due to what is called the founder 
effect.  The founder effect consists in the spread of genes from a small group 
of individuals which originate from a different geographically and 
genetically isolated population who relocate to a new geographical area 
(Cavalli-Sforza 1995).  Any rare genetic mutations within the original 
founder population are transmitted to all subsequent generations.  
Consequently, there will be a higher percentage of that rare mutation 
within the individuals of the population founded by the small group of 
individuals than in other populations (including the population from which 
the founders emigrated from.33   
 There are a number of reasons why people migrate from one area to 
another.  Migration might occur if there is an incentive for one group to 
move into another area, e.g. due to better climate, more cultivatable land, to 
escape political unrest, or to avoid starvation.  If there is another population 
already occupying that area then this migration affects both the newly 
migrated population and the resident population.  This is because they now 
have an opportunity to exchange both culture and genes with populations 
from which they were previously isolated.  For these reasons Cavalli-Sforza 
argues that these geographic expansions can be traced genetically.  The 
high frequencies of certain genes or alleles may indicate the expansion of 
different groups from one area to another.  He believes that population 
                                                     
33 This is especially pronounced in island populations which are genetically and 
geographically isolated. 
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genetic analyses can reveal some similarities which exist among individuals 
of the same race and some differences between individuals of different races.   
 This approach focuses ostensibly on genetic markers and in tracing 
these in current populations to suggest the major directions of migration 
over hundreds of generations.  Genetic data are suggestive, because both 
genetic and cultural factors co-evolve through the movement of people.  
Groups of people moved with their ideas.  Cavalli-Sforza (2000) argues that 
the original direction of the migration of human populations expanded from 
southeast to northwest into previously unoccupied geographical areas.  
These migration patterns suggest the spread of farming technologies and 
linguistic usage.   
 This population conception of race relies on gene frequencies and 
genealogical inferences using both haplotype data from mtDNA, the y-
chromosome, and low recombination autosomal genes as well as 
archaeological evidence.  It tracks migration events and interprets the 
pattern of migration and evolutionary adaptations as specifying certain 
population groupings.  This provides information about the movements of 
raced populations from one country to another.   
 This conception of race is based on a similar set of assumptions to the 
standard Mayrian biological species concept (discussed in Chapter Four).  
Just as the similarity among members of the same species are thought to be 
ensured by the reproductive isolation of the population and the lack of gene 
flow between members of different species, the cohesion of raced populations 
is preserved in like fashion.  Within members of the same race population, 
cohesion is thought to be ensured by forming reproductive relationships only 
with members of the same population.  Different raced populations are 
believed to be isolated from one another due to such factors as geographical 
distance, political isolation due to fighting,  religious strictures against 
marriage of those outside the population, or other considerations which 
make marriages and sexual relationships between members of the same 
population statistically more likely than with those of different populations. 
All of these are barriers to matings between members of different 
populations.  This is thought to ensure the preservation of race-specific 
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traits within the population that may be preserved generation after 
generation.  
 Whether a population concept of race accurately demarcates 
humankind into races on the basis of such empirical evidence may be in 
doubt if,   
[there has] always been a very large amount of migration and 
intergroup mating … in the history of the human species but 
[which] is now more widespread than ever.  The result [would be] 
that individuals identified by themselves or others as belonging to 
one ‘race,’ based on the small number of visible characters used in 
classical race definitions, are likely to have ancestry that is a 
mixture of these groups (Lewontin 2005). 
 
Reproductive isolation may be explained on a small scale with regard to 
cultural and religious practices, however; according to Lewontin, intergroup 
mating has been and continues to be generally pervasive among different 
racial groups.  Although there may be definite differences between 
individuals of various populations, an overwhelming 85% of genetic 
variation in humans is actually within populations, not between them 
(Lewontin 1972, 2005).  The majority of biological diversity (and genetic 
variation) occurs within rather than between what have been commonly 
understood as races.   
 Understanding race in terms of the genetic differences between racial 
populations assumes that there is significant genetic as well as geographic 
isolation between groups which prevents intermixing; however, this rarely 
exists.  The reason why certain genes (rare mutations) are present in high 
percentages within a population may be explained by population changes 
such as the founder effect.  But this is not the only explanation.  The 
population conception, like Mayr’s BSC, takes race populations to be defined 
as isolated interbreeding groups which share a gene pool.  But as Lewontin 
argues, in terms of racial populations, this isolation is an illusion.   
 Proponents of the morphological, biomedical, and populational 
conceptions of race seek to equate different biological variations with race.  
What is not in dispute is that variations exist and racial classifications have 
been based upon them.  What is in dispute is whether the variations 
identified by these natural scientific conceptions of race alone can identify 
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the kinds of things that are important in both recognizing and 
understanding an individual’s racial identity.   
 
 
 
5.2.2 SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTIONS OF RACE 
5.2.2.1 THE DEVELOPMENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL CONCEPTIONS OF 
RACE 
 
 An alternative to conceiving of race in terms of morphological, 
biomedical, or population genetic features are those explored by Boas (1911) 
and Appiah (2004).  Boas formulated his conception of race as an alternative 
to what he took to be the deeply flawed assumption common to many 
scientific conceptions of race, that  
when we try to judge the … races of man, we make the silent 
assumption that [race] is something permanent and stationary, 
that it depends upon heredity, and that, as compared to it, 
environmental, modifying influences are, comparatively speaking, 
of slight importance (Boas 1911: 84).   
 
Boas argued that understanding races as unchanging stable types was both 
theoretically and empirically disputable.  By focusing his research on the 
differences in body morphology of families who emigrated from Europe to 
America in the early 1900s, Boas found that newly emigrated Europeans’ 
height and the shape of their heads was dramatically different as compared 
to the height and head shape of their first and second generation born 
American descendants.  Of the families he studied in New York, he observed 
of the East European Jews that  
the head of the European-born is shorter [and wider] than the 
head of the American-born … At the same time the American-
born is taller.  All these differences seem to increase with the time 
elapsed between the emigration of the parents and the birth of the 
child, and are much more marked in the second generation of 
American-born individuals.  Among the long-headed Sicilians 
similar observations have been made … [and] the people of 
Bohemia and Hungary (Boas 1911: 86). 
 
The racialized characteristics of individuals which were seemingly fixed in 
one country changed when families immigrated to the New World.  
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 Boas concluded from these studies that race types were inherently 
unstable and plastic.  The individual development of morphological 
characteristics among these families was found to be considerably 
influenced by the different geographical, ecological, and social environments 
in which they lived showing considerable modification and plasticity of their 
“racial features” and “racial types” (Boas 1911).   
 More recent studies have shown similar results to those of Boas.  The 
plasticity of one’s own racialized features and ascribed racial classification 
can change in as little as a few years if one moves to a different country, or 
different community within the same country, with a different set of beliefs 
concerning the assessment of morphological, religious, linguistic, or 
behavioural features than one’s own.  These changes may even affect the 
racial ascription of individuals after a matter of months.  For example, a 
recent study showed that there were differences between the ascribed races 
on the birth and death certificates of babies who had died aged one year.  
The study found that 37% of the infants who were born Native American 
died a different race (Hahn et al. 1992).  According to the developmental 
reading of race, because human beings develop differently, individuals—
even at their birth or in the year afterwards (as the above case illustrates)—
already have a history of development which contributes to their racial 
ascriptions (Dent 1990: 694). 
  Opposing what he believed to be the main failure of previous notions 
of race, Boas’ critique of the assumption of the fixity of race was a 
significant theoretical influence in Appiah’s own understanding of race.  
Insofar as the meaning of our actions is constantly being shaped over our 
lifetime by our own understanding of them, Appiah argues that racial 
behaviour can be understood as intentional under a description.  Our 
behaviour is understood by us (or by others) as behaviour appropriate to a 
person of a specific race:  “what I do intentionally is dependent on what I 
think I am doing” (Appiah 2004: 65).  His notion of race employs a joint 
understanding of behaviour.  One’s behaviour can be understood as being 
both self-directed and other-directed.  A person understands her behaviour 
as self-directed when she understands her own behaviour as different or 
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similar in relation to another person or to a group.  She ascribes to her own 
behaviour a particular understanding of conformity or difference to various 
groups she perceives racially.  She may judge herself similar to a group with 
which she identifies herself racially.  Her behaviour is self-ascriptive when 
she chooses to act in a way that she believes is consistent with a group she 
wishes to belong to.  For instance, she may dress, speak, and conduct herself 
in a way that she believes is indicative of that group.  All of these decisions 
can contribute to one’s intentional ascription of race and be used to direct 
one’s future behaviours.  
 Behaviour is other-directed when individuals, groups, or nations 
make decisions about what group an individual belongs on the basis of her 
appearance and behaviour.  This conception of race claims that we utilize 
information about how certain kinds of people act to direct our own 
behaviour and interactions with them in a variety of situations.  It can 
include societal conventions, legal precedents, and political or class based 
discriminations among races.  Actions towards individuals judged to belong 
to a certain race are shaped by the expectations a group or individual has of 
others’ behaviour as well as the individual’s own behaviour, and interactions 
with different kinds of people based on these conceptions of different racial 
identities. 
 Appiah (2004) argues that this behavioural conception of race is not 
biological, but it is objective.  Its objectivity is not based on biological 
differences but instead on how one person’s actions are directed by his or 
her identification of another person’s race.  Race may not be a real biological 
notion, but racial conceptions have real behavioural effects.  The way 
individuals identify other individuals on the basis of their race forms the 
guidelines of their behaviour and treatment of others as well as their 
expectations of the behaviour of others.   
 Boas and Appiah’s conceptions imply that the persistent argument for 
a fixed, essential biological basis for racial classifications misjudges both the 
basis for racial groupings as well as what is required for them to be 
objective.  These “biological” features are inextricably linked to an 
individual’s development within a set of political, societal, class, linguistic, 
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and economic practices.  Discriminatory practices based on these perceived 
differences among raced individuals have lead to gross inequities where 
some are systematically privileged while others are oppressed.  Recognizing 
these constraints is surely necessary if we wish to understand the use and 
abuse of race-based classifications.  For Appiah, distinguishing individuals 
on the basis of their skin colour may be a significant characteristic just 
because there is a history of oppression that has made it one of the key 
differences perceived and utilized by those seeking to oppress or privilege 
one group over others.  The Jim Crow laws in the Southern United States 
that relied on the “common report” of (usually whites) in determining the 
race of infants (Omi and Winant 1994: 181), the history of oppression in the 
United States, the caste system in India, apartheid in South Africa, the 
ethnic cleansing of Russian pogroms, genocide in Rwanda, as well as the 
continued use of skin colour as a discriminating marker attest to the 
objective reality of it for sociologically and politically defined race categories. 
 I am sympathetic to the view that race is contingent on our 
interactions and behaviours with others.  However, as I will show towards 
the end of this chapter, I do not think the contingency of our racial 
ascriptions is limited to our actions but depends on a panoply of 
developmental, behavioural, physical, familial, and cultural features. 
 
 
5.2.2.2 FAMILIAL CONCEPTIONS OF RACE 
 
 Rather than relying on explicitly raced genetic or morphological 
features of individuals, the familial notion takes human beings as forming 
kinds based on whether they have descended from a common ancestral 
lineage or whether they share the same genealogical tree.  Human beings 
belong to the same racial kind if they are descended from the same 
unbroken sequence of ancestors.  This account of race originates with 
Darwin’s own understanding in The Descent of Man (1871).   
According to the widely adopted familial conception of race, “[we] 
assign people to races in a way that is governed by the rule:  if your parents 
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are of the same race, you’re of the same race as your parents” (Appiah 2006: 
364).  This conception of race rests on the naïve assumption that raciality is 
somehow biologically encoded and reliably transmitted from one generation 
to the next; racial traits are passed down from great-grandparent to 
grandparent to parent to child.   
The most infamous of the familial conceptions of race were those 
collectively referred to as the “one-drop rules.”  These were a number of laws 
which were first enacted during slavery34 and were common in the Southern 
United States.  Although now officially rejected as unconstitutional, the one-
drop rule is still used colloquially as an objective measure by those seeking 
to racialize both others and themselves on the basis of family ties or 
ancestry (Coolidge 1998).  One-drop rules held that if you had as little as 
one black ancestor in your extended family tree, you were black.  In some 
states this was set as a fractional notion, such that if one of your great, 
great-grandparents (one-sixteenth of your ancestry), or in some states, one 
of your great, great, great-grandparents (one-thirtysecond of your ancestry) 
was considered black then you were black.  These laws attempted to purify 
what was seen as a gradual dilution of the white race by multiracial 
individuals, previously classified as “mulattoes.”  This division was not 
between individuals commonly ascribed as black or white on the basis of 
their skin colour.  In practice these laws took the form of witch-hunt like 
searches for any distant black ancestors of individuals living as, and 
accepted as, white.  These laws were upheld in some states as late as 1982 
(Omi and Winant 1994).  Although originally aimed at black and white 
races, the absolute intolerance to those of “mixed race” was not limited to 
those of black and white ancestry.35  Madison Grant warns of the waning of 
his own white race in The Passing of the Great Race,  
                                                     
34 The first law was established in North Carolina in 1802:  Gobu v. Gobu, 1 N.C. 
188. 
35 This intolerance to individuals of multiraciality was not restricted to the U.S.  
Early in the 20th century, laws were enacted in Australia to ensure the protection 
of the purity of the aboriginal people.  These laws forced the removal of the light-
skinned children born of aboriginal and white parents (labelled by the government 
as “half-castes”) from their aboriginal families and taken by force to government-
run camps where they were trained to eventually “integrate” within the white 
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The cross between a white man and an Indian is an Indian; the 
cross between a white man and a negro is a negro; the cross 
between a white man and a Hindu is a Hindu; and the cross 
between any of the three European races and a Jew is a Jew 
(Grant 1916: 18).    
 
Although the naïve and popular variations of familial conceptions of 
race may seem more harmless than the notoriously racist one-drop rules, 
these familial conceptions all envisage race as an objective essential set of 
characteristics that are passed on through pure lines of inheritance.  In 
doing so they marginalize all individuals of whose ancestry does not conform 
to the continuous “pure” lines of inheritance or are easily classified with the 
neatly defined categories of Black, White, Red, and Yellow.  
Familial conceptions of race can sometimes employ the use of 
racialized notions of morphology and the necessary continuity of inheritance 
in defining what “pure” and “mixed” racial lineages are.36  Many of these 
rely on a gene-centred view of racial inheritance which takes an individual 
to inherit all of her genes that code for her racial traits from her parents.  
This would mean that she is of the same race as her parents are, if they are 
of the same race as each other.  Familial conceptions often assume that 
there exists some genealogically passed on essence or material identity, 
frequently construed in terms of the same genes or traits.  This presupposes 
that “one’s own genes … remain the same over many generations—
otherwise they could not be linked to particular diseases, ancestries or 
traits” (Hauskeller 2004: 291).  We have these same traits, same genes, and 
same talents and behaviours as our ancestors because we believe that they 
are reliably inherited through a pure, unbroken genealogical lineage of 
ancestors. 
This account is inaccurate in many ways.  The genes we inherit from 
our parents are neither materially nor logically identical with our own.  Not 
only are the genes not identical across generations, they are also non-
identical within the trillions of cells of one’s body throughout one’s ontogeny.  
                                                                                                                                                           
community rather than “diluting” the aboriginal population (cf. Pilkington-
Garimara 1996). 
36 These individuals are often lumped together under the names “mongrel” and 
“mixed race,” phrases that betray reliance on the assumption that there can (and 
should) be unmixed, pure lines.   
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Not all cells have identical genomes due to mutation in cell division and 
differentiation.  The DNA may be the same sequence in all cells but the 
methylation of the genome in each cell type, the specific cell products, 
proteins, and daughter cells may differ (cf. Hauskeller 2004: 294).   
 The one-drop rules suggest race may not be easily recognized in the 
faces or in the skin colour of some individuals.  They imply that it may be 
“hidden.”  An individual’s ancestry may suggest that she is not as she 
appears to be.  This may occur if her morphologically ascribed 
characteristics and the commonly ascribed race attributed to her by those 
within different communities are challenged with what is thought to be 
essential information about her identity.  For example, before the repeal of 
the last one-drop rule in 1982, a woman named Susie Phipps who, “having 
lived her whole life thinking that she was white, suddenly discover[ed] that 
by legal definition she [was] not … but if she [was] not white, of what race 
[was] she?  The state claim[ed] that she [was] black, based on its rules of 
classification” (Omi and Winant 2004: 182). 
 Familial conceptions of race take race to be an essential quality—
perhaps unseen, but potentially discoverable.  A person’s race can be 
assessed purely given her immediate or, in the case of the one-drop rules, 
distant ancestry.  Rather than anything else the presence of one of 32 great, 
great, great-grandparents is thought to definitively determine what race 
Phipps “really” was.  This takes an individual’s racial identity as essentially 
fixed and unchangeable.  Her race is determined only on the basis of her 
ancestral relationships.  It restricts her history to the history of her racial 
relatedness to her distant and close ancestors.   
 In the remaining sections I argue that the familial view of race, like 
the morphological, biomedical, and populational views, assumes that race is 
something that is preformed prior to one’s life in the world.  A person’s 
racial identity is determined prior to and irrespective of her experiences and 
relationships with other human beings during her lifetime.  It is a fixed 
feature of human beings.  And as such it is unaffected by her life activities.  
It can be determined before she is even born simply by examining the family 
trees of both her parents.   
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5.2.2.3 CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF RACE 
 
In contradistinction to both the fixed notions of the natural scientific 
and familial conceptions of race, Du Bois defines “race” as a  
a vast family37 of human beings, generally of common blood and 
language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, 
who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for 
the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived 
ideals of life (Du Bois 1897: 110).  
 
In formulating his conception of race in this way, Du Bois seeks a social 
scientific rather than a natural scientific approach to race.   
What does Du Bois mean when he writes that two people are members 
of the same race if they belong to the same “vast family,” are “of generally 
common blood,” and share a “common history”?  Relying on the notion of 
“common blood” and “common history,” makes Du Bois appear to support a 
biologically based or familial notion of race.  Although the idea of a common 
blood or a “blood quantum” is used by some Native Americans to determine 
their belonging to a particular tribe38, common blood has most frequently 
been understood to be isomorphic to “gene,” as it has been, and continues to 
be typically defined in many Western cultures as being an objective fact of 
nature ensuring one’s linear descent and the essential test for group 
inclusion.  
Common history and vast family are often used interchangeably with 
common ancestry or a group of individuals sharing the same lineage or 
family tree.  Usage of these restrictively defined notions of family is not 
consistent with Du Bois’ own particular use of these phrases.  His explicit 
aim to present a sociohistoric conception of race by utilizing the notion of 
common blood emphasizes at once the physical and psychological continuity 
                                                     
37 Du Bois’ specific use of “vast family” should not be confused with the familial 
conceptions of race just discussed.  The distinction between these two conceptions 
will shortly be made explicit. 
38 On the basis of such a claim, an individual may receive a “Certificate of Degree of 
Indian Blood” or  “Certificate of Degree of Alaska Native Blood” issued by the 
American Bureau of Indian Affairs (cf. Schneider 1968 and Dupré and Hauskeller 
2007). 
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among individuals of the same race.  His broad use of these notions set the 
starting points for many later attempts to clarify a conception of race.  
Even though he is explicit in his aim to secure a sociohistoric 
conception of race, it is hard to resist interpreting Du Bois’ use of common 
blood, common history, and vast family as together implying a thoroughly 
natural scientific notion of common ancestry and genetic inheritance.  But 
this tendency seems to be motivated by the persistent assumption discussed 
at length in previous chapters, that biological inheritance is narrowly 
construed in terms of genetic inheritance.  However, there are many 
different routes by which human features are passed on besides our genetic 
inheritance.  Following Du Bois, Bernard Boxill characterizes race as 
follows:  
a group of people have a common history if they have inherited 
their common way of life from a long series of ancestors who faced 
common problems together and passed on this way of handling 
these problems—their way of life—to their descendants, usually 
with adjustments and emendations (Boxill 1996: 60).  
 
Instead of being limited to the vertical inheritance of genetic material 
from parent to offspring, features such as “a common way of life” and a “way 
of handling these problems” are both vertically passed on in the non-genetic 
“inheritance” of teaching and mirroring behaviours of tutors, mentors, 
community leaders, political groups, religious congregations, youth groups, 
printed media, or artists to individuals from infancy to senility, as well as 
being horizontally passed between peers.  The vertical inheritance of a 
certain genetic complement and the development of a similar visage to one’s 
parents constitute only some of the features that can be inherited.  Earlier 
generations pass on their stock of knowledge, way of handling problems, 
learned behaviours, techniques and insight, to later generations.  This stock 
of knowledge is constantly being augmented, updated, and reinterpreted 
with the experiences of each new generation.  These updates are passed 
horizontally between contemporaries, but also reciprocally, both from older 
to younger and from younger to older generations.   
Even the notion of “common blood” and “vast family” need not identify 
individuals that are genetically related to one another.  The meanings of 
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“ancestry” and “descendent” ultimately rely on how we understand family 
groupings.  How someone defines “family”—in terms of genetic, 
developmental, or cultural relationships—depends on one’s own embedded 
life history, i.e. the situation one grew up in, one’s religion, current economic 
situation, sexual orientation, community identity, life history, the others 
within one’s community, and how ones’ peers form their family units.  A 
wide variety of family groupings demarcated in a number of different ways 
depending on one’s cultural heritage are possible.  “Family” may include a 
much broader unit than the nuclear family or direct descendents.  These 
may include the children of friends or siblings in the mother or father’s care, 
neighbours, adopted or fostered children, community elders, half-siblings, 
partners, previous wives and husbands, or be structured according to 
matrilineal or patrilineal rules of inheritance.   
 Common blood and common history need not be coincident with a 
restrictive understanding of biologically or genetically determined common 
ancestry.  This is because “having a common ancestry is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a group of people to have a common history.  What is 
essential is that the group inherit a common way of life that has developed 
over generations” (Boxill 1996: 62).  This means that if an adopted child is 
taught by its adoptive parents their customs, behaviours, and language and 
has the same common way of life as them, then the child shares a common 
history and is part of the same vast family and is of the same 
(metaphorically understood) common blood as the parents (regardless of 
whether they are the same morphologically defined race).  
 The reason why this seems such a controversial conception of race is 
because it comes up against the morphological, ancestral, and genomic 
conceptions of race so pervasive within a Western, Anglo-American way of 
thinking of race as an unfolding of a particular set of characteristics encoded 
in one’s biological inheritance reliably transmitted from parent to offspring.  
Our individual morphological and behavioural differences are often reported 
as being down to our genetics.  This way of speaking has buoyed a strong 
belief that our “biology” or our “genes” determine our racial characteristics 
(Dupré forthcoming).  This understanding of race appears to be a sort of 
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Putnam-Kripke approach to races as natural kinds that defines races in 
terms of fixed underlying biological essences that are shared by all human 
beings of the same race.  This underlying essence has been thought 
responsible for everything from a human being’s racial morphology and 
biomedical phenotypes to the biological variation among different 
populations and the kinship relations in his genealogical tree.   
 
 
5.3 PITFALLS OF ESSENTIALIST AND PREFORMATIONIST VIEWS OF 
RACE 
 
 The belief in race as a natural kind or essence pervades many of the 
conceptions of race from Bernier’s to those of the present, and it is apparent 
in several of the above accounts.  Essentialist views attribute morphological, 
behavioural, and biomedical characteristics as all having a common cause—
an essence which determines all our racial features.  Underlying this 
strongly essentialized view of race is an assumption that an individual’s 
racial essence is preformed prior to his life activities in the world.  Although 
perhaps more obvious in some race conceptions than in others, the 
understanding of race as a preformed static essence transmitted from one 
generation to the next clearly underlies morphological, biomedical, and 
familial conceptions, and in part, populational conceptions.  This underlying 
belief in preformationism conceives of an individual’s racial characteristics 
as determined by his essential racial nature prior to his birth.  In the 
familial and morphological conceptions, it suggests that we inherit our 
racial characteristics completely from our parents, and they from theirs.  
Our racial genealogical inheritance then forms our complete racial 
inheritance and identity.  In the genetic, biomedical and populational 
conceptions, an individual’s racial inheritance is understood to be passed on 
to him from his ancestors, encoded in the informational script within his 
genes.  Racial traits—like all other traits, are simply the result of this 
preformed essence or code unfolding over time.  These racial essences are 
immutable qualities that are ontologically distinct from an individual’s 
ecologically embedded lived experiences. 
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 Conceiving of race as preformed in these ways effectively alienates us 
from our racial identity.  It does so by alienating us from our own life 
activities and locating the source of our racial identity outside our influence 
and control.  But relying on race as a preformed immutable set of 
characteristics cannot explain the changeability of one’s own self-
determination or those attributed to us by others.  These racial ascriptions 
depend on a sequence of historical events, a diverse set of environmentally 
situated factors, and the set of characteristics a person uses in judging one’s 
own or another’s race and cannot be defined once and for all.  This makes 
race a highly unpredictable and unstable category to use in making 
generalizations on the basis of physical characteristics, biomedical features, 
or familial relatedness.  Racial generalizations defined at one point in time 
or place may appear to be fixed, but may not remain fixed at another time 
and place.   
 Preformationist views of race take race to be a fixed essence, a stable 
set of objective characteristics or relationships.  It thereby provides stable 
and objective descriptions by which the natural divisions of humanity can be 
delineated.  But because these natural divisions were founded on the basis 
of, for instance, a set of morphological features shared by a particular race, 
one has already reified the natural racial division used to distinguish 
individuals on the basis of these physical variations.  Alfred North 
Whitehead calls this type of reification “misplaced concreteness” (Whitehead 
1929: 11).  It arises when we assume that our categories of thought coincide 
with morphological characteristics and other datum of empirical scientific 
research.   
 Our tendency to believe that our conceptual categories are concrete 
proves unsurprising to those who believe that we have a general tendency to 
essentialize the differences we observe. 
[F]ew candidates for laws of nature can be stated by reference to 
the colours, tastes, smells or touches or objects.  It is hard for us 
to accept that the colour of objects, which play so important a role 
in our visual experiments and our recognition of everyday objects, 
turn out neither to play an important part in the behaviour of 
matter nor to be correlated with properties that do (Appiah 1993: 
38-9).  
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The assumption of essential racial types as preformed identities underlies 
the belief that morphological and genetic differences are continuous over 
generations and can be naturally demarcated along genealogical lines.  
Although our desire to classify may be ineluctable, this desire does not 
guarantee our perception that there are distinct human morphologies, 
genotypes, and ancestries that can be easily grouped within fixed racial 
types actually corresponds to any ontological divisions in the world.   
 
 
5.4 A NATURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE  
 
 In the remaining sections, I draw from elements of all the conceptions 
discussed in the foregoing (but without their preformationist or essentialist 
assumptions), and offer my own conception in terms of one’s natural self-
construction.  Specifically, this account derives from Du Bois’ view of race as 
a group of people with a common history who handle common problems and 
Boas’ conception of persons as ecologically situated.  Employing Taylor’s 
metaphor of heterogeneous construction I show how racial identities can be 
the products of a human-organism’s natural self-construction from her 
diverse environments.  The constructive endeavour captures the causal 
reciprocity between an individual’s experiences of her racial identity as an 
embedded subject (with her own particular physical characteristics and 
multiplicity of cultural resources and relationships) and her experience as 
the object of other individuals’ racial ascription.   
This natural constructive approach to race conceives of a human being 
as an agent who self-constructs, organizes, and interprets her own racial 
identity utilizing a diverse set of dynamic relationships, embedded 
environments, and histories which she links together to form her racial 
identity(ies).  My approach to race is a consequence of viewing racial 
identity from an organism-centred perspective.  It takes the human 
organism to be the centre of his or her constructive process of racial 
ascription.  The agent determines what aspects of her environments 
contribute to her racial identity.  Her race is not transmitted pre-formed, 
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either from her ancestral relationship or contained in her genes, but she 
may choose to use these as contributing factors in constructing her racial 
identity.  How she links together her genes, outward morphologies, 
ancestral and familial relationships, cultural, national, and political 
environments form her racial identity.  This identity may vary over her 
lifetime and depends on whether she relocates herself within a different set 
of environments and how she interprets and reinterprets both the cultural 
and personal historical events of which she feels a part.  This is because how 
we identify our whole selves at any given time or place, or individual 
features of ourselves, is contingent on our own life history and the common 
history with which we identify at any particular time and place.   
 This view takes race as a continual process:  “what is essential about 
races is not their state of being but that of becoming” (Dobzhansky 1937: 
61).  Taking  Dobzhansky’s notion of race as becoming to reveal the 
phenomenological nature of an individual’s race ascriptions, I argue that the 
best way to understand the changing identity of individuals can be found in 
our continually changing situatedness within different environments.  One’s 
racial identity comes from the meanings one attributes to one’s bodily 
features as well as one’s way of living within different environments.   
Interpreting race as a continual interactive process of self-organization 
and self-ascription rather than something that is fixed means 
understanding individuals’ racial identity in terms of the links they forge 
between themselves and others and the meaning they attribute to their 
political, cultural, religious, class, and ecological affiliations.  An individual 
may change aspects of her racial identity over time, or she may find that the 
race attributed to her by others changes depending on the racial categories 
of different environments she becomes embedded within, e.g. if she moves to 
another country or community.  In this sense one’s racial construction does 
not stop.  What changes when one moves from one country to another is not 
just the politics, social groups, religious affiliations, or currency.  It is the 
individual’s whole phenomenology of racialized traits which changes—
different cultures have different experiences of skin colour, face shape, and 
religious affiliation.  These are perceived, understood, and believed to be 
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indicative of race in different ways by different groups.  A particular group 
may favour certain physical features over others.  What is accepted or 
desirable to those within the group might include some things which may be 
highly plastic.  They may depend on time of life, hairstyle, lightening or 
tanning of the skin, application of make-up, weight gain or loss, style of 
dress, employment or marital status, sexuality, gender identity, religious 
beliefs, or cultural traditions. 
An individual both sees herself, and is seen by others, as being a 
member of a number of different groups.  Her racial identity, like her other 
identities, may be modified.  She may also choose not to identify herself with 
any racial group at all.  It is important to note that while my constructive 
approach provides an account of the dynamic process of racial ascription, it 
does not suggest that individuals are impelled to interpret any of their 
characteristics, relationships, or environments in terms of race.  Race is not 
an inevitable source of identity.  Just as an individual may choose to 
interpret all or some of these factors as constitutive of her racial identity, 
she may also choose not to identify herself in terms of race at all.  The 
features mentioned in the foregoing count as sources of racial identification 
only if the individual chooses to use them as such in the construction of her 
identity in terms of a particular race or races.      
 
 
5.5 THE DYNAMISM AND DISSONANCE OF RACIAL IDENTITIES 
 
 Racial identity is an intersubjective process of recognition, 
reciprocality, and exchange between oneself and other human beings.  Our 
own self-ascribed racial identities and those ascribed to us by others may 
fluctuate depending on the constant flux of our environments.  This dynamic 
conception of race relies on the reciprocality between the identity we ascribe 
to ourselves and the identity that others ascribe to us.  As such, the causes 
of an individual’s racial identity can be understood as necessarily 
reciprocal—a dynamic product of one’s own self-ascription, the acceptance 
and recognition of this ascription by the race(s) with which one identifies, 
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and the ascription of an identity by others that is consistent with one’s own.  
Adopting the neo-Kantian vernacular of past chapters, we might say that an 
individual is at once both cause and effect, subject and object, of her own 
racial identity.   
 One may respond that although my conception of race works well 
when one’s self-ascription matches with that ascribed by others, it fails 
when these ascriptions are inconsistent with one another.  This leads me to 
ask what happens when there is dissonance between an individual’s own 
ascription of her racial identity and that ascribed to her by others.  In 
response to this, I highlight the importance of the role of others’ recognition 
of one’s racial identification and how reliance on the notion of “pure races” 
misrepresents the racial identity of those who identify with more than one 
race.   
 I begin with a series of examples.  In her travels an individual may 
find that although she is considered white at home, on holiday she is 
considered brown, and when abroad, black, depending on where, when and 
by whom her race is being judged.  Not all of these racial ascriptions may 
match her own.  This is not just a theoretical example, as it has been the 
experience of many Latin Americans and South Asians travelling abroad.  
Whereas in New England, light skinned Latin Americans and South Asians 
are considered white or “nearly-white,” these same individuals are 
considered brown in the American South, and black in the United Kingdom 
(Alcoff 1995 makes a similar point).  Variation in these racial ascriptions 
across different communities and countries may either be based on the 
identification of different features as definitive of one’s race or they may be 
different interpretations of the same features.  
 During the 16th and 17th centuries, the immigration, political, 
economic, and cultural relations between the Europe, the United States, and 
Latin and South America facilitated travel, emigration, employment, and 
marriages between individuals of different races and ethnicities.  In Latin 
America this resulted in a largely multiracial society where the majority of 
individuals were born to parents of different races.  To identify individuals 
within this society, a racial classification system was established in the 17th 
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century called “casta.”  According to the casta system, there were numerous 
mixes that could be arranged in terms of their social standing within 
society.  This system involved the fine-grained racial categorization of 
multiracial combinations that included the Moor (Spanish, African Black, 
Spanish White), Zambos (Amerindian and African Black), Mulatto 
(European White and African Black), Cholito (Spanish White, South Indian, 
African Black), Mestizo (European White born in Europe, Amerindian), and 
Castizos (White European born in Latin America, Amerindian, White 
European born in Europe), among many others (Andrews 2004, Cummins 
2006).  This classification system of multiracial classes was used formally 
until the second half of the 19th century.  
Although no longer a government approved system of class and political 
privilege and oppression, individuals within Latin America and South 
America still refer to themselves utilizing a modified version of some of the 
racial classifications.  Although some classifications still retain their class 
distinctions, others are used generally to refer broadly to individuals of all 
multiracial groups.  The name “mestizo” is now understood in Latin America 
and Brazil to be synonymous with any mixture of races or multiraciality.  A 
“mestizo identity” is shared by the majority of individuals living in Latin 
American and has been spoken about with pride by the Mexican philosopher 
Jose Vasconcelos, who 
envisaged una raza mestiza, una mezcla de razas afines, una raza 
de color—la primera raza sintesis del globo.39  [Vasconcelos] called 
it a cosmic race, la raza cosmica, a fifth race embracing the four 
major races of the world.  Opposite to the theory of the pure 
Aryan … his theory is one of inclusivity (Anzaldúa 1987: 77).  
 
 This acceptance of multiraciality as a common mestiza race is arguably 
unique to Latin America and South America.40  It contrasts with the notions 
of racial purity that underlie the racial divisions in the majority of countries 
outside of Latin and South America (Rodriguez 1992: 24-25).  The reliance 
                                                     
39 This translates to “a racially mixed race, a mixture of [related or] compatible 
races, a race of colour—the first race synthesis of the globe” (Yahoo! Babel Fish 
translator 2008). 
40 However analogous terms are used by Filipinos:  “sanglay,” “pinoy” “tsinoy,” and 
“mistisong,” which all originally referred to individuals born of Chinese Christian 
fathers and Filipino mothers.  Like mestizo, “mistisong” is now used to describe 
individuals of multiraciality of Filipino and any other race(s) (Tan 2001).  
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on racial purity is revealed when one analyses the underlying assumptions 
of the morphological, genetic, and familial accounts of race.  Among many of 
these, the notion of racial purity or pure lineages of ancestry remains—if not 
as an actualized ideal, then as a theoretical ideal used to understand race.  
This notion of racially pure lineages or individuals is particularly ill-suited 
for understanding the majority of individuals living in much of North, 
Central and South America, the United Kingdom, Europe, and Australasia.   
The reliance on race defined in terms of racial purity necessarily denies 
racial identity to those who are racially “mixed.”  Within these societies, 
multiracial individuals “face an unresolvable status ambiguity.  They are 
rejected by the dominant race as impure and therefore inferior, but also 
disliked by the oppressed race for their privileges of closer association with 
the dominant [race]” (Alcoff 1995: 141-2).  They are treated as either having 
no race at all, as racially impure or sullied, or as symbols of racial and 
cultural dilution.  By denying an individual this recognition, he is prevented 
from the possibility of acceptance within the group he may identify.  
Without this recognition, the construction of his identity is one-sided.  It is 
the frustrated construction of an identity which is unreciprocated.  This 
leads to feelings of alienation.  The result of his unreciprocated racial 
identity is that he lacks the recognition necessary for understanding his own 
identity.  This lack can affect his self-knowledge since it frustrates his own 
subjective experience.   
A multiracial individual may choose to overcome the feeling of being 
alienated from the community he is living in and partially identifies with.  
For instance, an individual who racially identifies himself as both black and 
white may gain recognition of at least part of his racial identity if he accepts 
the identity within the white community, where he is recognized, or 
“passes,” for white.  However, in passing for white his racial identification is 
still frustrated.  Part of his identity is “hidden” when he passes for white 
within the white community.  Although he is recognized as white in the 
community with which he partially identifies, this may be insufficient for 
his self-understanding.  For instance, the lack of recognition and acceptance 
from the black community may frustrate part of his racial awareness when 
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this is denied to him.  Although accepted by one community, he may 
continue to feel alienated—both from the community that does not recognize 
him and from himself.   
To deny recognition of this hidden identity is to deny the individual the 
bonds of “human solidarity built as shared emotions, collective 
effervescences, becom(ing) stamped into the shared meanings, norms and 
feelings that constitute the glue of collective identity41” (Moss 2008).  This 
alienation from one’s racial identity can be understood in terms of Moss’s 
notion of the “pain of detachment” (Moss 2008).  
This alienation can happen either as a result of the non-recognition or 
rejection by a group with which one identifies, or the divided nature of one’s 
own internal identity within a society that demands only unified racially 
pure identities.  This causes a crisis of identity or the feeling of pain from 
being detached from either part of one’s own multiracial identity or from 
one’s identified racial group.  Identification with groups of individuals like 
us can provide both the necessary recognition we need for our own self 
identification as well as facilitate a sense of community which is vital in 
avoiding feelings of alienation.   
 Seeking to reformulate a conception of race that encompasses the 
multifarious nature of racial identities, the heterogeneous construction of 
race is presented as a reciprocally self-organized notion of one’s racial 
identity.  Unlike preformationist and essentialist notions of race, it does not 
presuppose that an unambiguous racial self already exists or even that 
racial self-determination is a prescriptive ideal.  My account embraces 
rather than ignores the internal heterogeneity of individuals and their 
disparate relationships, environments, morphologies, and familial lineages.  
All can be possible factors by which the individual decides his racial 
identity.  The flexibility and the stability of one’s own racial ascriptions can 
be understood in terms of the ways in which individuals use the cultural, 
ecological, politically embedded environments to reciprocally ascribe racial 
identity.   
 
                                                     
41 Moss does not apply the “pain of detachment” to race but I have tried to show 
how my novel application of it is justified in the present chapter. 
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5.6 DISSOLVING THE DUALISM OF BIOLOGY AND CULTURE  
 
 In attempting to subvert the racist conceptions of race of his 
contemporaries, Boas formulated a conception of race which separated the 
biological from the cultural characteristics used to identify an individual’s 
race (Boas 1940).  The legacy of this dualism is evident in the dichotomous 
notions of race set out in the second section of this chapter.  The putative 
“scientific” or “biological” conceptions, such as those based on morphological 
features or one’s genetic complement, are considered as being ontologically 
distinct from the putative “social scientific” conceptions based on behaviour, 
familial relatedness, or culture.  Whereas those characteristics construed as 
“biological” are believed to be transmitted from parent to offspring through 
the genetic information contained within the genes, the sociological or 
cultural characteristics are thought to be passed on as the result of non-
genetic processes such as learning or imitation.   
Approaching race using a dualism of biology on one hand and culture 
on the other, although perhaps necessary for avoiding racist theorizing in 
Boas’ time, may now only be a barrier to understanding race.  My final 
suggestion for a reconstruction of the conception of race from an organism-
centred perspective is dissolve the dualism that separates the biological 
from cultural factors used to understand race.  In doing so, I follow Ingold’s 
(2001, 2004) suggestion that we treat humans as organism-persons that are 
at once biological and cultural, body and mind embedded within 
environments.  He argues that the problem Boas wanted to avoid and what 
we should continue to avoid is to equate biology with genetics; “the source of 
the problem is not the conflation of the cultural with the biological, but the 
reduction of the biological to the genetic” (Ingold 2004: 217).   
 Taking the dissolution of this dichotomous thinking seriously means 
that far from being separate and unconnected, our genetic, morphological, 
biomedical, national, cultural, behavioural, familial, and cultural traits are 
all different facets of ourselves as multiply embedded organism-persons.  
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The biological and cultural are simply different aspects of our biological 
personhood and not two sets of ontologically distinct characteristics.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
 
 
The overarching aim of this dissertation has been to criticize and 
reconfigure the ontological framework within which discussions of the 
organization, ontogeny, and evolution of organic form have been conducted.  
I did so by defending what I called an organism-centred perspective.  The 
claim that the organism takes priority in our understanding of both 
ontogeny and evolution is a central tenet of many versions of the 
developmental systems perspective.  DSP has typically been used in 
criticizing gene-centred conceptions of inheritance, development, and 
evolution.  In this respect my thesis follows closely Moss’s own 
deconstructive and reconstructive project (cf. Moss 2001, 2003, 2006).  
 There have been, though, very few applications of DSP, however 
formulated, to the concepts of homology, species, and race.42   
 I began my reconfiguration by introducing the popular gene-centred, 
selectionist, and interactionist perspectives of biological organization.  These 
                                                     
42 I have not come across any philosophical applications of DSP to homology.  Only 
Lewontin and Moss have explicitly applied DSP to the conception of species, and 
have done so only in passing.  Many applications of DSP have criticized gene-
centred views of adaptation and inheritance, views that relate to our 
understanding of species and homology, but have not dealt with them in their own 
right.  As for race, only Ingold (2001: 259 and only very briefly) has even mentioned 
applying a philosophical perspective of developmental systems to its 
understanding.   
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are typically understood using the metaphors of the internal unfolding of 
information contained within the genes, the moulding of a naturally 
selective environment, or an interaction between the two.  Understanding 
organismal development using these metaphors rests on viewing organic 
causation as concentrated within discrete sources of causal power—wholly 
preformed within the information encoded in the genetic blueprint and/or 
within the selective information of the environment.  These strongly 
preformationist views conceive organisms as passive recipients of their own 
organizational form from either the active design specifications unfolding in 
the informational genetic code or genome, or shaped by certain selective 
factors.   
 Instead of this linear view of causation, I offered a view of organic 
causation that characterized its direction as mosaic and circular.  The 
causes of organic organization are distributed across temporally and 
spatially diverse resources rather than localized.  This view took inspiration 
from Kant’s conception of organisms as natural purposes, at once both cause 
and effect of their own self-organization and Taylor’s metaphor of organic 
construction from heterogeneous resources.  This Kant and Taylor inspired 
view of organic causation was shown to be a consequence of the ontological 
centrality of the organism from an organism-centred perspective (as opposed 
to a gene- or selectionist-centred perspective).  I argued that the causal 
importance of genetic and environmental factors does not come from pre-
existing information either within the genetic code or the selecting factors 
within the environment but rather from the organism’s generic germs and 
capacities which enable its use of these features as resources in its own 
construction.   
I fleshed out what this ontological centrality meant in Chapter Two 
by utilizing both Buffon and Kant’s views of organismal organization.  For 
Buffon, organisms organize themselves throughout their lives through the 
joint action of their organic molecules and the internal shaping of their 
moule intérieur.  In so far as Kant’s generic preformationism relied on both 
generically preformed parts, (the Keime), as well as capacities, (the 
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Anlagen), his view of the organization of organisms can be understood as 
picking up where Buffon left off.   
The focal point of the second chapter was Kant’s regulative principles 
(i.e. God, the thinking subject, and mechanism, (cf. Kant 1781/1787: 
A334/B391, A646/B674 and McFarland 1970: 26-30), their use in 
understanding organisms as self-directed natural purposes, and various 
criticisms and amendments to these regulative principles provided by those 
studying physiology, comparative morphology, embryology, and cytology.  In 
assessing and extending Kant’s view in light of the recent contributions by 
Oyama, Taylor, and Moss, I suggested that these three regulative principles 
of reason needed to be augmented by a further regulative idea:  natural self-
construction.  Denuded of Kant’s transcendental idealism, these regulative 
ideas become facts about the biological world itself, rather than facts about 
the preconditions of all experience. 
This extends our metaphysics by enabling us to conceive of causality 
not solely linearly or even reciprocally (as Kant did) but as arising from 
heterogeneous sources which are organized as causes by the organism itself.  
Using heterogeneous construction we can understand that each causal step 
and each causal link in the journey to any particular goal state, for the sake 
of which the organism aims, is determined and orchestrated by the 
organism itself.  This means that philosophers of biology can reconceive 
what count as causes of the construction of organism-environment 
complexes.  They can do so by identifying the contingent linkages that 
particular complexes make over space and time among a wide range of 
distributed resources (including genes, cells, tissues, behaviours, trees, 
rocks, nests, and other organisms).    
In setting up my organism-centred view I diverged from a strictly 
Kantian approach to organismal organization.  My organism-centred 
perspective extends the resources available to the organism in self-
construction.  These include not just the organism’s internal stock of Keime 
and Anlagen but also the so-called external resources within its habitat, 
through its behaviours and interactions with parents, littermates, 
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predators, or prey—in sum, its spatiotemporally extended situatedness 
throughout the course of its lifetime.  
I then turned my attention to reconsidering some categories and 
concepts from this organism-centred perspective.  In Chapter Three, I began 
by critically assessing various conceptions of traits, homology, and analogy.   
I discussed de Beer’s (1971) empirical work and his claim that 
homology at one level does not guarantee homology at another level of 
biological organization.  I then showed how morphological traits that are 
homologous may be the outcomes of different developmental pathways and 
different genes (that are themselves not homologous to each other).  
Reflecting on de Beer’s work, I questioned how the concept of historical 
continuity could explain the ubiquity of developmentally plastic pathways 
and whether this affected what we mean when we talk about the concept of 
homology.   
In opposition to the neo-Darwinian view of homology I suggested that 
the biological organization of organisms does not have one cause—it does 
not arise simply from the vertically transferred genes passed down from 
parent to offspring.  Challenging the general acceptance of homology as 
exclusively determined by unbroken ancestry to a common ancestor, I 
showed through a number of examples that many traits are in fact the 
result of different recombined elements which have been inherited from 
more than one ancestral trait, although these are not considered to be 
completely homologous.  The bulk of the third chapter centred on cashing 
out West-Eberhard and Minelli’s proposal that in order for our conception of 
homology to reflect this mixed ancestry, it should be extended to include 
complete, partial, combinatorial, and mixed homologies and analogies.  I 
illustrated how this can be understood from my organism-centred 
perspective.  Reconceiving homology and analogy from this perspective 
meant recognizing traits as being constructed heterogeneously from 
multiple resources.  I argued that trait construction occurs within a confined 
possibility space, partially restricted by an organism’s “degree of partness” 
and its body plan.  These constraints enable it to make changes to certain 
features while keeping the rest of its body stable.   
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The fact that traits are heterogeneously constructed by organisms 
was used to challenge the traditional view that homologues and analogues 
arise from two completely separate and non-interacting processes:  shared 
ancestry and convergent evolution respectively.  This duality is exemplified 
in the standard dichotomous thinking in the philosophy of biology which 
takes similar traits to be either completely homologous or false homologies.  
I argued that if an organism’s traits are self-constructed from multiple 
interacting resources under similar constraints this sharp distinction is not 
possible.  According to the organism-centred perspective, mosaic traits are 
the result of a combination of different structures and processes.  These may 
be partially homologous and partially analogous to another mosaic trait in 
another organism which is generated by some but not all similar processes 
or structures.  As an alternative to the standard all-or-nothing approach to 
homology, my organism-centred view extended both the meaning and 
reference of “trait” and “homology” by including the similarity of structures, 
behaviours, and of developmental processes of organisms in terms of their 
complete, partial, or mixed homology (and/or analogy) .   
Reconsidering homology according to this organism-centred 
perspective is controversial.  It challenges one of the main premises of 
evolutionary biology on which the understanding of the conceptions of 
homology and species are based.  This is the assumption that the ontogeny 
of an individual’s life cycle is ontologically distinct from the evolution of the 
species to which it belongs.  Or more to the point, phylogenetic lines of 
descent are ontologically separate from individual ontogenetic life cycles. 
In addition to providing a reconception of traits and homology 
according to the organism-centred perspective, I also sought to tackle the 
ontological distinction between the evolutionarily significant genetic 
resources from which organisms are believed to directly inherit unbroken 
from their ancestor-descendent lineage and those evolutionarily 
insignificant extragenetic resources from which organisms are thought to 
acquire by indirect or broken inheritance.  In Chapter Four, this began with 
my opposition to the received notion of species—Mayr’s notion of a species 
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as a protected gene pool maintained by a stable environment.  Mayr’s BSC 
focuses on the gene flow between sexually mature adults.   
Rather than strictly defining species in terms of unbroken linear 
(vertical) inheritance of genetic material, I proposed an organism-centred 
view of species that combined Buffon’s historical-ecological view of species 
with Taylor’s metaphor of the heterogeneous construction of organisms.  The 
adult form of organisms typically used by the BSC to classify them as 
belonging to a particular species was shown to be just one of many temporal 
slices throughout an organism’s life cycle.   
I argued that species should be reconceived in terms of a Buffonian 
view that took them to be collections of organisms sharing similar resources, 
a similar habitus, similar capacities for sustaining themselves, and repeated 
generative processes.  As such, they are a recurrent succession of self-
constructed and reconstructed life cycles embedded within particular 
temporal periods and particular spatial-ecological contexts.  They are both 
cause and effect of the evolution of the species to which they belong. 
I also considered other means of inheritance besides vertical genetic 
inheritance from parent to offspring such as hybridization, horizontal gene 
transfer, maternal oviposition, and niche construction.  These revealed that 
the BSC’s reliance on a gene-centred view that holds species to be 
maintained by the inheritance of species-specific genes and a common gene 
pool is not justified.  I suggested that a common gene pool may be just one of 
many resources organisms of a particular species use in their construction 
and reconstruction over each generation.  To illustrate how this might be 
understood, I presented a series of examples of developmental plasticity and 
the heteromorphism among organisms of the same species at different 
stages in their life cycle.  These were used to show how the underlying 
adult-centred view of species taken by the BSC and other conceptions of 
species artificially restricts what count as species typical organisms.   
I began Chapter Five by outlining the origins of some of the most 
controversial and persistent concerns for those attempting to form or re-
form a conception of race.  These included the belief in race as natural kind 
or essence, reliance on morphological features conceived in contrast to the 
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(often white) observer, the cause of racial continuity among generations, the 
belief that raced morphological features, behavioural, and intellectual 
capacities are linked, the idea of racial purity, and the separation between 
the putatively biological and putatively cultural characteristics of race.  In 
critically discussing six current conceptions of race, I highlighted two 
underlying assumptions.  Firstly, many are based on an essentialist-
preformationist understanding of race that holds an individual’s racial 
characteristics to be determined by their essential racial nature prior to 
their birth.  Racial traits—like all other traits—are simply the result of this 
preformed essence or code unfolding over time.  Secondly, racial essences 
are immutable and ontologically distinct from an individual’s ecologically 
embedded lived experience during their lifetime.  By conceiving race as 
preformed in this way individuals are effectively alienated from their own 
racial identity by alienating them from their own life activities and locating 
the source of their racial identity outside their influence and control.  This 
experience of alienation was expanded later in the chapter with insights 
from both Alcoff and Moss.  I emphasized both the external sense of 
alienation of being rejected by the racial group with which one identifies as 
well as the internal sense of alienation that can occur in multiracial 
individuals. 
My own organism-centred perspective of race took Du Bois’ 
sociohistorical notion of race and combined it with Taylor’s metaphor of 
heterogeneous construction.  The human organism is at the centre of its own 
racial ascription as situated within a common history.  This approach took 
the human organism as organizing and interpreting its own morphological, 
cultural and historical embeddedness, directing its experiences, and making 
historical and causal linkages among these various factors.  Following my 
organism-centred redescription of racial identity, I showed race to be 
reciprocally and dynamically caused by one’s own ascription and the 
ascription given to one by other groups and individuals.  I endeavoured to 
capture the causal reciprocity between an individual’s experiences of their 
racial identity as an embedded subject (with their own particular physical 
characteristics and a multiplicity of cultural resources and relationships) 
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and their experience as the object of others’ racial ascriptions.  I was also 
careful to note that race is not an inevitable source of identity.  Just as an 
individual may choose to interpret all or some of these factors as 
constitutive of their racial identity, they may also choose not to identify 
themselves in terms of race at all.  Human organisms are agents who may 
self-construct, organize and interpret their own racial identities utilizing a 
diverse set of dynamic relationships, embedded environments and histories 
which they link together to form their racial identities.  
A number of opponent positions have recurred in this thesis.  The 
most prominent of these have been the commitments to preformationism 
and the numerous dualisms that separate features of organisms considered 
ontologically distinct.  In addition to these was the pervasive underlying 
assumption that there is something analogous to water’s supposed chemical 
essence, H2O, or a privileged set of criteria that can be used to identify 
organic beings once and for all, rather than viewing these as providing us 
with valuable snapshots of organic being at a particular time and place but 
not exhaustive of their traits and behaviours.  If the arguments in this 
dissertation have been successful, I will have created the conceptual space 
necessary for a new ontology of nature.      
 
 
Implications for further philosophical research  
 
 As preceding chapters have demonstrated, the concepts of homology, 
species, and race are reconceptualized when viewed from a revised 
organism-centred perspective.  But these are just three of many concepts 
whose reconfiguration is possible when viewed from this new vantage point.  
Others ripe for revision include the longstanding dualist conception of 
gender and sex; the conception of the individuality of organisms; the 
categories of healthy organism, normal development; and the dualism of 
innate abilities and learned behaviours within the philosophy of psychology.  
Below, I briefly sketch how my organism-centred view might be used to 
 254
reconfigure these conceptions, beginning with the dualist conception of 
gender and sex. 
  Whether sex and gender are separate categories of being human has 
been hotly discussed ever since Gayle Rubin (1975) suggested that the 
former is distinguishable in terms of a biological body type and the latter in 
terms of a cultural understanding of masculinity and femininity.  This 
distinction is widely considered to be between sex—conceived of as 
something that is beyond our control (a determined essential or 
predetermined aspect of our identity) and gender—conceived of as 
something that is within our control (expressed over our lifetime within our 
culture and interactions with others).  Like the other dualisms discussed 
throughout this thesis—the natural and social scientific, germ and soma, 
nature and nurture, mind and body—this dualism maintains that gender 
and sex are ontologically distinct categories.  This duality takes the shape of 
one’s body and the constitution of one’s genetic complement to 
unambiguously pre-determine one’s sex prior to one’s life in the world.  
One’s sexed identity is therefore ascribed for us—written in our genes and 
moulded in the form of our bodies.  This preformed “biological” sexed 
identity is conceived of as distinct from and separate to our “sociological” 
gendered identity.  Gendered identity develops over one’s lifetime within 
one’s culture(s) and understanding of one’s self-ascribed femininity or 
masculinity. 
 This dualist way of thinking is aimed at thwarting the possibility that 
the sexual dimorphisms in human bodies (e.g. whether bodies have uteruses 
or penises, ovaries or testes, breasts or beards) are external markers for 
internal emotional or intellectual capacities.  Separating sex from gender is 
believed to successfully separate what is biologically essential and 
preformed from what is the product of our cultural, political and ontogenetic 
activities.  Although arguably politically valuable at the time, this dualist 
thinking now seems to obscure rather than reveal the nature of sexed and 
gendered identity.   
 Understood from an organism-centred perspective, our sex/gender 
identity can be conceived of in a similar way to our race identity.  The 
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conceptions of sex and gender may continue to be used.  But instead of being 
ontologically separate from one another, they may be reconceived as two 
aspects of our situated, embedded experiences in the world.  These identities 
are grounded in our embedded spatial and temporal position.  Both sex and 
gender, like race, have histories.  These histories may include economic, 
political, religious, and cultural traditions that structure the meanings of 
sex and gender as well the development and experiences of an individual’s 
life history.  Using insights from Du Bois, we can regard ourselves as male, 
female, and intersex, or feminine, masculine, and multigendered in terms of 
a common history and similar problems we share with others of our sex or 
gender when we identify ourselves in these terms.  This history may change 
depending on where we live as well as how we live and who we live with.  
From an organism-centred perspective, neither gender nor sex is preformed.  
They are no more determined by our genes or morphological features than 
race is.  The meaning one ascribes to one’s sex and gender is a function of 
one’s expressed behaviour, actions and interactions with other individuals 
within different embedded environments.  Like race, our sex/gender 
identities are aspects of our heterogeneously self-constructed organism-
personhood.  We construct ourselves and our identities from distributed 
causal sources.  These might include our chromosomal complement (xx, xy, 
x0, xxy), whether we are insensitive to androgens, how much oestrogen and 
testosterone we produce, our susceptibility to breast or prostate cancer, our 
distribution of body fat, the form of our primary and secondary sex 
characteristics, whether we see ourselves or are seen by others as sexually 
ambiguous, or have been surgically altered, our contribution to 
reproduction, our sexual activities, the culture in which we live, our vocation 
and avocations, how we dress, keep our hair, eat, behave, talk, whether we 
wear makeup and how, our preference of sexual partners, and what roles we 
occupy with regard to our immediate and extended families, at home, in the 
workplace, and within society.   
  Another concept that may be reconsidered using the organism-
centred perspective is the notion of biological individuality within 
philosophy of biology.  The individuality of organisms has been variously 
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conceived in terms of a single genetic lineage—a unified group of diverse 
cells determined by the unfolding of the information contained in the 
genotype present in the fertilized ovum or as a functional whole or as a 
developmental unit (Wilson 2000).  In each of these characterizations, 
biological individuals have tended to be construed as closed systems that are 
impervious to external inputs.  However, this conception jars with the 
multitude of viruses, bacteria, parasites, biofilms, horizontally transferred 
gene segments and other “non-indigenous” cell types or molecular fragments 
found within a single organism.  Reconceived from an organism-centred 
view, an individual’s multicellularity is not simply determined as a 
functional or developmental program contained within the zygote.  It is the 
constructed product of numerous dynamic interactions, including genes, the 
properties and behaviours of cells, cell-cell communication, and feedback 
loops between different organs and organ systems within the organism as 
well as its interactions with chemical, physical, and biological processes 
throughout its lifetime.  The unity of organismal individuality is therefore 
contingent on a series of events—it has a history.  Understood according to 
the organism-centred view, an organism’s individuality is not the result of 
its genetic, functional, or developmental program prior to its life within the 
world.  It is the result of orchestrated ontogenetically extended self-
organizing and self-constructing capacities.  Organismal individuality is the 
result of a spatiotemporally embedded organic agency. 
 Thirdly, the organism-centred view could be used to reconfigure the 
ontological categories of healthy or diseased organisms and normal or 
abnormal development.  This would be an extension of my brief discussion 
in Chapter Two of teratological development.  This view would be an 
alternative to the view that normal development and normal function are 
biologically determined and scientifically discoverable objective categories 
(Boorse 1997).  As such biological normality is believed to be firmly based in 
biological and biomedical science (Wachbriot 1994).   
 But what is normal?  And how is this quantified?  It seems odd that 
“normal” would refer to variation that is statistically most common (as it is 
often defined), as variation is widely regarded as necessary for evolution.  
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Accounts of normal development, normal form, and normal function seem to 
assume that biological normality is a fixed quality of organisms—a natural 
kind of biological variation.  I think this view of biological normality rests on 
the assumption that there is an invariant species-specific program of 
development that normal individuals follow.  This would mean that 
organisms are normal because they are the result of a well-run species 
specific genetic or developmental program.  And they are abnormal because 
the program went wrong.  
 On an organism-centred view, normal function, normal development 
and normal form are perhaps better understood as normative categories 
that can only be defined within a particular embedded ecology and may 
change throughout an organism’s lifetime.  If one wants to retain a 
conception of normality, one might consider assessments of normality to be 
assessments of the mode of organismal self-construction.  This would 
include the resources it utilizes as well as the series of temporally extended 
environments, (e.g. that may be dependent on its embryological 
environment, maturation and care received by its parents, stages of 
ontogeny, or migrations) over its lifetime.  An organism’s functioning, form, 
and development only make sense in light of the organism’s lived 
experiences and its capacities for sustaining itself within a particular 
ecology.  Teratological, chimeric, and ectopic development of seemingly well-
functioning tissues, organs, and organisms as well as phenotypic plasticity 
are phenomena that could be relied upon in exploring what the categories of 
normal and healthy mean and their underlying assumptions.   
 Lastly, this perspective provides another route into the recent 
ecologically situated view of cognitive capacities that is increasingly popular 
in philosophy of psychology (cf. Wheeler 2005).  It does so in two ways.  
Firstly, it reinforces the radical externalism that claims that the mind 
literally extends outside the boundary of the skull.  By utilizing various 
different resources in carrying out cognitive tasks, these resources are 
incorporated into the mind.  Secondly, it provides support to recent 
criticisms of the innate/acquired distinction (cf. Griffiths 2002).  This 
distinction is important to philosophers discussing the nativism/empiricism 
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debate.  The idea that biological development consists in heterogeneous 
construction over a life cycle, a process that can avail itself of multiple 
resources, can be extended to cognitive development.  Indeed cognitive 
resources would be called upon in some cases of biological development.  
Recognizing this might lead us to suspect that there will be no way of 
apportioning causal responsibility to that which is innate and that which is 
non-innate.   
 Mindedness, like the other conceptions discussed above, can be 
understood according to my Kant and Taylor inspired organism-centred 
view as a phenotypic feature of human beings that is at once both cause and 
effect of its own construction.  This view would probably result in a view 
resembling Michael Wheeler’s (2005) account of situated cognition.  But 
whereas Wheeler arrives at his view by utilizing Heideggarian 
phenomenology, the view I have sketched above utilizes Kantian ideas of 
reciprocal causation and Taylorian ideas of heterogeneous self-construction.  
 The above constitutes no more than an extremely rough sketch of 
lines of thought suggested by the organism-centred view defended in the 
proceeding chapters.  
 In this dissertation I hope to have provided reason to believe that the 
organism-centred perspective is a fruitful one and motivation for applying it 
to other concepts.      
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